This study examines the legitimacy of political communication within the United States’ two-party system, focusing on voters’ perceptions of the two major parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and their respective candidates, Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, in the 2024 election. The analysis is based on a survey conducted in collaboration with the Emerson College Polling Center, comprising a stratified sample of 1,000 respondents, weighted according to the electoral significance of different regions across the country. The article compares voters’ perceptions of the legitimacy of political communication styles among supporters of each party and those of the opposing party. The results reveal substantial differences in levels of tolerance and acceptance of political communication across parties and candidates, as well as notable variation in the degree of perceptual polarization between partisans, candidates, and non-partisans. Drawing on legitimacy theory, the study provides a social interpretation of these differences through tests of proportions. The findings underscore the central role of tolerance in sustaining democratic stability and highlight the prevalence of communicative intolerance in contemporary U.S. society. Finally, this research proposes and empirically tests a quantitative tool for monitoring changes in political polarization across electoral cycles.
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