Arms transfers to the Middle East have been high on the international agenda since the Gulf war and the end of the Cold War. But the precise nature of recent developments, and the underlying motivations and forces that have produced the current pattern of weapons proliferation in the region, are poorly understood. A close examination of the data suggests that arms transfers to the Middle East have actually declined in the 1990s, following similar patterns manifest around the world. In addition, by shifting the focus away from arms transfers, toward overall changes in weapons arsenals and the relationship between weapons and armed forces, one can gain some insight into the underlying motives that drive regional arms acquisitions. These motives can be regional, systemic, or internal, and they interact in such a way as to enormously complicate the process of security building in the Middle East.
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References
1.
Avner Cohen and Marvin Miller, “Nuclear Shadows in the Middle East: Prospects for Arms Control in the Wake of the Gulf Crisis,”Security Studies, 1(1):54-77 (Autumn 1991).
2.
2. For an analysis of the Middle East regional arms control process throught the fall of 1992, see Keith Krause, “The Evolution of Arms Control in the Middle East,” in Confidence-Building in the Middle East, ed. David Dewitt and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 267-290.
3.
3. See President Bush's address to the Air Force Academy, 29 May 1991, and the accompanying White House fact sheet unveiling his “comprehensive arms control policy for the Middle East.” These efforts also include the meetings, now in limbo, of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to develop a framework for consultation on arms transfers to the Middle East. For a summary of this, see Natalie Goldring, “Transfer of Advanced Technology and Sophisticated Weapons” (Paper delivered at the U.N. Conference on Disarmament Issues, Kyoto, Apr. 1993).
4.
Middle East Report , no. 177, special issueArms Race or Arms Control? (July-Aug. 1992).
5.
Goldring , “Transfer of Advanced Technology,” passim.
6.
6. Stephanie Neuman, ed., Defense Planning in Less-Industrialized States (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1984), p. 3.
7.
7. For a classic example of this, see Kemp, Control of the Middle East Arms Race, pp. 17-18.
8.
8. The concept of military development is analogous to economic development, which is not just a set of statistical indicators—gross national product per capita, and so forth—but a policy issue of alternative choices that states can make and a field of study with competing ideologies of development and a set of theoretical tools. Thus, at its most basic level, “military development” would mean the growth and modernization of armed forces. It is also, however, the broader process that is catalyzed by the diffusion of modern military technologies and techniques of organization to the developing world, and it encompasses such things as choices about military doctrines (mass versus elite armies, defensive versus offensive force postures); the development of ancillary social and political institutions (civil-military relations, a military educational system, a fiscal apparatus for the state); and choices between different concepts of security (who or what represents the threat and how best to counter it).
9.
The data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Congressional Research Service are also presented in this fashion. For a good, albeit dated, survey that does not fall into this trap, see Joe Stork and Jim Paul, “Arms Sales and the Militarization of the Middle East,”MERIP Reports, pp. 5-15 (Feb. 1983).
10.
10. The only exception is the rate of growth of helicopter stockpiles, which grew more quickly in the core Middle East than in North Africa.
11.
On the Persian Gulf, see Anthony Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (London: Mansell, 1984), pp. 85-147. The literature on these conflicts is, of course, vast, and I do not intend to discuss in detail their particular dynamics.
12.
12. These data were compiled by Ken Boutin. A complete breakdown of how weapons systems were classified is available from the author.
13.
13. How this works can be illustrated by Singapore's 1993 decision to upgrade its fighter plane purchases from the F-16A/B to the F-16C/D variant. This decision appears to have been influenced primarily by Malaysia's acquisition of M-29s and F/A-18Ds. Jane's Defence Weekly, 27 Nov. 1993.
14.
14. The Military Balance, 1990-1991 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), pp. 105-106. I have considered only the T-72 tanks to be sophisticated, and the Mirage F-1, Su-24 and 25, and MiG-29 to be modern aircraft.
15.
15. Keith Krause, Arms and the State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 187-192.
16.
idem, “Iraq's Bomb: Blueprints and Artifacts,” ibid., pp. 30-40 (Jan.-Feb. 1992).
17.
See also Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction.
18.
18. These are Iraq, Israel, Iran, Libya, and Egypt. Elisa Harris, “Towards a Comprehensive Strategy for Halting Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,”Arms Control, 12(2):129 (Sept. 1991).
19.
Steve Fetter , “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction,”International Security, 16(1):5-42 (Summer 1991).
20.
20. Figures in this paragraph from U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, various years).
21.
21. I am arguing that the external forces—the willingness of superpowers to reduce the opportunity costs of weapons acquisitions by their clients—were a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the arms buildup of the 1980s.
22.
Harvey argues that the attractiveness of ballistic missiles to Third World states cannot be explained by their combat effectiveness, which is lower than that of advanced strike aircraft. See also Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction.”
23.
John Williams , The Middle East Peace Process and the Arms Trade: A Fatal Contradiction? (London: Saferworld Foundation, Aug. 1992).
24.
24. All data in this section are from Richard Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, Report 93-656F (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1993), pp. 57, 68.
25.
25. Israel, which has a large domestic arms industry, imports relatively small quantities of arms.
26.
26. See the extensive analysis in the New York Times, 23 Aug. 1993. The Saudis have already canceled or postponed several recent contracts and are purchasing their weapons on credit!
27.
27. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers, p. 18.
28.
28. Robert Rothstein, “National Security, Domestic Resource Constraints and Elite Choices in the Third World,” in Defense, Security and Development, ed. Saadet Deger and Robert West (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 141.
29.
For a detailed statistical correlative analysis, see Robert McKinlay, Third World Military Expenditure: Determinants and Implications (London: Pinter, 1989).
30.
Gold , ed., Arms Control in the Middle East.
31.
Mohammed Ayoob , ed., Regional Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 3-23.
32.
32. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 2d ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 187-195.
33.
Ibid., p. 264.
34.
Stephanie Neuman , “Arms Transfers, Indigenous Defence Production and Dependency: The Case of Iran,” in The Security of the Persian Gulf, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi (London: Croom Helm, 1981), pp. 131-150.
35.
35. Libya is a slightly different case, with the legitimacy of the Ghadhafi regime being reinforced by a strong ideology and military, but it still may constitute a weak state.
36.
36. The actual figures are: Jordan, 60.5; Iraq, 55.3; Syria, 33.3; Libya, 21.0. Yemen (Aden) was also in the top 10, with 34.9. The figures are from U.S., Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1990 (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991), p. 41.
37.
37. Ibid. The global average for military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product was 4.9 percent; the average for the developing world was 4.3 percent.
38.
38. The identical conclusion was reached by some analysts of the superpower competition in the Cold War and by the literature on organizational/bureaucratic politics. See Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), chap. 4.
39.
Elisabeth Picard , “Arab Military in Politics: From Revolutionary Plot to Authoritarian State,” inBeyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State, ed. Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (New York: Croom Helm, 1988), pp. 116-146.
40.
40. Strategic Survey, 1987-88 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 187-188.
