This article provides an overview and assessment of the implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the major U.S. law intended to curb illegal migration. Enforcement of employer sanctions, protection against possible discrimination linked to employer sanctions, and legalization of alien workers are considered. IRCA should be viewed as a first step in coping with illegal immigration, but much more will have to be done to achieve an optimal balance between hospitality and control.
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References
1.
1. Holly Idelson, “Baird's Wrenching Withdrawal Mars the Inaugural Week,”Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 23 Jan. 1993, pp. 179-181.
2.
2. See Craig R. Whitney, “Europeans Look for Ways to Bar Door to Immigrants,”New York Times, 29 Dec. 1991. In the United States, requesting political asylum serves to delay deportation proceedings, creating requirements for a separate hearing. Often, if arrivals to the United States request political asylum after flying to the United States on a commercial airline, they cannot be detained and are paroled until their hearing.
3.
3. Robert Reinhold, “In California, New Talk of Limits on Immigrants,”New York Times, 3 Dec. 1991.
4.
In a June 1993 New York Times/CBS News poll, 61 percent of respondents said immigration to the United States should be decreased, up from 33 percent of respondents in 1965, 42 percent in 1977, and 43 percent in 1986. Seth Mydans, “Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility,”New York Times, 27 June 1993.
6. “Fact Sheet: Initiatives to Curb Illegal Immigration” (U.S., Department of Justice, Aug. 1993).
7.
7. Apprehension data fail to distinguish between those who stay in the United States and those who return to their native countries; fail to take into account repeat apprehensions; and rely on INS resources. See Jeffrey S. Passel, Frank D. Bean, and Barry Edmonston, “Assessing the Impact of Employer Sanctions on Undocumented Immigration to the United States,” in The Paper Curtain: Employer Sanctions' Implementation, Impact and Reform, ed. Michael Fix (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 1991), p. 200.
8.
A third study estimated that IRCA accounted for a 21 to 32 percent decline in apprehensions. Keith Craneet al., The Effect of Employer Sanctions on the Flow of Undocumented Immigrants to the United States (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990). This research is summarized in Passel, Bean, and Edmonston, “Assessing the Impact of Employer Sanctions.”
9.
9. Beanet al., Undocumented Migration.
10.
10. U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Employer Sanctions and U.S. Labor Markets: Second Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 209.
11.
11. U.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Employer Sanctions and U.S. Labor Markets: First Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991).
12.
12. Katharine M. Donato, Jorge Durand, and Douglas S. Massey, “Stemming the Tide? Assessing the Deterrent Effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act,”Demography, 29(2):139-157 (May 1992).
13.
13. Sherrie A. Kossoudji, “Playing Cat and Mouse at the U.S.-Mexican Border,”Demography, 29(2):160-180 (May 1992).
14.
14. U.S., Department of Labor, First Report.
15.
15. Ibid., p. 95.
16.
16. Roberto Suro, “Boom in Fake Identity Cards for Aliens,”New York Times, 19 Feb. 1992.
17.
17. U.S., General Accounting Office, Immigration Reform: Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination, Report to the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Mar. 1990).
18.
18. Charles E. Schumer, “A Review of the Implementation of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, A Report of the Office of Congressman Charles E. Schumer,” mimeographed (Washington, DC: Congress, House of Representatives, Mar. 1990).
19.
19. See statement of Senator Alan K. Simpson, in U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 103d Cong., 2nd sess., 2 Mar. 1994, p. S2290.
20.
See also the discussion of repeal in Michael Fix, “Toward an Uncertain Future: The Repeal or Reform of Sanctions in the 1990s,” in Paper Curtain, ed. Fix, pp. 316-325.
21.
21. See Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission on Agricultural Workers (Washington, DC: Commission on Agricultural Workers, 1992).
22.
22. Philip L. Martin and J. Edward Taylor, The Initial Effects of Immigration Reform on Farm Labor in California (Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, Mar. 1990).
24. Philip L. Martin, “Harvest of Confusion: Immigration Reform and California Agriculture,”International Migration Review, 24(1):69-95 (Spring 1990).
25.
25. Ibid., p. 77.
26.
26. Ibid., p. 84.
27.
27. Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission, p. 52. There were regional disparties in application approvals. In the Northeast, where 80 percent of the SAW applications were from ethnic groups other than Mexicans, only 50 percent of the SAW applications were approved.
28.
28. Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission, p. 52.
29.
29. Martin and Taylor, Initial Effects. The data are taken from a survey of 300 California agricultural employers.
30.
30. Commission on Agricultural Workers, Report of the Commission, p. 53.
31.
31. Ibid., p. 54.
32.
32. Michael Fix and Paul Hill, “Implementing Sanctions: Reports from the Field,” in Paper Curtain, ed. Fix.
33.
33. Fix, “Toward an Uncertain Future,” p. 319.
34.
34. Suro, “False Migrant Claims,” p. 36.
35.
A 1991 GAO report also criticizes decentralization of the INS, citing the agency's “lack of control over politically appointed regional commissioners, who use their autonomy to thwart headquarters' efforts” to allocate funds and manage programs. U.S., General Accounting Office, Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to Address Serious Problems (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991).
