The Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles,Questions,and Cautions

Abstract

Long-established principles of federalism have limited federal action against violent crime. An important question is whether those principles ought now to be relaxed. We distinguish two roles for the federal government: direct operations and financial assistance. Regarding direct operations, the natural division of labor among federal, state, and local enforcement agencies should be maintained, and federal enforcement agencies should be diverted to the fight against street crime only on an emergency, backup basis and only while the emergency exists. Regarding financial assistance, traditional principles of federalism that favor local decisions over national decisions should apply unless some important federal interest—such as the protection of individual rights; the encouragement of innovation and learning; or the protection of one state against the actions of others—is engaged. If such an interest is engaged, that interest ought to be reflected in federal restrictions on how the money can be used. When we apply these principles to recent federal legislation, we conclude that the nation's interest in experimenting with the potential of community policing justifies a federal categorical grant program, while the effort to encourage states to stiffen their sentencing requirements does not.

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References

idem , “Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law,” Hastings Law Journal, 46(4):1135-1174 (Apr. 1995).

2. Brickey , “Criminal Mischief,” pp. 1138-1139.

3. Ibid., pp. 1141-45.

4. Mark H. Moore , “Criminogenic Commodities,” in Crime and Public Policy, ed. James Q. Wilson (San Francisco: ICS, 1983), pp. 125-144.

5. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Roth , eds., Understanding and Preventing Violence (Washington, DC: NAS Press, 1993), pp. 51, 64.

6. For an excellent analysis of LEAA, see Malcolm M. Feely and Austin D. Scott , The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1968-78 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980).

7. Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime: Final Report (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 1981).

8. Criminal Justice Newsletter, 1 Dec. 1994, pp. 5-6.

9. H.R. 3, 104th Cong., 1st sess. (1995).

10.

10. See generally Kevin R. Reitz , “The Federal Role in Sentencing Law and Policy,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.

11.

11. Under the House bill (H.R. 3), State A, which has always imprisoned violent people for just as long as most other states do and which insists on following its own substantial periods of incarceration with a long period during which the individual can be reincarcerated if he does anything further to show that he is a danger (parole or supervised release), will get nothing. State B, which has maintained but not increased a very long determinate sentence law for a number of years, is ineligible for 50 percent of the $10.5 billion made available for prisons. A third state, C, which has increased its sentence for repeated armed robbery from a foolishly short two years to three years but requires the individual to serve 85 percent of the 36 months in prison (a period far shorter than he would be incarcerated in A or B), receives the federal government's blessing and funding. This is simply absurd.