Likely trends in the supply side of the arms trade are examined, considering the opportunities and motives available to key actors and the changing international system that constrains their options. Among suppliers, the United States remains predominant, if somewhat more commercially than hegemonically oriented than in the past. Despite reassertive efforts and lower prices in the arms field, Russian export prospects are questionable, given uncertainties over budgetary investments, lagging technology, and potentially unreliable parts production or supply. West European sales are likely to remain confined to niches, since there still are no single unified European Union production and marketing mechanisms. China, the least predictable supplier, remains on an economic arms sales push. The depressed market for third-tier suppliers seems likely to persist. The global move to restructure defense industries is likely to lead to a shift from overproduction of finished arms, with many dual-use products emerging instead.
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References
1.
1. See Herbert Wulf, ed., Arms Industry Limited (London: Oxford University Press, 1993).
2.
Keith Krause , Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
3.
3. It has been estimated within the industry that 75-80 percent of existing American weapons contractors, including subcontractors, could disappear from the arms market completely or become part of larger, more aggressive companies. Calvin Sims, “For Weapons Makers, a Time to Deal,”New York Times, 17 Jan. 1993.
4.
Quote reprinted courtesy of Defense News. Copyright by Army Times Publishing Company, Springfield, Virginia.
5.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , SIPRI Yearbook 1993: Armament and Disarmament (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 443-448.
6.
On disagreements within the administration about the commercial viability of arms sales, see “Clinton Administration Gives Mixed Signals on Arms Trade,”Arms Trade News (Council for a Livable World Education Fund) (June 1993).
7.
7. Barbara Opall, “USAF May Curtail Bargain Fighter Exports,”Defense News, 31 Jan.-6 Feb. 1994, pp. 1, 20.
8.
8. An indicator is the justification for U.S. military assistance as reported in Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1994 (Washington, DC: Department of State and Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1993).
9.
9. This concern is strongly argued in Ashton B. Carter, William J. Perry, and John D. Steinbrunner, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, Brookings Occasional Papers (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992).
10.
10. See, for example, U.S., Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Building Future Security (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992).
11.
11. See, for example, Philip Gummett and Judith Reppy, eds., The Relations between Defence and Civil Technologies (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988).
12.
Quote reprinted courtesy of Defense News. Copyright by Army Times Publishing Company, Springfield, Virginia.
13.
13. These are official governmental figures; see Konstantin Sorokin, “Russische Rüstungsindustrie sucht Überleben im Export,”Europäische Sicherheit, 42:238 (Apr. 1993). Of course, the low international valuation of the ruble provides arms producers with comparatively large ruble incomes from small dollar receipts.
14.
14. Issues of grants and credits in arms exports are discussed in Michael Brzoska, “Military Aid, Trade and Developing Country Debt,” in Research Symposium on Military Expenditures, World Bank Discussion Paper no. 185, ed. Geoffrey Lamb with Valeriana Kallab (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1992).
15.
See, for example, Alexei Izyumov, “The Soviet Union: Arms Control and Conversion—Plan and Reality,” in Arms Industry Limited, ed. Wulf, pp. 109-120.
16.
16. The German Air Force inherited a squadron of MiG-29 fighters in October 1990 and thoroughly tested them. See, for example, Manfred Opel, “Die MiG-29 Fulcrum der NVA,”Wehrtechnik, 22(10):48-54 (1993).
17.
17. See both civilian and military projects in “East/West Aerospace Ventures on the Rise,”Aviation Week and Space Technology, 23 Aug. 1993, pp. 51-59.
18.
18. Daniel Sneider, “Russians Extol Fighter Sale,”Defense News, 5-11 July 1992, pp. 1, 20.
19.
19. See Elisabeth Sköns and Herbert Wulf, “The Internationalization of the Arms Industry,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
20.
20. See, for instance, Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock, Restructuring of Arms Production in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
21.
21. See Andrew Moravcsik, “The European Armaments Industry at the Crossroads,”Survival, 32(1):65-85 (1990).
22.
Jean-Paul Hebért , Stratégie francaise de l'armement (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense National, 1990).
23.
23. The best publicly available account is Paul Eavis, ed., Arms and Dual-Use Export from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control (Bristol, U.K.: Saferworld, Dec. 1992).
24.
24. Nods to limiting supply and assertions of military cutbacks evidently were designed to reassure a suspicious American government. See, for example, R. Bates Gill, “Curbing Beijing's Arms Sales,”Orbis, 36:879-896 (Summer 1992).
25.
See also Ariane Genillard, “Question of Arms Points up Czechoslovak Divisions,”Financial Times, 11 Mar. 1992, p. 2.
26.
26. The latter is the subject of Robert E. Harkavy, “The Changing International System and the Arms Trade,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
27.
27. There is much academic controversy about rules and norms in international politics. See, for example, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
28.
and Edward J. Laurance, The International Arms Trade (New York: Lexington Books, 1992).
29.
29. See Masako Ikegami-Anderson, “Japan: A Latent But Large Supplier of Dual Use Technology,” in Arms Industry Limited, ed. Wulf.
30.
and, more generally, Hans W. Maull, “Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers,”Foreign Affairs, 69:91-106 (Winter 1990/91).
31.
31. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade with the Third World (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1971).
32.
32. See, for example, Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
33.
33. The original rationale of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was that it strengthened nonproliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling the preferred means of delivery. But the MTCR also has been cited in cases without a clear nuclear connection, such as reported Chinese deliveries to Syria. Russia complied with U.S. requests when it canceled the sale of controversial rocket motors to India in 1993, though perhaps after useful technology already had been exchanged. See Elaine Sciolino, “Russia Is Halting Arms-Linked Sale,”New York Times, 17 July 1993.
34.
John Sislin, “The Elusive Link between Military Assistance and Political Compliance” (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1993).
35.
on recent U.S. policy, see Simon Payaslian, “Human Rights and U.S. Distribution of Foreign Economic and Military Assistance” (Ph.D. diss., Wayne State University, 1992).
36.
36. See Michael Moodie, “Constraining Conventional Arms Transfers,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
37.
37. Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Targets Hybrid Weapons,”Defense News, 29 Nov.-5 Dec. 1993, p. 4.
