Since its founding, Hong Kong had been troubled with corruption. Eventually, the corruption became so serious as to threaten some of the basic institutions of society. In response, the government attempted an approach different from its past efforts. It created an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which immediately began to have considerable success. ICAC not only eliminated much of the corruption, but it succeeded in changing public attitudes. Although its powers are enormous, ICAC by and large has operated within the restraints set for it. Nevertheless, its existence is a potential danger. Its powers could be abused even in a society characterized by moderation and the rule of law. In a society whose leaders are less restrained, no legal changes would be required to operate ICAC as the enforcement agency of a police state. Its vast authority therefore becomes a direct, not merely an implied, threat.
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References
1.
1. For cooperative efforts against corruption between Hong Kong and China, see, for example, Bertrand de Speville, Annual Report on the Activities of the Independent Commission Against Corruption for 1993 (Hong Kong: Independent Commission Against Corruption [ICAC], 1994), p. 10.
2.
2. Frank Welsh, A History of Hong Kong (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 489.
3.
3. Stephen Davies with Elfed Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1990), p. 92.
4.
4. See, for example, Adam Y. C. Lui, Corruption Under the Early Ch'ing, 1644-1661 (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, Centre of Asian Studies, 1979).
5.
5. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 92.
6.
6. Peter N.S. Lee, “The Causes and Effects of Police Corruption: A Case of Political Modernization,” in Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, ed. Rance P. L. Lee (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1981), pp. 182-183.
7.
7. See Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, pp. 209-210.
8.
8. Welsh, History of Hong Kong, p. 490.
9.
9. Ibid., p. 491.
10.
10. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 114.
11.
11. David Clark, “A Community Relations Approach to Corruption: The Case of Hong Kong,”Corruption and Reform, 2:244 (1987).
12.
12. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 171.
13.
13. Welsh, History of Hong Kong, p. 491.
14.
14. The ICAC: An Introduction to the Independent Commission Against Corruption, 3d ed. (Hong Kong: ICAC, 1989), p. 5.
15.
15. See Anoop Gulab Gidwani, “The Impact and Accountability Implications of the Bill of Rights in Relation to the Independent Commission Against Corruption” (MPA diss., University of Hong Kong, 1994), p. 25.
16.
16. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 31. Godber's trial took place in Hong Kong in 1975, and he received a four-year prison sentence.
17.
17. Interview with Rosaline Cheung, Regional Officer of the Community Relations Department of the ICAC, 13 June 1995. See also Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 209.
18.
18. For statistics and information on organization, see the ICAC commissioner'sAnnual Report on the Activities of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (various years).
19.
19. Clark, “Community Relations Approach,” p. 244. See “Responsibilities of the Commissioner,”Annual Report on the Activities of the Independent Commission Against Corruption for 1993, pp. 6-7.
20.
20. David Clark, “Mobilizing Public Opinion Against Corruption: A Commentary,”Corruption and Reform, 4:124-125 (1989).
21.
21. Welsh, History of Hong Kong, p. 492.
22.
22. See the relevant annual reports.
23.
23. There were numerous press articles for several weeks. One that presents a good sense of the situation is Cliff Buddle and Mariana Wan, “Taxman's Right to See Patient Files Upheld: Ruling Angers Medical Bodies,”South China Morning Post, 13 Apr. 1995.
24.
24. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 405.
25.
Martin Lee is the author of “Political Developments in Hong Kong: Implications for 1997,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
26.
26. See Donald H. McMillen and Man Si-wai, eds., The Other Hong Kong Report, 1994 (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1994), p. xxii.
27.
27. Tim Hamlett, “Comic Crusade Just Isn't Funny,”South China Morning Post, 5 Apr. 1995.
28.
28. Sam Mok, “Obscene Power Stays,”Eastern Express, 21 June 1955.
29.
29. Jeremiah K. H. Wong, “The ICAC and Its Anti-Corruption Measures,” in Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong, ed. Lee, p. 51.
30.
30. Gidwani, “Impact and Accountability,” pp. 29 and 76. The authorizations are in sec. 13 of the ICAC Ordinance, and secs. 13 and 14 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance.
31.
31. Gidwani, “Impact and Accountability,” p. 60.
32.
32. Ibid., p. 62.
33.
33. ICAC, p. 7.
34.
34. Ibid., p. 13.
35.
35. Ibid., p. 39.
36.
36. Ibid. On advisory committees, see ICAC's annual reports.
37.
37. ICAC, p. 15.
38.
38. Gidwani, “Impact and Accountability,” p. 49.
39.
39. Ibid., p. 50.
40.
40. Ibid., p. 116.
41.
41. Ibid., p. 147.
42.
42. Sonny S. H. Lo, “Independent Commission Against Corruption,” in Other Hong Kong Report, ed. McMillen and Man, p. 27.
43.
43. Cited in Gidwani, “Impact and Accountability,” p. 125.
44.
44. Lo, “Independent Commission Against Corruption,” p. 28.
45.
45. For details of the Tsui case, see Gidwani, “Impact and Accountability,” pp. 122-135.
46.
46. Lo, “Independent Commission Against Corruption,” p. 43.
47.
47. Ibid., p. 38.
48.
48. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute, 1992), esp. chap. 1.
49.
49. See ICAC, p. 24.
50.
50. Ibid., p. 25.
51.
51. For obvious reasons, such persons wish not to be identified in any way.
52.
52. Lo, “Independent Commission Against Corruption,” p. 25.
53.
53. Davies with Roberts, Political Dictionary for Hong Kong, p. 211.
