The political system of Hong Kong has evolved into a unique structure, conditioned by the fact that the territory is not, and never will be, an independent state. This article traces four broad models in Hong Kong's political development: the colonial model, the consultative model, the transitionary model, and the future Basic Law model (outlined within the transitionary model). Despite belated British efforts to move in the direction of democracy, China, which opposes such reforms and which is suspicious of Hong Kong as a subversive force, has the upper hand. Although reform forces are increasingly marginalized, there is room for restrained optimism.
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
1.
ibid., 90:17; respectively.
2.
2. For details relating to Hong Kong's return to China, see A Draft Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 26 Sept. 1984), known as “the Joint Declaration.”
3.
3. For details of how the People's Republic of China promoted the idea of Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, see Joseph Y.S. Cheng, Hong Kong in Search of a Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 72.
4.
4. The Basic Law was promulgated on 4 Apr. 1990 and adopted at the Third Session of China's Seventh National People's Congress. See The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Hong Kong: Consultative Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, Apr. 1990).
5.
5. See Max J. Skidmore, “Promise and Peril in Combating Corruption: Hong Kong's ICAC,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
6.
6. See Draft Agreement.
7.
7. Ibid., pp. 11-13.
8.
8. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
9.
9. Ibid., Annex XI, p. 26.
10.
10. Ibid., p. 26.
11.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12.
12. The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1988).
13.
See also Peter Wesley-Smith, “Law in Hong Kong and China: The Meshing of Systems,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
14.
14. For examples of China's reaction, see Beijing Review, 3-9 July 1989, p. 6.
15.
For evolution of LegCo, see Stephen Davis and Elfed Roberts, A Political Dictionary for Hong Kong (New York: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 260-265.
16.
16. See Commentary on the Draft Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Hong Kong: Government Printer, Mar. 1990).
17.
17. Martin C. M. Lee is the author of “The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Implications for 1997,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
18.
18. Rowena Kwok, Joan Y. H. Leung, and Ian Scott, “An Overview of the Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections of 1991,”Asian Journal of Public Administration, 13(2):13-14 (Dec. 1991).
19.
19. Following are Hong Kong's most important political groups and parties as of June 1995, listed by their name, the year in which they were formed, their chair, and their political position or nature: Reform Club, 1949, B. Bernachi, liberal pressure group; Civic Association, 1954, H. Cheong-leen, liberal pressure group; Federation of Trade Unions, prewar, Tam Yiu-chung, pro-Beijing pressure group; Trades Union Council, postwar, Pang Chunhoi, pro-Taiwan pressure group; Meeting Point, 1983, Cheung Bing Leung, liberal pressure group; Hong Kong Association for Democracy and the People's Livelihood, 1986, Fung Kin-kee, liberal pressure group; New Hong Kong Alliance, 1989, Wai Kee Shun, pro-Beijing political party; United Democrats of Hong Kong, 1990, Martin Lee, liberal political party; Business and Professional Federation, 1991, Vincent Lo, conservative pressure group; Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong, 1992, Tsang Yok Sing, pro-Beijing political party; and Liberal Party, 1993, Allen Lee, conservative political party. The most significant of these groups and parties are the United Democrats of Hong Kong and the Liberal Party.
20.
20. Kwoket al., “Overview,” p. 15.
21.
21. South China Morning Post, 17 Sept. 1995.
22.
22. See, for example, “China's Internal Affairs Brook No Interference,”Beijing Review, 31 July-6 Aug. 1989.
23.
23. Christopher Patten, Address by the Governor the Right Honourable Christopher Patten at the Opening of the 1992-1993 Session of the Legislative Council (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1992), p. 1.
24.
24. Ibid.
25.
25. “Fruitless Trip by HK Governor,”Beijing Review, 2-8 Nov. 1992, p. 6.
26.
26. Ibid.
27.
27. South China Morning Post, 15 Nov. 1992.
28.
28. See Christopher Patten, Hong Kong: A Thousand Days and Beyond: Address by the Governor the Right Honourable Christopher Patten at the Opening of the 1994/1995 Session of the Legislative Council (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1994), p. 23.
29.
29. The exact nature of that body has not been clarified, but it would be for more restricted in power than LegCo, and it would be appointed. Later, probably within 12 months, the provisional legislature would give way to elections, but on a very narrow basis, thus negating Patten's attempts at a wide franchise. Patten's legislative package was passed on 30 June 1994; the Chinese response is well summed up in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 Sept. 1994, p. 36.
30.
30. The number of Hong Kong delegates to the NPC increased to 28 in January 1993; of those, 6 were known members of the Chinese Communist Party.
31.
31. A “second stove” is a vivid Chinese allusion to a newly married couple who move into the parent's home. To assert their independence, they set up a kitchen within the kitchen.
32.
32. South China Morning Post, 25 Mar. 1993. The one offering the suggestion was Sir Lo Tak Shing, who had been a LegCo and an Executive Council member—he had once staunchly advocated British rule.
33.
33. South China Morning Post poll, Sunday Morning Post, 26 July 1992.
34.
34. South China Morning Post poll, South China Morning Post, 6 Nov. 1992.
