Two major types of motivation underlie the ability of leaders to gain cooperation in groups. First is the desire of people to gain rewards and avoid punishments. Leaders can tap into such motivations to the extent that they control resources and/or instruments of surveillance and sanctioning. Second is people's internal attitudes and values, which shape what people want or feel they ought to do. Leaders can draw on these internal motivations by appealing to or creating attitudes and values. Both strategies influence behavior, but there are clear advantages to leadership based on connecting to people's attitudes and values. In particular, people voluntarily follow leaders who engage their internal motivations.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
Brann, P. , & Foddy, M. (1988). Trust and consumption of a deteriorating common resource. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 31, 615-630.
2.
Deci, E. L. (1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum.
3.
Deci, E. L. (1980). The psychology of self-determination. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
4.
Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money: An economic theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
5.
Gaertner, S. L. , & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing intergroup bias: The common ingroup identify model. London: Psychology Press.
6.
Gold, M. (1999). The complete social scientist: A Kurt Lewin reader. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
7.
Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
8.
Hogg, M. , & Abrams, D. (1988). Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes. London: Routledge.
9.
Huo, Y. J. , Smith, H. J., Tyler, T. R., & Lind, E. A. (1996). Superordinate identification, subgroup identification, and justice concerns. Psychological Science, 7, 40-45.
10.
Kelman, H. C. , & Hamilton, V. L. (1989). Crimes of obedience. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
11.
Kramer, R. M. (1990). The effects of resource scarcity on group conflict and cooperation. Advances in Group Processes, 7, 151-177.
12.
Lepper, M. R. , & Greene, D. (Eds.). (1978). The hidden costs of reward: New perspectives on the psychology of human motivation. Hillsdale, NY: Erlbaum.
13.
Levi, M. (1997). Consent, dissent, and patriotism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
14.
MacCoun, R. J. (1993). Drugs and the law: A psychological analysis of drug prohibition. Psychological Bulletin, 113, 497-512.
15.
Messick, D. M. , & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 11-44.
16.
Messick, D. M. , Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P. E., & Lui, L. (1983). Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 294-309.
17.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Praeger.
18.
Robinson, P. H. , & Darley, J. M. (1995). Justice, liability, and blame: Community views and the criminal law. San Francisco: Westview Press.
19.
Rutte, C. G. , & Wilke, H.A.M. (1984). Social dilemmas and leadership. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 105-121.
20.
Samuelson, C. D. (1991). Perceived task difficulty, causal attributions, and preferences for structural change in resource dilemmas. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 181-187.
21.
Samuelson, C. D. , & Messick, D. M. (1986a). Alternative structural solutions to resource dilemmas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 139-155.
22.
Samuelson, C. D. , & Messick, D. M. (1986b). Inequities in access to and use of shared resources in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 960-967.
23.
Sato, K. (1987). Distributive of the cost of maintaining common resources. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 19-31.
24.
Smith, H. J. , & Tyler, T. R. (1996). Justice and power. European Journal of Social Psychology, 26, 171-200.
25.
Thibaut, J. , & Faucheux, C. (1965). The development of contractual norms in a bargaining situation under two types of stress. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1, 89-102.
26.
Tyler, T. R. (1990). Why people obey the law. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
27.
Tyler, T. R. , & Blader, S. (2000). Cooperation in groups. London: Psychology Press.
28.
Tyler, T. R. , Boeckmann, R. J., Smith, H. J., & Huo, Y. J. (1997). Social justice in a diverse society. Boulder, CO: Westview.
29.
Tyler, T. R. , & Darley, J. (2000). Building a law-abiding society: Taking public views about morality and the legitimacy of legal authorities into account when formulating substantive law. Hofstra Law Review, 28, 707-739.
30.
Tyler, T. R. , & Degoey, P. (1995). Collective restraint in social dilemmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 482-497.
31.
Tyler, T. R. , & Mitchell, G. (1994). Legitimacy and the empowerment of discretionary legal authority: The United States Supreme Court and abortion rights. Duke Law Journal, 43, 703-814.
32.
Wit, A. P. (1989). Group efficiency and fairness in social dilemmas: An experimental gaming approach. Unpublished dissertation, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands.
33.
Yamagishi, T. (1986a). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110-116.
34.
Yamagishi, T. (1986b). The structural goal/expectation theory of cooperation in social dilemmas. Advances in group processes, 3, 51-87.
35.
Yamagishi, T. (1988). Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 32-42.
