In the area of criminal law, the federal government often sets trends. This article discusses the potential impact of two trends in federal criminal justice that are being followed by the states: privatizing prosecution and blurring the line between criminal and civil law. While there are potential benefits of both trends, such as enhancing law enforcement's resources and flexibility, this article suggests that the potential harm they pose for a system of criminal justice is serious. By abdicating prosecutorial functions to private parties motivated by greed rather than the public interest and by blurring the line between criminal and civil law, we risk diluting the power of the criminal law to communicate core values of society.
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References
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