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Abstract

Several features of Canadian political institutions have contributed in important ways to Canada's constitutional discontent. The system of plurality elections in single-member districts to the House of Commons tends to exaggerate regional differences in support for political parties, leading to some regions being severely underrepresented in the governing party caucus. This perceived exclusion has heightened regional alienation, especially in western Canada. Federalism in Canada has empowered provincial majorities, but it has also created grievances among provincial minorities and increased the visibility and perceived legitimacy of provincial government leaders rather than federal politicians as spokespersons for regional interests. A veto-ridden constitutional amending formula, and the failure of the last two rounds of constitutional negotiations, strengthen the argument made by politicians favoring Quebec sovereignty that no package of reforms meeting Quebec's aspirations is likely to win approval in the rest of Canada.

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References

1. See Peter H. Russell , Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Be a Sovereign People? 2d ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

2. See, for example, Patrick J. Monahan , Meech Lake: The Inside Story (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).

Arend Lijphart , Ronald Rogowski , and R. Kent Weaver , “Separation of Powers and the Management of Political Cleavages,” in Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the U.S. and Abroad, ed. R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993), pp. 302-344.

4. Donald V. Smiley , Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980).

idem, “Constitutional Minoritarianism in Canada,” in Canada: The State of the Federation 1990, ed. Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown (Kingston, ON: Queens University, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1990).

Richard Simeon , Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972).

David E. Smith , “Party Government, Representation and National Integration in Canada,” in Party Government and Regional Representation in Canada, coordinated by Peter Aucoin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), pp. 1-68.

8. See, for example, Ian Stewart , “Of Customs and Coalitions: The Formation of Canadian Federal Parliamentary Alliances,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 13(3):451-479 (Sept. 1980).

For a later example, see Jeffrey Simpson , Discipline of Power: The Conservative Interlude and the Liberal Restoration (Toronto: Personal Library, 1980), pp. 28-31.

10.

10. Indeed, the only minor parties that managed to win representation in Ottawa for a sustained period of time were those that also won power at the provincial level, notably, the New Democratic Party (formerly the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation), from the 1940s to the present, and the Social Credit Party, from the 1930s to the 1960s.

11.

11. See Murray Campbell , “How Rep by Pop Wins Converts,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 27 Oct. 1993.

12.

12. Alan C. Cairns , “The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 1(1):61 (Mar. 1968).

13.

13. Indeed, a political party led by a non-Quebecer has won a majority government in the House of Commons only once since 1945; that was in 1958.

14.

Donald V. Smiley and Ronald L. Watts , Intrastate Federalism in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).

15.

15. For a critical review of the literature, see R. A. Young , Philippe Faucher , and André Blais , “The Concept of Province-Building: A Critique,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 17(4):783-818 (Dec. 1984).

16.

16. See the discussion in Martin Painter , “Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: An Institutional Analysis,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 24(2):269-288 (June 1991).

17.

17. See Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson , State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

18.

18. See the discussion in Kenneth McRoberts , “Federal Structures and the Policy Process,” in Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy, ed. Michael M. Atkinson (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada, 1993), pp. 149-177.

19.

19. Donald C. Wallace , “Friends and Foes: Prime Ministers and Premiers in Intergovernmental Relations,” in Prime Ministers and Premiers, ed. Leslie Pal and David Taras (New York: Prentice Hall, 1988), p. 69.

20.

20. See R. Kent Weaver , “Political Institutions and Canada's Constitutional Crisis,” in The Collapse of Canada? ed. R. Kent Weaver (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 51-54.

21.

21. Cairns , Disruptions, chap. 4.

22.

22. Patrick J. Monahan , “Canada after Charlottetown,” Canada Watch, 1(4) (Nov.-Dec. 1992).

23.

23. McRoberts , “Federal Structures and the Policy Process,” p. 157.

24.

24. For an outline of such a system, see R. Kent Weaver , The Canadian Constitution: Recommendations for Reform, Brookings Discussion Papers in Governmental Studies No. 15 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992).

Political Institutions and Conflict Management in Canada

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