This introductory article provides an overview of the concept of flexibility and the articles to follow. Both positive and problematic aspects of flexibility for conflict resolution are discussed: if manifest in joint problem-solving behavior, flexibility can contribute to improved negotiated outcomes; if used tactically by one or another party, it can lead to unfavorable outcomes for at least one of the parties. Flexibility can be understood at each of three levels of analysis—individual, small group, and organizational behavior—and the articles in this collection reflect these different levels. A variety of factors have been shown to influence flexible behavior, including the way negotiators plan, their orientations, tactics, and a number of aspects of the negotiating situation. These and other factors are treated in the articles to follow, each of which is summarized in this article. The articles in this collection are intended to contribute to our understanding of this concept, and the key lessons learned are presented in a final article.
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References
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1. Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New York: Academic Press, 1975), pp. 188-189.
2.
2. David A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 29 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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3. Dacher Keltner and Robert J. Robinson, “Imagined Ideological Differences in Conflict Escalation and Resolution,”International Journal of Conflict Management, 4:249-262 (1993).
4.
See also idem, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981).
5.
5. See William Raspberry, “The Clinton Thing,”Washington Post, 29 Nov. 1994.
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6. For a discussion of these developments, see Lee Michael Katz, “Hostage Watchword: `Flexibility,' ”USA Today: International Edition, 16 Aug. 1991, p. 5A.
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7. For a description of these events, see R. Jeffrey Smith, “North Korea Pact Contains U.S. Concessions,”Washington Post, 19 Oct. 1994.
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8. For a description of this case, see Daniel Druckman, “Stages, Turning Points, and Crises: Negotiating Military Base Rights, Spain and the United States,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30(2):327-360 (June 1986).
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9. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960).
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11. For a review of the findings, see Daniel Druckman, “Determinants of Compromising Behavior in Negotiation: A Meta-Analysis,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3):507-556 (Sept. 1994).
12.
Roger Brown , “Models of Attitude Change,” in New Directions in Psychology, ed. Theodore M. Newcomb (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962), chap. 1.
13.
For an interesting discussion of the intrinsic incentives for legitimate political assertion and judicious compromise, see Merton S. Krause, “Establishing the Psychological Conditions for Representative Government” (Manuscript, Institute for Juvenile Research, Chicago, 1970).
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14. A. B. Fetherston, Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 168.
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Henry A. Landsberger , “Interaction Process Analysis of the Mediation of Labor-Management Disputes,”Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 51:552-559 (1955).
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Geoffrey M. Stephenson , Bromley H. Kniveton, and Ian E. Morley, “Interaction Analysis of an Industrial Wage Negotiation,”Journal of Occupational Psychology, 50:231-241 (1977).
18.
Daniel Druckman with P. Terrence Hopmann, “Content Analysis,” in International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues, ed. Victor A. Kremenyuk (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1991).
19.
Judith Orasanu and Eduardo Salas, “Team Decision Making in Complex Environments,” in Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods, ed. Gary Klein, Judith Orasano, and Roberta Calderwood (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1993).
20.
See also idem, “Educational Organizations as `Loosely Coupled Systems,' ”Administrative Sciences Quarterly, pp. 1-19 (Mar. 1976).
21.
21. See Richard W. Scott, Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 229-230.
22.
22. Joel Bleeke and David Ernst, “The Way to Win in Cross-Border Alliances,”Harvard Business Review, p. 131 (Nov.-Dec. 1991).
23.
Daniel Druckman , “Prenegotiation Experience and Dyadic Conflict Resolution in a Bargaining Situation,”Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4:367-383 (1968).
24.
24. See Daniel Druckman and Robert A. Bjork, eds., Learning, Remembering, Believing: Enhancing Human Performance (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), chap. 3.
25.
25. Margaret G. Hermann and Nathan Kogan, “Negotiation in Leader and Delegate Groups,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, 12:332-344 (1968).
26.
26. Margaret A. Neale and Max H. Bazerman, “The Effects of Framing and Negotiator Overconfidence on Bargaining Behaviors and Outcomes,”Academy of Management Journal, 28:34-40 (1985).
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27. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), chap. 9.
28.
28. I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982).
29.
29. Pruitt and Lewis, “Psychology of Integrative Bargaining.”
30.
30. Daniel Druckman, “Three Cases of Base-Rights Negotiations: Lessons Learned,” in U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and the Philippines, eds. J. W. McDonald, Jr. and D. B. Bendahmane (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 196-199.
31.
31. Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
32.
32. Zartman and Berman, Practical Negotiator.
33.
See also Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991).
34.
For more on these influences, see idem, “Situational Levers of Position Change: Further Explorations,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
35.
35. Kenneth Kresselet al.“The Settlement-Orientation vs. the Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation,”Journal of Social Issues, 50(1):67-84 (1994).
36.
36. Peter Contuzzi, “Moving Negotiations from Idle to Forward: The Commitment to Flexibility,”Missouri Journal of Dispute Resolution, pp. 39-42 (1987).
37.
37. Roger Fisher and Scott Brown, Getting Together (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988).
38.
38. See Johannes Botes and Christopher Mitchell, “Constraints on Third Party Flexibility,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
