On the Immoral Campaign Trail: Conceptualization,Underlying Affective Processes,and Democratic Outcomes of Perceived Dirty Campaigning

Abstract

Dirty campaigning, which is understood as actions between elite politicians that violate social norms and democratic principles, is becoming an increasingly relevant phenomenon across the globe. Despite this development, we know little about which forms constitute dirty campaigning, how citizens perceive dirty campaigning, and how perceived dirty campaigning is associated with affective responses and political trust. We argue that the techniques and actions that constitute dirty campaigning go beyond uncivil campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques, as dirty campaigning also involves disinformation campaigning. Using data from a two-wave panel study (N = 524) during the 2020 Viennese state election campaign, we examined the perceived structure of the dirty campaigning construct using exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. We show that perceived dirty campaigning forms a hierarchical construct with three latent variables. Furthermore, we tested the associations of perceived dirty campaigning with negative emotions toward campaigns as well as outcomes related to political trust. Using structural equation modeling with longitudinal measurement invariance and controlling for autoregressive associations, we found that perceived dirty campaigning increases anger, frustration, and disgust toward campaigns, as well as increases distrust in politicians over time. We also observed that frustration toward campaigns decreases trust in democracy and that disgust toward campaigns increases distrust in politicians over time. We contribute to previous research by developing a framework for investigating perceived dirty campaigning as a hierarchical construct and demonstrating how perceived dirty campaigning can impair democratic outcomes.

Keywords

dirty campaigning emotions panel study political incivility political trust

Introduction

Dirty campaigning, which is regarded as actions between elite politicians that violate social norms and democratic principles (Mark, 2006; Reiter & Matthes, 2022a), has become increasingly relevant in politics (Fridkin & Kenney, 2019; Mutz, 2015; Sydnor, 2019). For instance, during the 2020 U.S. presidential campaign, the incumbent at the time, Donald J. Trump, frequently insulted his challenger, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., by referring to Biden as “Sleepy Joe” (Quealy, 2021). In the 2019 U.K. general election campaign, the Conservative Party’s Twitter account pretended to be an independent fact-checking service during a TV debate (Waterson, 2019). This has led citizens to perceive dirty campaigning as a prevalent feature of campaigns. For example, in the 2019 Austrian and 2021 German parliamentary election campaigns, citizens believed that dirty campaigning occurred more frequently than civil negative campaigning (Reiter & Matthes, 2022a, 2022b). In the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, 92% of the citizens perceived that there was more “mudslinging” than in past presidential campaigns (Pew Research Center, 2016). Moreover, politicians and the media have increasingly used the term “dirty campaigning” to describe forms of campaigning that go beyond a constructive debate. In Austria, since the 2017 Silberstein affair, politicians have frequently accused each other of using dirty campaigning (Völker, 2023). In Germany, the media outlet “Die Zeit” called the 2021 federal election campaign “dirty like in Washington” (Brockschmidt, 2021). Furthermore, in the United States, “dirty tricks” (Kamarck, 2019) and “smear campaign” (Goudsward, 2023) have become common terms used to describe dirty campaigning. In this context, the use of dirty campaigning has raised concerns, as it can contribute to a toxic political environment, disconnect citizens from politics, and have negative implications for democratic quality (Benkler et al., 2018; Walter, 2021).

Despite the relevance of dirty campaigning in politics and the media, dirty campaigning has drawn little attention in research. Although previous research (e.g., Jamieson, 1993; Mark, 2006; Reiter & Matthes, 2022a, 2022b) aimed to conceptualize dirty campaigning, we still lack knowledge about citizens’ perceptions of dirty campaigning and the democratic outcomes of such perceptions. Four research gaps persist. First, previous research has not considered forms of perceived dirty campaigning that go beyond uncivil campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques (Reiter & Matthes, 2022b). Second, the theoretical contributions of studying such forms under the concept of perceived dirty campaigning are not clear. For example, an abundance of research has already examined the democratic outcomes of various individual forms of perceived dirty campaigning (e.g., Brooks & Geer, 2007; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020). In this context, we also lack an understanding of how the concept of dirty campaigning is related to previous research on negative campaigning. It is unclear whether dirty campaigning is a subform of negative campaigning, an overarching concept that brings together several research strands, or a concept that is fully distinct from negative campaigning. Third, there is little knowledge on the outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning that goes beyond a mere replication of previous research on uncivil campaigning or deceitful campaign techniques. For instance, previous research has assessed affective responses to uncivil campaigning, such as anger, anxiety, disgust, or pride (e.g., Gervais, 2017; Lee et al., 2022; Sydnor, 2019). However, frustration as a potential affective response has been neglected. Moreover, we lack studies on affective responses to deceitful campaign techniques. Fourth, there is a paucity of studies on perceived dirty campaigning and individual forms of perceived dirty campaigning at the state and local levels. Most studies have focused on federal- or national-level campaigns (e.g., Feinberg & Frimer, 2022; Mutz, 2015; Reiter & Matthes, 2022a). The state and local levels have a different degree of proximity to citizens, can involve different policies, or reveal different electoral dynamics compared to the federal level (Fox, 2018). Thus, studies at the state and local levels could offer a more comprehensive understanding of campaigns and can complement studies at the federal level.

We address these research gaps in several ways. First, we argue that disinformation spread between political actors—that is, disinformation campaigning (Benkler et al., 2018; Freelon & Wells, 2020)—can also constitute a dimension of perceived dirty campaigning. Thus, perceived dirty campaigning may be a three-dimensional concept involving uncivil campaigning, disinformation campaigning, and deceitful campaign techniques. Second, to investigate perceived dirty campaigning, it is important to test the perceived structure of the dirty campaigning construct. This means that we provide a conceptualization of dirty campaigning based on objective characteristics that allows the testing of how citizens perceive these forms as dirty campaigning (Stryker et al., 2021). To investigate the factorial solutions suggested, we will use exploratory factor analysis (EFA). If a one-factorial solution is suggested, we will apply confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to examine the dimensional structure of the perceived dirty campaigning construct (Field, 2018; Kohring & Matthes, 2007). Investigating the perceived structure of dirty campaigning is essential to highlight the contribution of the perceived dirty campaigning concept. In other words, if citizens perceive the forms of dirty campaigning as independent from each other, there is arguably no need to study perceived dirty campaigning as a hierarchical construct. Third, we will conduct a two-wave panel study (N = 524) during the 2020 Viennese state election campaign to examine the associations between perceived dirty campaigning with anger, frustration, and disgust toward campaigns, as well as distrust in politicians and trust in democracy over time. Dirty campaigning was believed to play a prominent role during this state election (Halwax, 2020). In response to signs of potential dirty campaigning, several political parties on the center-left signed a fairness agreement, which was rejected by political parties on the center-right (Mitterbauer, 2020). Due to the aftermath of the so-called 2019 Ibiza scandal, the right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the party newly founded by Heinz-Christian Strache, the former vice chancellor and leader of the FPÖ, were expected to engage in dirty campaigning against each other and against the governing coalition of Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Greens (Seidl, 2020). Methodologically, studying this election allows us to test the outcomes of dirty campaigning at the state level, which has drawn little attention from extant research. Moreover, panel studies have the advantage over cross-sectional studies in investigating stability and change over time (Hsiao, 2014).

The Conceptualization of Perceived Dirty Campaigning

Past research has defined dirty campaigning as actions between elite politicians that violate social norms and democratic principles (Mark, 2006; Reiter & Matthes, 2022a). Two types of campaigning can be related to dirty campaigning: uncivil campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques (Reiter & Matthes, 2022b).

Uncivil Campaigning

Uncivil campaigning involves the use of incivility between political elites. It is considered to be a form of negative campaigning that can be defined as “any criticism leveled by one candidate against another during a campaign” (Geer, 2006, p. 23). Due to the broadness of the term “negative campaigning” (Haselmayer, 2019), most research has distinguished between civil and uncivil negative campaigning (Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Sydnor, 2019). Civil negative campaigning widely refers to criticism between political elites that avoids being disrespectful and thus enhances democratic conversation (Geer, 2006). When it comes to uncivil negative campaigning, there is still ongoing scholarly debate as to what it is and what it is not (Bormann et al., 2021; Rossini, 2022; Walter, 2021). It most commonly encompasses “name-calling, contempt, and derision of the opposition” (Brooks & Geer, 2007, p. 1) or “communication that violates the norms of politeness for a given culture” (Mutz, 2015, p. 6). More recent work has demonstrated that individuals’ perceptions of uncivil campaigning include insults (e.g., name-calling or disrespect), discourse (e.g., interrupting political opponents), modality (e.g., sarcasm or ambiguity), or context (e.g., calls for political violence) (Bormann et al., 2021; Stryker et al., 2021). Following previous research on dirty campaigning (Reiter & Matthes, 2022a, 2022b), it appears reasonable to rely on the most widely shared conceptualizations of uncivil campaigning. These include utterances, such as name-calling, vulgarity, or making fun of politicians (Stryker et al., 2021), as well as discursive forms, such as interrupting or refusing to listen to politicians (Mutz, 2015). Therefore, uncivil campaigning is defined as communication between political elites that includes norm violations in terms of insulting utterances and discursive forms.

Deceitful Campaign Techniques

Deceitful campaign techniques encompass unethical and disproportionate political practices (Reiter & Matthes, 2022b). These include actions or techniques that go beyond forms of communication between political elites. Such techniques may involve the illegal use of voter data for political targeting, illegal campaign financing, direct or indirect financing of news media for favorable coverage, push polls, or spying on political opponents (see Reiter & Matthes, 2022a). Taken together, deceitful campaign techniques constitute the systematic use of unethical or disproportionate practices by political elites that do not involve regular forms of communication (Reiter & Matthes, 2022b).

Disinformation Campaigning

To arrive at a conceptualization of dirty campaigning, we must go beyond uncivil campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques. A third form that has been neglected by research is the use of disinformation between elite politicians—that is, disinformation campaigning. Disinformation is generally defined as “false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit” (High Level Expert Group, 2018, p. 10). It involves deception, the potential for harm, and the intent to harm (Freelon & Wells, 2020). Disinformation is also different from misinformation, which is understood as “misleading or inaccurate information shared by people who do not recognize it as such” (High Level Expert Group, 2018, p. 8). Therefore, disinformation and misinformation differ in the intentions behind the spread of such information (Benkler et al., 2018). A third related concept, fake news, encompasses disinformation presented as news, and it is also used as a label to delegitimize news media (Egelhofer & Lecheler, 2019). In summary, we understand disinformation campaigning as disseminating information between political elites that is intentionally false, inaccurate, or misleading.

Given the above definition of dirty campaigning, disinformation campaigning may violate social norms and democratic principles. Social norms include being honest and truthful in interpersonal exchanges. If political actors do not adhere to such norms in their political exchanges, citizens may gradually disconnect from them, which in turn can foster negative democratic outcomes (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Previous research has demonstrated that exposure to disinformation campaigning can decrease trust in democratic institutions (Castanho Silva et al., 2017), and low trust in democratic institutions can increase the believing of disinformation (Zimmermann & Kohring, 2020). Disinformation campaigning also violates democratic principles, such as using facts and evidence in public discourse when providing citizens with information (Benkler et al., 2018). On the contrary, disinformation campaigning has the potential to manipulate the public and promote democratic backsliding, as evidenced by the 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol (Davidson & Kobayashi, 2022).

Perceived Dirty Campaigning and Individual Factors Affecting Such Perceptions

The outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning may not be uniform across various groups and can depend on political predispositions (e.g., party identification, distrust in politicians, or inclusiveness of debates) and personality traits (e.g., tolerance for disagreement or moral disapproval). For instance, perceived dirty campaigning by the least versus most favored parties can have different outcomes on the perceived harm of dirty campaigning on democratic quality or the need for dirty campaigning regulation (Reiter & Matthes, 2022a). Uncivil campaigning tends to decrease the approval ratings of the sponsor among political groups ranging from moderate supporters to strong opponents (Frimer & Skitka, 2018). Furthermore, citizens who highly value the inclusion and discussion of different perspectives in political debates appear less convinced by uncivil campaigning compared to citizens who do not value this (Goovaerts & Marien, 2020). Regarding personality traits, low levels of tolerance for disagreement can increase the negative effects of uncivil campaigning on political trust, political participation intention, and policy support (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Additionally, moral disapproval of uncivil campaigning can increase the negative effects of uncivil campaigning on interest in the sponsor (Feinberg & Frimer, 2022).

The Perceived Structure of Dirty Campaigning

Why is it important to study different forms of campaigning under the concept of dirty campaigning? Would it not be sufficient to study these forms individually to draw inferences about the democratic outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning? There are several reasons to advance the study of dirty campaigning. The first relates to the underlying components of dirty campaigning—the violation of social norms and democratic principles. Based on this common denominator, it is important to examine these forms in a single study to better understand the potentially similar or different outcomes they yield. However, this argument would not elucidate how they are empirically related. For instance, how do politicians use these forms in combination, and how do citizens perceive the structure of dirty campaigning? On the meso level, there is some evidence that politicians often combine different forms of dirty campaigning (Hameleers et al., 2022). For instance, Trump frequently applies both uncivil and disinformation campaigning (Jamieson & Taussig, 2017; Quealy, 2021). In a similar fashion, the 2017 Silberstein affair in Austria (Völker, 2023) and the 2019 fact-checking controversy surrounding the Conservative Party in the U.K. (Waterson, 2019) demonstrated that deceitful campaign techniques can be used in combination with disinformation campaigning.

The most important reason to study dirty campaigning as a hierarchical construct stems from the micro level. In particular, the perceived structure of the dirty campaigning construct is of importance. To study the democratic outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning on the micro level, it is essential to first examine if citizens perceive these three forms as dimensions of dirty campaigning. If citizens do not perceive these forms to share an underlying component, then it is redundant to attempt to understand them within an overarching construct. In this case, it would be more reasonable to study these forms individually or as independent concepts. However, if they do perceive that these forms share an underlying component, then it is important to study them within the hierarchical framework of perceived dirty campaigning. Methodologically, this involves two steps. First, we will apply EFA to test the number of factors for these three constructs (Field, 2018). Given our argument, we assume that a one-factor solution rather than a three-factor solution will be suggested. Second, if a one-factor solution is suggested, we will apply CFA. This would allow us to test the model with the best fit based on the number of subdimensions for the perceived dirty campaigning construct (Carpenter, 2018). Based on our reasoning, we assume that a model with three subdimensions, one for each form of dirty campaigning, would have a better fit than a model with one subdimension, in which there would be no distinction between these three forms.

Perceived Dirty Campaigning, Emotional Reactions, and Democratic Outcomes

We hypothesize that perceived dirty campaigning is associated with negative emotions through an affective route and that negative emotions are associated with democratic outcomes. Furthermore, perceived dirty campaigning is associated with democratic outcomes through a cognitive route, independent of emotional reactions. Figure 1 depicts our hypothesized model.

Figure 1.

Hypothesized model.

Affective Route

In terms of the affective route, we consider three negative emotions toward campaigns to be most important: anger, frustration, and disgust. Previous research has shown that anger, frustration, and disgust can be elicited by the campaign style and political processes in general (e.g., Flinders, 2021; Gervais, 2015, 2017; Sydnor, 2019), making them important to study in the context of dirty campaigning. We use appraisal theory (Roseman et al., 1996; Scherer et al., 2001) to explain these emotional reactions. Appraisal theory argues that emotions are elicited as a result of interpretive appraisals of events and situations, such as expectedness, control, goal relevance, or agency. An appraisal is thus a process through which values are determined for each appraisal factor. Anger is defined as an “aroused state of antagonism toward someone or something perceived to be a source of an aversive event” (Novaco, 1994, p. 22). Individuals feel anger when they assess a situation as offensive and are certain about the perpetrator of the offense (Scherer et al., 2001). According to appraisal theory, these aversive situations are appraised as being high in unexpectedness because the perpetrator would have caused a motive-inconsistent outcome for an individual (Roseman et al., 1996). Previous research based on appraisal theory has shown that different forms of political incivility, such as disagreeable elite incivility and incivility targeting an in-group, can evoke anger (Gervais, 2017; Sydnor, 2019). We argue that dirty campaigning as a whole is perceived as an offensive action because it violates social norms of daily interaction and is inconsistent with individuals’ expectations about the outcomes of political exchange. We thus assume that perceived dirty campaigning induces an aversive, unexpected event that increases anger toward campaigns.

Frustration is a negative emotion evoked by an undesirable situation one is unable to influence or change and is rooted in disappointment over the outcome of an event (Berkowitz, 1989). Appraisal theory argues that individuals react with frustration if they feel that their potential control over an undesirable outcome is low and if a situation is unlikely to be changed. Thus, they assign low values in their appraisal of individual control over a situation (Roseman et al., 1996). Dirty campaigning is perceived as undesirable (Brooks & Geer, 2007), yet it is frequently used by political elites. Hence, individuals would perceive themselves as having little control over the outcome of such an undesirable event. Therefore, we expect that perceived dirty campaigning increases frustration toward campaigns because it leads to undesirable situations for individuals with low appraisals of control.

Disgust describes a negative emotion that can be elicited by the violation of expectations of moral behavior (Horberg et al., 2009). Such violations provoke a form of revulsion reflected in responses to moral transgressions (Chapman et al., 2009). According to appraisal theory, disgust is provoked by situations in which the character of the instigator of a moral transgression is perceived as “bad” or even “rotten” (Roseman et al., 1996, p. 264). Thus, disgust stems from a moral domain based on negative appraisals of a person’s agency, such as negative evaluations of character. We argue that the sponsors of dirty campaigning cross a “red line” and commit such a moral transgression. Thus, perceived dirty campaigning can evoke disgust toward campaigns because individuals evaluate the sponsors of dirty campaigning as immoral or even rotten in character. To reiterate, we treat the concept of perceived dirty campaigning as a hierarchical concept comprised of three subdimensions: uncivil campaigning, disinformation campaigning, and deceitful campaign techniques. In this study, we treat these subdimensions as highly related; therefore, we formulate hypotheses about the concept of dirty campaigning as a whole rather than based on its subdimensions:

H1: Perceived dirty campaigning increases (a) anger, (b) frustration, and (c) disgust toward campaigns over time.

Democratic Outcomes

Political communication research suggests that emotions toward campaigns can affect democratically relevant outcomes (Sydnor, 2019). Affective intelligence theory (AIT) (Marcus et al., 2000) argues that this underlying psychological mechanism stems from interconnected processes between emotion and reason. This mechanism of mood congruity results in a consistent direction between emotional states and social judgments. Individuals who are primed to exhibit high levels of negative emotions will negatively evaluate the target of their emotional state. Anger has been found to decrease trust in government (Webster, 2018). As such, anger is a negative emotion related to a negative event perpetrated by another person, such as the actions of politicians that are perceived as negative. Thus, anger toward campaigns can negatively affect individuals’ trust in politicians, as well as decrease diffuse political support, such as trust in democracy. The latter may be linked to negative evaluations of the quality of campaigns as an extension of the quality of democracy (Norris, 2011; Warren, 2017).

Frustration toward campaigns can be rooted in disappointment with the quality of campaigns and low control over this undesirable outcome. According to AIT, the specific targets of frustration toward campaigns can be political candidates, as they are the main political figures associated with campaigns. Thus, high levels of frustration toward campaigns can spill over into negative evaluations of politicians and thus decrease trust in them. Frustration toward campaigns can also have negative effects on trust in democracy. Individuals who are frustrated with campaigns might have the perception that the low quality of campaigns is an indicator of low democratic quality and that this undesirable outcome is unlikely to change (Van der Meer & Hakhverdian, 2017).

Disgust toward campaigns can be linked to individuals’ perceptions that these campaigns violate moral norms, which can evoke a form of revulsion (Chapman et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 2009). Since candidates are responsible for these violations, we argue in line with AIT that individuals might develop negative evaluations of politicians as their targets of disgust and perceive them as having bad characters. Via this mechanism of mood congruity, such negative evaluations can affect evaluations of politicians’ trustworthiness and thus decrease trust in them. Disgust toward campaigns might also influence perceptions about the quality of campaigns and impact evaluations of the quality of democracy as a whole. As such, disgust toward campaigns can decrease trust in democracy. Taken together, we hypothesize that anger, frustration, and disgust toward campaigns increase distrust in politicians and decrease trust in democracy over time.

H2: In a campaign, (a) anger, (b) frustration, and (c) disgust increase distrust in politicians over time.

H3: In a campaign, (a) anger, (b) frustration, and (c) disgust decrease trust in democracy over time.

Cognitive Route

Thus far, our reasoning is that perceived dirty campaigning can elicit negative emotional reactions toward campaigns, which are, in turn, related to democratic outcomes. However, perceived dirty campaigning can also have direct effects on democratic outcomes, independent of emotional reactions. Dirty campaigning may make specific cognitive processes and bites of knowledge salient, shaping trust judgments independent of negative effects. We argue in line with the new video malaise theory (Mutz, 2015; Mutz & Reeves, 2005), which contends that citizens in their daily interpersonal interactions are used to obliging the social norms of mutual civility. They expect the same from political elites in their daily interpersonal exchanges (Brown & Levinson, 1987). We argue that these norms are not only applicable to interpersonal interactions but also to interactions within the entire campaign context. Once political campaigns cross the red line and become dirty, citizens tend to lose faith in political actors as the sponsors of dirty campaigning. Similarly, dirty campaigning can also be perceived as a negative indicator of the quality of democracy and thus decrease trust in democracy (Mutz, 2015; Norris, 2011). Thus, when politicians are perceived to “go dirty,” distrust in politicians is likely to increase, and trust in democracy is likely to decrease over time, independent of negative emotions.

H4: In a campaign, perceived dirty campaigning (a) increases distrust in politicians and (b) decreases trust in democracy over time, independent of emotional reactions.

Dirty Campaigning During the 2020 Viennese State Election Campaign

During the 2020 Viennese state election campaign, experts assumed that dirty campaigning would become a recurring feature, particularly of political parties on the right (Halwax, 2020). This was largely due to the aftermath of the so-called 2019 Ibiza scandal, which prompted Heinz-Christian Strache to resign as vice chancellor and leader of the rightwing-populist FPÖ. Ultimately, the governing coalition formed by the center-right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and the FPÖ was dissolved (see Oltermann, 2019). During the 2020 Vienna election, Strache ran for the first time with his newly founded party, Team HC Strache, even though he was expected to fail at the electoral threshold. The FPÖ was projected to lose more than 20% of their voter share compared to their 2015 Vienna election results (Seidl, 2020). Ahead of the intensive campaign, the ÖVP fiercely criticized the municipal coalition formed by the SPÖ and the Greens for their management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Vienna. This was in turn criticized by the SPÖ as “Vienna bashing” (Tiefenthaler, 2020).

In response to signs of potential dirty campaigning, the SPÖ, the Greens, and the New Austria and Liberal Forum, among other parties, signed a fairness agreement. This was rejected by ÖVP, FPÖ, and Team HC Strache (Mitterbauer, 2020). The agreement stipulated that the parties involved would not use dirty campaigning, which was specified as strategies involving disinformation, fake news, defamation, and personal attacks—which can arguably be considered disinformation and uncivil campaigning. Furthermore, they committed themselves to transparent campaign financing and an upper limit for campaign expenditures. These can be regarded as measures against deceitful campaign techniques, such as intransparent and illegal campaign financing.

During the campaign, dirty campaigning was mostly used by parties that did not sign the fairness agreement. For instance, in a campaign video, Strache criticized the “insidious Islamization,” “imported cultural conflicts,” and “high criminality” in Vienna. At the end of the video, the call of the muezzin was heard as Strache stated “it’s enough” (Hollauf, 2020). In a Facebook post, the candidate affiliated with the FPÖ stated that since the 2015 refugee movement, Vienna has become “the absolute stronghold of crime” (Nepp, 2020). A fact check revealed that this statement was misleading (Harter & Schmidt, 2020). A video on social media showed a candidate of the Greens speaking in Arabic. The German subtitles suggested that he would oppose the current Austrian marriage law. The frontrunner for the Greens, Birgit Hebein, criticized the translation as misleading and called it “dirty campaigning” (Oezelt, 2020).

Method

Procedure and Sample

We used longitudinal data from a two-wave, quota-based panel survey that was disseminated during the 2020 Viennese state election campaign.¹ Dynata collected the survey data during two time periods: August 7–24, 2020, and October 1–10, 2020, as the election was held on October 11, 2020. The time interval was about 6 weeks between both panel waves (see Hsiao, 2014).

Only participants eligible to vote in the election were included in the sample. The ID codes of completed cases were matched to those who participated in both waves. To test for careless responses, we adopted a conservative approach of excluding only cases in Wave 1 where the respondent took less than 10 minutes to complete a survey meant to be 25 minutes in length, which indicates that items and instructions were not read for a majority questions (Leiner, 2019). Individuals who required an above average duration to complete the survey were included in the sample because they could have clicked on the link but started the survey at a later point. Therefore, a longer duration did not indicate carelessness by default. Of the 1465 respondents who started in Wave 1, 802 completed the survey. In Wave 2, 524 of 593 respondents completed the survey. Our final sample size was N = 524. The response rate for Wave 1 was 4.36%, and that for Wave 2 was 66.75%.² The retention rate of complete responses between Waves 1 and 2 was 65.34%. We used a quota-based sample based on age (ranging from 18 to 66 years, M = 45.05, SD = 12.97), gender (50.95% of the participants identified as female), and education. Education did not fully meet the quota but was heterogeneously distributed among the sample (26% with a lower education level, 46.2% medium education level, and 27.9% higher education level). The age of participants who completed both waves (M = 45.05, SD = 12.97) was significantly higher compared to respondents who only finished the first wave (M = 42.85, SD = 13.51), t(1,324) = −2.94, p = .003, but the effect size of this difference was low (Pek & Flora, 2018): Cohen’s d = −0.165, 95% CI [−0.275, −0.055]. We observed no systematic differences in participants’ gender, χ²(1, N = 802) = 0.27, p = .604, and education, χ²(6, N = 802) = 5.77, p = .449.

Measures

Proofs of all measures used are reported in Appendix Table A1. Our measure of perceived dirty campaigning comprised nine items, with three per subdimension. All items specifically referred to the participants’ perceptions of the campaign. The uncivil campaigning items were derived from previous research (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Stryker et al., 2021), and the items on disinformation campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques were based on our own conceptualization (T1: α = .90, M = 4.49, SD = 1.17; T2: α = .90, M = 4.27, SD = 1.14). We assessed emotional reactions toward campaigns by asking participants, in thinking about the style of the Viennese election campaign and behavior of the political parties, how frequently they felt anger and wrath (T1: Spearman–Brown coefficient ρ = .81, M = 4.80, SD = 1.57; T2: ρ = .82, M = 4.78, SD = 1.57), frustration and disappointment (T1: ρ = .77, M = 4.78, SD = 1.58; T2: ρ = .74, M = 4.69, SD = 1.57), and disgust and revulsion (T1: ρ = .84, M = 3.97, SD = 1.80; T2: ρ = .83, M = 4.02, SD = 1.81) (Matthes & Beyer, 2017). Our measure distrust in politicians was derived from a scale developed by Craig et al. (1990) (T1: ρ = .79, M = 4.23, SD = 1.52; T2: ρ = .78, M = 4.15, SD = 1.48). To measure trust in democracy, we relied on a scale by Wagner et al. (2018) (T1: ρ = .88, M = 4.30, SD = 1.61; T2: ρ = .90, M = 4.48, SD = 1.65).

In our statistical models, we controlled for demographics (i.e., age, gender, and education level), political ideology at Time 2 (M = 4.50, SD = 2.26), and political knowledge (T1: α = .75, M = 6.55, SD = 2.65; T2: α = .71, M = 7.35, SD = 2.43) (Wagner et al., 2018). We also controlled for perceived civil negative campaigning (T1: α = .84, M = 3.30, SD = 1.04; T2: α = .85, M = 3.58, SD = 1.07) to examine potentially different associations with the outcome variables compared to perceived dirty campaigning. A correlation table with all variables (except demographics) is provided in Appendix Table A2.

Data Analysis

We carried out structural equation modeling (SEM) with latent variable analysis using Amos 26 (Arbuckle, 2019). To determine model fit, we used the chi-squared to degrees-of-freedom ratio (χ2/df), the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker–Lewis index (TLI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (Weston & Gore, 2006). We ran models with lagged dependent variables and included the autoregressive paths in our analysis. Autoregressive models explain changes between the dependent variables at T1 to T2 that are not explained by individuals’ T1 scores, thus decreasing the number of problems related to omitted variable bias, selection bias, or reverse causation. To ensure metric invariance, we constrained all latent factor loadings of the same constructs across measurement occasions as equal among groups. We found no statistically significant difference between the unconstrained and constrained models, χ²(5, N = 524) = 4.42, p = .491. Therefore, the constructs showed metrical invariance over time.

Results

Factor Analyses

We performed EFA of the perceived dirty campaigning scale at T1 using maximum likelihood estimation with oblique rotation (oblimin) (see Appendix Table A3 for full results). The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) measure (KMO = .93) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ²(36, N = 524) = 2193.42, p < .001, indicated that the correlation structure is adequate for factor analysis (see Field, 2018). The EFA showed that all items loaded on one factor, suggesting a one-factor solution. The results showed that one component had an eigenvalue over 1 and explained 55.70% of the variance. The eigenvalues of the other eight components ranged from 0.76 to 0.33. Regarding factor loadings, a minimum criterion level of .40 was applied. All factor loadings ranged from .59 to .79. CFA of the dirty campaigning concept was conducted using maximum likelihood estimation. CFA with three latent variables comprising one hierarchical factor revealed a good model fit, χ² (71, N = 524) = 199.90, CFI = .98, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [0.03, 0.07]. We also performed a nested model comparison with nine manifest variables comprising one hierarchical factor that yielded a worse fit than our initial model, χ²(27, N = 524) = 79.17, CFI = .98, TLI = .97, RMSEA = 0.06, 90% CI [0.05, 0.08].

Hypotheses Tests

Table 1 and Figure 2 show all findings. Our full constrained model that included all outcomes and controls revealed a good fit: CFI = 0.98, χ²/df = 1.48, p < .001, RMSEA = 0.03, 90% CI [0.025, 0.035], PCLOSE = 1.00. H1 posited that perceived dirty campaigning increases (a) anger, (b) frustration, and (c) disgust. Our results confirmed H1a, H1b, and H1c, indicating a significant positive association between perceived dirty campaigning at T1 and anger (b = 0.22, SE = 0.08, p = .007), frustration (b = 0.19, SE = 0.09, p = .038), and disgust (b = 0.22, SE = 0.10, p = .029) at T2. These findings suggest that every one unit increase in perceived dirty campaigning at T1 increased the predicted value for anger by 0.22, frustration by 0.19, and disgust by 0.22 units at T2.

Table 1.

Results of the Hypothesized Latent Variable Structural Equation Model.

Variables	Anger (T2)	Frustration (T2)	Disgust (T2)	Distrust in Politicians (T2)	Trust in Democracy (T2)
Female (T1)	0.02 (0.12)	−0.04 (0.13)	−0.16 (0.15)	0.10 (0.11)	0.11 (0.13)
Age (T1)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	−0.01* (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
High education (T1)	−0.05 (0.13)	0.07 (0.14)	−0.01 (0.15)	0.01 (0.11)	0.00 (0.12)
Ideology (T2)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)
Political knowledge (T1)	−0.00 (0.02)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Perceived civil negative campaigning (T1)	0.05 (0.07)	−0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.08)	0.05 (0.06)	0.14* (0.07)
Perceived dirty campaigning (T1)	0.22** (0.08)	0.19* (0.09)	0.22* (0.10)	0.28*** (0.08)	0.07 (0.09)
Anger (T1)	0.50*** (0.05)	—	—	−0.14 (0.16)	0.38 (0.20)
Frustration (T1)	—	0.56*** (0.06)	—	−0.01 (0.16)	−0.41* (0.20)
Disgust (T1)	—	—	0.57*** (0.05)	0.14** (0.05)	−0.03 (0.06)
Distrust in politicians (T1)	—	—	—	0.43*** (0.08)	−0.05 (0.09)
Trust in democracy (T1)	—	—	—	−0.16** (0.05)	0.65*** (0.06)
Adjusted R ²	0.33	0.39	0.38	0.63	0.60

Note. Suffix “toward campaign” omitted for variables “anger,” “frustration,” and “disgust.” Standard errors in parentheses. N = 524. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2.

p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.

Figure 2.

Effect associations of hypothesized model.

H2a and H2b were rejected because we observed no significant association between anger (b = −0.14, SE = 0.16, p = .372) or frustration (b = −0.01, SE = 0.16, p = .967) at T1 and distrust in politicians at T2. Supporting H2c, disgust at T1 had a significant positive association with distrust in politicians at T2 (b = 0.14, SE = 0.05, p = .005). Every one unit increase in disgust at T1 increased the predicted value for distrust in politicians at T2 by 0.14 units.

H3 expected that in evaluating a campaign, (a) anger, (b) frustration, and (c) disgust would decrease trust in democracy over time. H3a and H3c were rejected, as there was no significant association between anger (b = 0.38, SE = 0.20, p = .053) or disgust (b = −0.03, SE = 0.06, p = .58) at T1 and trust in democracy at T2. We found support for H3b, as revealed by the significant negative association between frustration at T1 and trust in democracy at T2 (b = −0.41, SE = 0.20, p = .038). Thus, every one unit increase in frustration at T1 decreased the predicted value for trust in democracy by 0.41 units at T2.

Regarding H4, we postulated that in evaluating a campaign, perceived dirty campaigning directly (a) increases distrust in politicians and (b) decreases trust in democracy over time, independent of emotional reactions toward campaigns. Supporting H4a, the results revealed a significant positive association between perceived dirty campaigning at T1 and distrust in politicians at T2 (b = 0.28, SE = 0.08, p < .001). This means that every one unit increase in perceived dirty campaigning at T1 led to 0.28 units increase in the predicted value of distrust in politicians at T2. H4b was not confirmed because we found no significant association between perceived dirty campaigning at T1 and trust in democracy at T2 (b = 0.07, SE = 0.09, p = .456).

Additionally, age at T1 was negatively associated with disgust toward campaigns at T2 (b = −0.01, SE = 0.01, p = .023). Ideology at T2 was positively associated with distrust in politicians at T2 (b = 0.08, SE = 0.03, p = .003) and negatively associated with trust in democracy at T2 (b = −0.06, SE = 0.03, p = .029). Political knowledge at T1 was negatively associated with disgust toward campaigns at T2 (b = −0.06, SE = 0.03, p = .033) and positively associated with trust in democracy at T2 (b = 0.05, SE = 0.02, p = .046). Perceived negative campaigning at T1 was positively associated with trust in democracy at T2 (b = 0.14, SE = 0.07, p = .033). Trust in democracy at T1 was negatively associated with distrust in politicians at T2 (b = −0.16, SE = 0.05, p = .001).

Discussion

Dirty campaigning is generally regarded as actions between political elites that violate social norms and democratic principles (Jamieson, 1993; Mark, 2006; Reiter & Matthes, 2022a). In this article, we argued that forms of dirty campaigning may go beyond previous conceptualizations of uncivil campaigning and deceitful campaign techniques (Reiter & Matthes, 2022b) and also involve disinformation campaigning—that is, the spread of information between political elites that is intentionally false, inaccurate, or misleading (High Level Expert Group, 2018). We demonstrated that studying these forms under the multidimensional construct of dirty campaigning is important because they share an underlying component and citizens perceive them as intertwined. EFA suggested a one-factor solution for our construct, and CFA with three latent factors comprising one hierarchical factor revealed good model fit. Additionally, our measure of perceived dirty campaigning was highly reliable. Given this evidence, we demonstrated that citizens perceive dirty campaigning as actions between elite politicians that violate social norms and democratic principles. Such forms include uncivil campaigning, disinformation campaigning, and deceitful campaign techniques.

Our conceptualization contributes to previous research because it provides a framework for studying these forms under the umbrella of dirty campaigning. This means if researchers aim to investigate the outcomes of uncivil campaigning, disinformation campaigning, and deceitful campaign techniques through a single study or to compare them with more civil forms of campaigning, they should study these three forms as a hierarchical construct. Most importantly, this still allows the testing of these forms of campaigning independently of each other in separate studies, as most previous research has done. For instance, one can investigate civil versus uncivil campaigning or truthful information versus disinformation in a separate study.

In a two-wave, quota-based panel study carried out during the 2020 Viennese election campaign, we applied SEM with measurement invariance and controlled for autoregressive effects. We found that perceived dirty campaigning increases anger, frustration, and disgust toward campaigns over time. These results pertaining to the affective route suggest that perceived dirty campaigning increases negatively valenced emotions over the course of a campaign. Regarding the positive association between perceived dirty campaigning and anger toward campaigns, this means that citizens may perceive dirty campaigning as an aversive event (Sydnor, 2019). Such situations are assessed as violations of social norms (e.g., mutual politeness and respect). Citizens expect political actors to adhere to such norms (Mutz & Reeves, 2005). If political actors fail to do so, then citizens experience an aroused state of antagonism toward political actors and campaigns as a whole.

Regarding the positive relationship between perceived dirty campaigning and frustration toward campaigns, our results demonstrated that dirty campaigning could evoke a feeling of disappointment toward campaigns. This finding demonstrates that dirty campaigning is perceived as an undesirable outcome that increases the feeling that the campaigning style of political actors is “out of control” for citizens to change (Berkowitz, 1989). This indicates a sort of unbridgeable normative distance between citizens’ perceptions of how political campaigns ought to be and how campaigns are perceived in reality.

Regarding the positive association between perceived dirty campaigning and disgust toward campaigns, our findings showed that dirty campaigning is perceived as a violation of moral norms that eventually evokes a form of revulsion (Chapman et al., 2009). This form of revulsion also occurs in situations in which citizens perceive the character of a sponsor of dirty campaigning to be “bad” or even “rotten” (Roseman et al., 1996). Thus, citizens who perceive high levels of dirty campaigning might reject the character of politicians as being problematic.

Taken together, these findings suggest that dirty campaigning has the potential to increase negative emotional reactions toward campaigns. These outcomes can be considered harmful and worrisome for the integrity of elections because citizens might be dissatisfied with political campaigns and thus gradually turn away from elections (Norris, 2014). These findings also prevail over time, as our results came from a panel study that controlled for autoregressive effects.

Our results on the relationships between negative emotions toward campaigns and distrust in politicians as well as trust in democracy draw a somewhat diverse picture. We found that frustration toward campaigns decreases trust in democracy and that disgust toward campaigns increases distrust in politicians. However, we could neither observe any significant associations between anger and frustration toward campaigns with distrust in politicians nor between anger and disgust toward campaigns with trust in democracy. We think that anger toward campaigns is more of an action-related emotional state elicited by a negative event (Novaco, 1994). Thus, anger toward campaigns might not affect political evaluations or trust-related attitudes but rather the action-related political behaviors of citizens, such a political participation. The insignificant association between frustration toward politics and distrust in politicians might indicate that frustration, as a feeling of disappointment in not being able to change undesirable situations, is not related to specific political actors but rather to more diffuse evaluations of political trust (Easton, 1975). This argumentation is in line with our finding that frustration toward campaigns decreases trust in democracy. Citizens’ disappointment with campaigns might be linked to more diffuse forms of political trust. This reasoning would concur with Norris (2011) who argued that perceptions of the quality of campaigns are important in evaluations of democratic quality, which constitutes a pillar of trust in democracy. The significant positive association between disgust toward campaigns and distrust in politicians can be explained by the revulsion stemming from negative evaluations of the character of a sponsor of dirty campaigning (Horberg et al., 2009). Citizens might perceive and reject politicians who use dirty campaigning as “bad” or “rotten” in character. This reasoning would also explain why disgust toward campaigns is not significantly associated with trust in democracy. Trust in democracy is a rather diffuse concept of political support (Warren, 2017), whereas disgust is more related to character evaluations of an instigator (Chapman et al., 2009).

These findings imply that some but not all negative emotions toward campaigns can have negative consequences for the quality of a democracy. Citizens might be disgusted by campaigns and thus experience distrust in politicians and lose faith in the responsiveness of politicians to their interests and concerns. Citizens might also become frustrated with campaigns because they perceive the use of dirty campaigning as a violation of democratic principles. Low levels of trust in politicians and democracy evoked by emotions toward campaigns can suggest, for instance, that citizens, in times of political crisis, are unwilling to support the proposed crisis-handling measures because they consider political actions to be generally ineffective.

Regarding the cognitive route, we found that perceived dirty campaigning is positively related to distrust in politicians, whereas we observed no significant association between perceived dirty campaigning and trust in democracy. As argued by the new video malaise theory (Mutz, 2015; Mutz & Reeves, 2005), citizens may associate dirty campaigning with a violation of social and moral norms and directly link it to politicians as sponsors. This kind of normative gap between citizens’ expectations and politicians’ actions can lead to increasing levels of distrust in politicians, independent of emotional reactions. Similarly, citizens may not link dirty campaigning to diffuse levels of political support, such as trust in democracy (Hetherington, 2004). These findings suggest that dirty campaigning could potentially undermine the legitimizing foundation of political actors’ actions and deeds, which may particularly backfire in times of political crisis.

Our additional analysis indicated that age decreases disgust toward campaigns over time. It may be that older citizens have more positive attitudes than younger citizens toward politicians and may thus perceive the style of their campaigns to be less morally reprehensible. We also found that citizens on the ideological right have higher levels of distrust in politicians and lower levels of trust in democracy than citizens on the ideological left. This could be explained by anti-elite and anti-systemic elements rooted in right-wing populist ideology (Castanho Silva et al., 2017). Furthermore, we found that political knowledge decreases disgust toward campaigns and increases trust in democracy over time. High political knowledge could increase the awareness that moral transgressions by politicians during the hot phase of campaigns are a common phenomenon and thus decrease disgust toward such transgressions (Sydnor, 2019). They might also be more knowledgeable about the functioning of a democracy and its relevance for society than less politically knowledgeable citizens and also have more faith in democratic norms and principles (Hetherington, 2004). We also show that trust in democracy decreases distrust in politicians. Diffuse forms of political support, such as high levels of trust in democracy, may function as a heuristic for more specific forms of political support, such as distrust in politicians (Easton, 1975; Norris, 2011). Our analysis also revealed that perceived civil negative campaigning was not significantly associated with anger, frustration, and disgust toward campaigns, as well as distrust in politicians, and even increased trust in democracy over time.

Limitations and Future Research

This work has important limitations. Our study focused on the state level; therefore, the results may not be applicable to other countries and the federal level. Replications of this study in other contexts, particularly on the perceived structure of dirty campaigning, are warranted. We measured perceptions as opposed to actual behavior. This means that respondents may have over or underestimated the amount of dirty campaigning, although we statistically controlled for key third variables. However, to study the effects of dirty campaigning on emotional reactions or trust judgments, the underlying logic is that only subjective impressions matter for how citizens think and act. If respondents perceive a dirty campaign as unproblematic, then effects on emotional reactions and trust judgments are arguably unlikely. Of course, perceptual measures can be criticized because they are unable to elucidate the actual degree of dirty campaigning. Additionally, perceptual biases may have affected the results. However, research suggests that perceptions are related to actual campaign events (e.g., Norris, 2011). Nevertheless, the validation of this study with non-perceptual measures is needed, such as through experiments.

Our study did not investigate how moderators might affect the outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning. Future research should therefore examine how the outcomes of perceived dirty campaigning differ based on personal dispositions (e.g., party identification or personality traits) and different candidates as targets.

Conclusion

The aim of our article was to test the perceived structure of dirty campaigning and to investigate the associations between perceived dirty campaigning and psychological processes as well as outcomes of political trust. We showed that dirty campaigning is perceived as a hierarchical construct, with uncivil campaigning, disinformation campaigning, and deceitful campaign techniques as subdimensions. We demonstrated that dirty campaigning has important negative consequences for democratically relevant outcomes, albeit via different routes. These findings suggest that “going dirty” in a political campaign may backfire. Dirty campaigning can evoke negative emotional reactions toward campaigns and diminish trust in politicians, which may not only affect the functioning of democracy as a whole but also how the performance of politicians is evaluated by citizens.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-abs-10.1177_00027642241240335 – Supplemental material for On the Immoral Campaign Trail: Conceptualization, Underlying Affective Processes, and Democratic Outcomes of Perceived Dirty Campaigning

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-abs-10.1177_00027642241240335 for On the Immoral Campaign Trail: Conceptualization, Underlying Affective Processes, and Democratic Outcomes of Perceived Dirty Campaigning by Franz Reiter and Jörg Matthes in American Behavioral Scientist

Footnotes

Data Availability Statement

Data openly available in Open Science Framework (OSF) at

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the uni:docs Fellowship Program of the University of Vienna.

Pre-Registration Statement

This study is not pre-registered.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author Biographies

Franz Reiter is a PhD candidate at the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna. His main research interests include dirty campaigning, media contents and effects, and political communication.

Jörg Matthes (PhD, University of Zurich) is a professor in communication science and director of the Department of Communication at the University of Vienna. His research interests include political communication, digital media, advertising, and quantitative methods.

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