Constraining Conventional Arms Transfers

Abstract

Interest in restraining the conventional arms trade has intensified in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf war as well as in the face of continuing hostilities in Bosnia, Somalia, and elsewhere. Analysts differ considerably, however, over whether the new features of the post-Cold War security landscape create an environment more conducive or more hostile to future arms trade restraint. Developed and developing countries must cooperate on technology transfer and other aspects of the conventional arms trade problem to devise new approaches to replace traditional efforts focused on constraining supply that are virtually doomed to failure in the future. The need for nontraditional approaches is especially strong in the face of the difficulties for both suppliers and recipients in balancing the competing and complex political, economic, and security interests at work in arms transfer decisions. New approaches should be built on the foundations of the initiation of supplier-recipient dialogues, intensified regional arms control efforts, and heightened transparency and confidence building in arms trade transactions.

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References

Andrew J. Pierre , The Global Politics of Arms Sales (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), esp. pt. 4.

2. Brad Roberts , “The Chemical Weapons Convention and World Order,” in Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention, ed. Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 9.

3. Ibid., p. 11.

4. Quoted in Richard H.P. Sia , “Small Wars to Shape U.S. Military,” Baltimore Sun, 2 Dec. 1992.

5. Johann Joergen Holst , “Arms Control in the Nineties: A European Perspective,” in The International Practice of Arms Control, ed. Emanuel Adler (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 87, 114.

6. The author is indebted to Richard Betts of Columbia University for highlighting this point.

7. Roberts , “Chemical Weapons Convention,” p. 9.

8. Rolf Ekeus , “Arms Control and the New Security Structure,” in Challenges for Arms Control in the 1990s, ed. James Brown (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), p. 21.

9. Samuel Huntington , “A Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72(3):41 (Summer 1993).

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10. Ali Dessouki , “Globalization and the Two Spheres of Security,” Washington Quarterly, 16(4):112-115 (Autumn 1993).

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11. Given the NPT experience, Southern states have insisted that any future arms control regime be universal and entail equal obligations, and they have been somewhat successful in promoting these principles. It was only when the Bush administration abandoned its position of insisting on retaining a small portion of its chemical weapons stockpile, for example, that the logjam at the CWC negotiations was broken.

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12. Shahram Chubin , “The South and the New World Order,” Washington Quarterly, 16(4):99 (Autumn 1993).

13.

13. Efforts to restrain conventional arms transfers have also been hampered by the fact that the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been the primary—indeed, almost the exclusive—focus of interagency policy review. The fact that no one on the Bush administration's National Security Council staff was particularly interested in the United Nations' Transparency in Armaments resolution, which established the arms transfer register, a small step to draw attention to the problem of conventional weapons proliferation, is indicative of broader institutional inattention to the problem. Similar attitudes have characterized the Clinton administration.

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14. “Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy” (U.S., White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 Sept. 1993).

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15. “White House Braces to Tackle Conventional Arms Export Policy,” Inside the Pentagon, 30 Sept. 1993, p. 1.

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16. Andrew Pierre , “Conventional Arms Proliferation Today: Changed Dimensions, New Responses,” in Science and International Security Anthology 1993: Trends and Implications for Arms Control, Proliferation, and International Security in the Changing Global Environment, ed. Elizabeth J. Kirk , W. Thomas Wander , and Brian D. Smith (Washington, DC: American Academy for the Advancement of Science, 1993), p. 213.

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17. David Tanks et al. , Defense Conversion and Arms Transfers: The Legacy of the Soviet-Era Arms Industry (Washington, DC: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1993), p. 27.

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18. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

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19. See, for example, Pierre , “Conventional Arms Proliferation Today,” p. 221.

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20. Jayantha Dhanapala , “Introduction,” in Regional Approaches to Disarmament: Security and Stability, ed. Jayantha Dhanapala (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), p. 3.

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21. Trevor Findlay , “The South Pacific,” in Regional Approaches, ed. Dhanapala , p. 31.

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23. Natalie J. Goldring , “UN Register Released: Response Favourable, but Questions Remain,” Basic Reports, 1 Nov. 1993, p. 1.

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24. Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf , “An Evaluation of the First Year of Reporting to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms” (Research report, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Oct. 1993), p. 3.

25.

25. Ibid.

26.

26. Ronald F. Lehman, director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Statement to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 46th sess., 15 Oct. 1991.