The article uses two very different examples of third party mediation to illustrate the argument that intermediary flexibility has two aspects: freedom from constraint and capacity to undertake an influential interventive role by carrying out a variety of important functions. It concludes that both aspects are important for the success of mediation initiatives—although each confers very different advantages on particular mediator types and circumstances—and that the constituencies of other types of mediators need to be delineated and analyzed before further general propositions can be advanced.
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References
1.
P. H. Gulliver , Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross-Cultural Perspective (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1979).
2.
2. See Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965).
3.
3. See Loraleigh Keashley and Ronald J. Fisher, “Towards a Contingency Approach to Third Party Intervention in Regional Conflict,”International Journal, 45:424-453 (Spring 1990).
4.
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 518:23-38 (Nov. 1991).
5.
5. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, ed., Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1991), pp. 9-11.
6.
6. James A. Wall, “Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, 25(1):157-180 (Mar. 1981).
7.
7. James H. Laue, “The Emergence and Institutionalization of Third Party Roles in Conflict,” in Conflict Management and Problem Solving: Interpersonal to International Applications, ed. D.J.D. Sandole and Ingrid Sandole-Staroste (New York: New York University Press, 1987).
8.
8. C.R. Mitchell, “Motives for Mediation,” in New Approaches to International Mediation, ed. C. R. Mitchell and K. Webb (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).
9.
9. Track 1 is defined as government-to-government negotiation: formal, official interaction between instructed representatives of sovereign states. Track 2 is nongovernmental, informal, and unofficial interaction between private citizens or groups of people who are outside of the formal governmental structure. See John W. McDonald, Jr., “Introduction,” in Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, ed. John W. McDonald and Diane B. Bendahmane, (Washington, DC: Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, 1987), p. 1.
10.
10. Outsider neutrals are third parties who intervene in a conflict of which they are not part; their combined strengths and drawbacks arise from their lack of involvement in the conflict and commitment to the fortunes and interests of the parties. Insider partials are third parties within the society wherein the conflict is taking place and who derive both strengths and drawbacks from their relationships with, commitments to, and involvement with all parties in the conflict.
11.
11. See Chester A. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York: Norton, 1992).
12.
12. Ibid., p. 458.
13.
13. Dr. Chester A. Crocker, interview with authors, Washington, DC, Jan. 1995.
14.
14. Ibid.
15.
15. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 483.
16.
16. Crocker, interview.
17.
17. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 118.
18.
18. Crocker, interview.
19.
19. Ibid.
20.
20. Ibid.
21.
21. Ibid.
22.
22. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 302.
23.
23. Crocker, interview.
24.
24. Ibid.
25.
25. Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, p. 458.
26.
26. American Friends Service Committee, Search for Peace in the Middle East (Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 1970).
27.
27. Dr. Landrum Bolling, interview with authors, Fairfax, VA, Jan. 1995.
28.
28. C. H. (Mike) Yarrow, Quaker Experience in International Conciliation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 277.
29.
29. Quoted in Maureen R. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 76.
30.
30. Bolling, interview.
31.
31. See Mitchell, “Process and Stages of Mediation.”
32.
32. Wall's original list of important aspects of mediator-constituent relationships consists of only the following items: pointing out constituent misperceptions and excess expectations; arguing that constituent demands are not salable; misrepresenting and distorting information; exaggerating extent of disagreement; threatening to quit; arguing that support is needed; and exaggerating the cost of agreement. Wall, “Mediation.”
33.
33. On this particular third party, see Saadia Touval, “Mediator's Flexibility and the U.N. Security Council,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
34.
34. We should emphasize that this list contains only mediators who fit into the outsider neutral model of intermediaries. A whole series of different questions might arise from any systematic consideration of constituencies, constraints, and capacities affecting insider partial intermediaries.
