While Hong Kong people are often characterized as politically apathetic, closer study indicates that such descriptions need to be reconsidered in light of Hong Kong's particular, and peculiar, history and future. The restraints of proximity to a soon-to-be-sovereign China and its position as a listening post, capitalist enclave, and refuge imposed psychological (internalized) and security-based (external) limits on formal democratic political development. Although there have been, and remain, vigorous structures of Chinese political influence and activity, with Chinese Communist Party and Nationalist China partisans estimated at some 60,000 in the early 1980s, political participation in colonial politics remained limited except for the village-based politics of Heung Yee Kuk. In a process beginning in the early 1970s, however, territorywide political structures were erected that encouraged the grassroots activities that laid a foundation for rapid political development in the 1980s and 1990s.
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References
1.
But see also Lau Siu-kai's criticism of the term “apathy,” in ibid., p. 14.
2.
2. The authors observed and photographed the events of 4 June 1989 in Hong Kong, and one of them conducted a survey, the first of Hong Kong demonstrators. Ming Chan noted that Hong Kongese “were transformed almost overnight from apolitical and apathetic residents of a colony to citizens of a threatened community committed to preserve their freedom and fight for their rights.”Ming Chan, “Democracy Derailed,” in The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” Under Chinese Sovereignty? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1991), p. 18.
3.
Guo Fengmin, “The JLG's Progress,” ibid., 11 Nov. 1994, pp. 16-17.
4.
Mary Fulbrook , The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 355-357.
5.
Miners , Government and Politics of Hong Kong, pp. 114-120.
6.
6. See Michael DeGolyer, “Politics, Politicians and Political Parties,” in The Other Hong Kong Report 1994, ed. Donald H. McMillen and Man Si-Wai (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp. 75-101.
7.
7. Joan M. Nelson, “Political Participation,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, ed. Joel Krieger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 720.
8.
8. The Basic Law is the “mini-constitution” for Hong Kong drafted by the National People's Congress in Apr. 1990. See Joseph Y.S. Cheng, “Basic Law—Basic Problems,”Free China Review, pp. 24-29 (Mar. 1990). Surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project also support the low level of trust reported by many analysts.
9.
9. The source of all the data cited is the Hong Kong Transition Project unless otherwise indicated. The project, begun in 1989, tracks Hong Kong political development by a variety of measures with an interdisciplinary and multinational team. Surveys are conducted by standard telephone randomizing methods of at least 600 respondents. Hong Kong has a telephone penetration rate exceeding 97 percent.
10.
10. In surveys since 1991—11 at this writing—a consistent 15 percent or so reject both British and PRC politics and refuse to engage in Hong Kong politics due to lack of genuine democracy.
11.
11. One year later, in another survey (618 respondents), 50 percent indicated LegCo; and only 7 percent, the PWC; 15 percent still indicated neither.
12.
12. Following the 1991 LegCo elections, banner headlines in the South China Morning Post proclaimed the end of consensus politics. Conservative forces desire its return, however, and the vice-chair of the Liberal Democratic Federation proclaimed it the basis for Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. “Letter from Hong Kong,” RTHK Radio Three, 28 May 1995.
13.
ibid., 5 June 1994.
14.
“Rights of Indigenous NT Residents Must Be Protected,”Ta kung pao, 30 Mar. 1994, trans. in Window, 8 Apr. 1994, p. 47.
15.
Ming K. Chan , “Hong Kong in Sino-British Conflict,” in Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992, ed. Ming K. Chan and John D. Young (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1994), pp. 27-57.
16.
“History,” in Hong Kong 1995, ed. Renu Daryanani (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1995), pp. 451-459.
17.
Amnesty International reported over 1079 executions in 1992, but “most are secret” and many are linked to corruption; see “China's Government in a Jam,” ibid., 15 Jan. 1994, pp. 29-30.
18.
18. See Welsh, History of Hong Kong, pp. 365-382, 455-473.
19.
19. The Preamble to the Basic Law says that China's resumption of sovereignty will fulfill “the long-cherished common aspiration of the Chinese people for the recovery of Hong Kong.” This “common aspiration” seems less prevalent in Hong Kong itself. Asked “If you could control history and choose whatever outcome you desired, what would you prefer?” and presented the choices of independence, commonwealth status, continued colonial rule, or reunification with China under the one-country, two-systems formula, never have more than 42 percent of respondents favored returning to China. A solid 25 percent have always chosen independence, and nearly 20 percent on average have preferred to remain colonial subjects.
20.
20. The description of PRC views is based on the following: anonymous interviews with seven pro-Beijing figures in Hong Kong; weekly South China Morning Post articles by Tsang Yok Tsing (chair of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, the pro-Beijing party) (Jan.-Oct. 1995); all articles in Window written by PRC officials (Oct. 1994-Sept. 1995); Ji Pengfei, “Explanations on `The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Draft)' and Its Related Documents,” in The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1991), pp. 106-146.
21.
21. The Executive Council is the advisory body to the governor and develops nearly all law and policy proposals. It is wholly appointed, with elected members of other bodies excluded by Governor Patten's decision. Under Governor Wilson (1987-92), some members were elected members of LegCo or other bodies.
22.
22. In years in which neither a president nor governor is elected. Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics 1992 (Washington, DC: National Journal, 1991), p. xxxvii.
23.
T. Wing Lo , Corruption and Politics in Hong Kong and China (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1993).
24.
24. Emigration following the Tiananmen massacre reached over 60,000 per year and has continued at more than 1000 per week. Most of the emigrants are well educated and well off. For figures, see Hong Kong Annual Report (1990-95).
25.
For development of consultative government during the 1970s under Governor MacLehose, see Melinda J. Parsons, ed., Hong Kong 1983 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1983), pp. 155-161.
26.
See also “China's Magic Tool for Hong Kong,”Economist, 18 Mar. 1995, pp. 31-32. Christine Loh, an appointed LegCo member, created controversy in May 1995 with her motion in LegCo to discuss the role of the Chinese Communist Party.
27.
27. Over 20 in Chinese and 5 in English; many are known for their political slant.
28.
28. Edith J. Barrett, “The Role of Public Opinion in Public Administration,”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 537:157 (Jan. 1995).
29.
29. Four local channels with several broadcasts daily; four full-time cable news channels of CNN, BBC, and Asia Business News; local news in Chinese; and so forth.
30.
30. See various articles in this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The authors were present during the Red Guard disturbances of 1967 and observed the intense political activity.
31.
Ming pao, 11 May 1995.
32.
32. Estimated by averaging the number of observed poll workers and multiplying by the number of candidates in the three elections. Extensive observations of the elections in 1991 and 1994-95 were conducted by teams of Hong Kong Transition Project members.
33.
Currently, Hong Kong has over 4000 MACs and over 70 Area Committees. See Daryanani, Hong Kong 1995, p. 35.
34.
34. Hong Kong Government, City and New Territories Administration, Model Rules for a Mutual Aid Committee in a Public Housing Estate (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1982).
35.
35. Aline K. Wong, The Kaifong Associations and the Society of Hong Kong, Asian Folklore and Social Life Monographs, vol. 43 (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972).
36.
See also idem, “Action and Meaning: Women's Participation in the Mutual Aid Committees, Kowloon” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1980).
37.
37. Scott, “Action and Meaning,” p. 213.
38.
38. See Hong Kong Government, Model Rules for a Mutual Aid Committee (1982, revised in 1988, 1990, and 1993).
39.
39. The importance of these trust-building exercises should not be underestimated. In 1921, the census was severely distorted when rumors went around that the government was using the census to discover suitable children to be buried at the foot of piers, to ensure stability of a bridge to be built across the harbor. See Norman Miners, Hong Kong Under Imperial Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 10. Until the 1960s, many people in Hong Kong believed it was a legal offense to criticize the government or complain about the police. Considering the crackdown following the 1967 riots, they were not far wrong.
40.
idem , “Local-Level Election Behavior in an Urban Area” (Occasional Paper no. 6, Centre for Hong Kong Studies, Chinese University, 1985).
