A proper understanding of both the limits and strengths of futures research requires some commitments both in the philosophy of science and in the philosophy of history. For example, those who believe that science explains by subsumption under laws hold that explanation and prediction are symmetrical. Similarly, those who believe that history is law-governed cannot find an appropriate place for contingency in history. On the view argued here, one can always explain where one could not predict. On the other hand, if it is acknowledged that action is structured, then one can say that some outcomes are very likely, ceteris paribus, and others not.
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