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Abstract

The tragic conflict in the Balkans is the product of a complex interaction of historical, religious, and political factors, the absence of effective political institutions in new states, and personal and ideological imperatives. This article reviews that interaction, focusing on events following the breakup of Yugoslavia. It highlights in particular the impact of extremist ethnic nationalism on all of the parties to the conflict. The article also addresses international involvement in the Balkan conflict, reviewing the numerous peace plans that have been unsuccessfully promoted and the impact of the crisis on transatlantic relations. It contends that no country or institution has won particularly good marks for its policies and actions.

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References

1. Albert Wohlstetter , “Why We're in It—Still,” Wall Street Journal, 1 July 1993.

2. The phrase appears in “Post-Communist Balkans: The First Phase,” in Strategic Survey, 1990-1991 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 165.

3. Ibid.

4. Stephen F. Larrabee , “Instability and Change in the Balkans,” Survival, 34(2):36 (Summer 1992).

5. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu , Crisis in the Balkans, UNIDIR Research Paper 22 (New York: United Nations, 1993), p. 14.

6. Robert M. Hayden , “The Partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-1993,” RFE/RL Research Report, 2(22):2 (May 1993).

7. Ibid.

8. Steven L. Burg , “Nationalism and Democratization in Yugoslavia,” Washington Quarterly, 14(4):13 (Autumn 1991).

9. “How Many Little Wars Make a Big One?” Economist, 30 Jan. 1993.

10.

10. “Turmoil in the Balkans,” in Strategic Survey, 1991-1992 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 35.

11.

11. Ibid.

12.

12. Ibid., p. 36.

13.

13. Ibid.

14.

14. “How Many Little Wars Make a Big One?” p. 45.

15.

15. Hayden , “Partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” p. 4.

16.

16. Ibid., p. 7.

17.

17. Patrick Moore , “The Serbian and Croatian Factor,” RFE/RL Research Report, 2(22):16 (May 1993).

18.

18. Hayden , “Partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” p. 8.

19.

19. “Another Destructive Year in the Balkans,” in Strategic Survey, 1993-1994 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), pp. 99-100.

20.

20. Bruce Clark , “A Turn for the Worse in Bosnia,” Financial Times, 1 Nov. 1994.

21.

21. Ibid.

22.

22. Albert Wohlstetter argues that it was the early U.S. and European assurance to Belgrade that they would not recognize any breakaway republic “and so would not allow the republics to arm themselves” that was responsible for the debacle by encouraging “three successive invasions by Milosevic's Yugoslav People's Army.” Wohlstetter, “Why We're in It.”

23.

23. The U.S. approach also led to a difficult incident for Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany. Responding to a letter from President Clinton urging Kohl to attempt to promote support for the lift-and-strike option among Germany's fellow EC members, the chancellor spoke out in favor of it. He was quickly rejected by the other EC states, and the White House backed off from its original effort to get the German chancellor out in front on the issue, leaving him isolated and embarrassed.

24.

24. Chrystia Freeland , “New World Order Going Badly Wrong,” Financial Times, 19 Nov. 1994.

25.

25. Aid efforts have resulted in more than 10,000 flights of food, medical, and other supplies to the inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia. Clark, “Turn for the Worse in Bosnia.”

26.

26. When the international community brought the former Yugoslavian republic into the United Nations, it did so through a political compromise with Greece under the name “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”

27.

27. Roger Cohen , “Europe's Menacing New Divisions,” International Herald Tribune, 28 Nov. 1994.

28.

28. Ibid.

The Balkan Tragedy

Abstract

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