U.S. military policy in the Caribbean after the Cold War faces two nontraditional security threats: drug trafficking and illegal migration. Haiti and Cuba are the worst possible scenarios. This policy is being formulated and furthered by the U.S. Atlantic Command in conjunction with regional security forces but without adequate civilian participation and public debate in the Caribbean. This policy contradicts stated U.S. goals of promoting democratic practices and institutions in the region. U.S. military policy in the Caribbean is analyzed within a historical context that divides the U.S. military presence—in terms of installations and armed forces—in the Caribbean during the twentieth century into five phases, with emphasis on the Cold War and its aftermath.
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References
1.
1. Gordon K. Lewis, “The Politics of the Caribbean,” in The United States and the Caribbean, ed. Tad Szulc (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 34.
2.
2. We prefer the term “security forces” because it includes whatever forces—military, defense forces, police and paramilitary bodies —are organized in each Caribbean society. In the region, all have internal security as their main function.
3.
3. A new element of U.S. military presence arose in this phase: the establishment of U.S. military-related industry in the Caribbean Basin. See Maribel Aponte-García, “Changing Production Paradigms and Industrial Policy: United States Military Production in the Caribbean” (Ph.D. diss., University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 1990).
4.
4. A unified combatant command is a military command that has broad, continuing missions and that is composed of forces from two or more military departments. See U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 100, Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sec. 161.
5.
5. The Neutrality Treaty, while establishing a regime of permanent neutrality for the Canal to be enforced by both the United States and Panama, gave the United States the right of unilateral action, including military action, in defense of the Canal. See Robert J. Sanders, Jr., “Permanent Neutrality and the Panama Canal after 1999,”Essays on Strategy VII, ed. Thomas C. Gill (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1990), pp. 69-97.
6.
6. See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcommittee on Panama Canal/Outer Continental Shelf, Strategic Importance of the Panama Canal, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 2 Nov. 1989.
7.
“Guyana/France: Recherche d'une coopération militaire,”Information Caraïbe, 18 Mar. 1991, pp. 10-11.
8.
8. See Jorge Rodríguez Beruff and Humberto García Muñiz, “El debate estratégico en Estados Unidos y la revisión de la política militar hacia la América Latina y el Caribe,”Caribbean Studies (in press).
9.
9. One military analyst says that “Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean Islands constitute the American heartland, the Monroe Doctrine defense zone.”Donald E. Neuchterlain, “National Interests and National Strategy: The Need for Priority,” in Understanding U.S. Strategy: A Reader, ed. Terry L. Heyns (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1983), p. 42.
10.
10. See David Ronfeldt, Geopolitics, Security and U.S. Strategy in the Caribbean Basin (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1983), pp. 48-51.
11.
11. For a moving account of the Haitian migrants confined in Puerto Rico in the 1980s, see Raymond Lafontant Gerdes, “Fort Allen: La diaspora haïtienne” (Manuscript, deposited at the University of Puerto Rico, Center for Historical Research, 1988).
12.
12. See Ivelaw L. Griffith, The Quest for Security in the Caribbean (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), chap. 9.
13.
Even U.S. military personnel have been involved in the traffic; in 1988 four servicemen were arrested at Roosevelt Roads while bringing cocaine on stateside-bound Military Airlift Command flights out of the Howard Air Base in the Canal Zone. See Beatriz de la Torre, “Puerto Rico, Unstoppable Drug Flow Stymies U.S. Officials,”San Juan Star, 28 Aug. 1988.
14.
14. See Donald J. Mabry, ed., The Latin American Narcotics Trade and U.S. National Security (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989).
15.
15. In December 1991, the JTF-4 and the Royal Netherlands Navy were to sign a cooperation agreement concerning anti-drug operations in the Caribbean. See “Dutch Forces Join War against Drugs,”Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 Dec. 1991, p. 1141.
16.
16. See Pablo J. Trinidad, “Guns and Bread: The U.S. Navy's Impact on Puerto Rico's Economy,”Caribbean Business, 15 Apr. 1993, p. 19.
17.
“U.S. Radar Station Being Built in Cayman Islands,”Daily Gleaner, 27 Nov. 1991, p. 4.
18.
18. Harry Turner, “Cocaine Inundates the Island,”San Juan Star, 7 July 1991.
19.
The defense forces of the anglophone Caribbean, the RSS, and the Dominican Republic as well as representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Venezuela participated. This conference has been held only three times in the Caribbean, last year in Kingston, Jamaica. See “PM: Less $$ for WI Security,”Trinidad Guardian, 31 Mar. 1993.
20.
“Les Aspin, Defense Secretary, to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn and House Armed Services Committee Chairman,”Defense Issues, 29 Mar. 1993, p. 1.
21.
21. By an alert order, LANTCOM already has been put in charge of a contingency planning operation for Haiti that focuses on the Pentagon's nation-building capabilities. Susanne M. Schafer, “Pentagon Developing Aid Package to Rebuild Haiti,”San Juan Star, 13 Apr. 1993.
22.
Stewart M. Powell , “San Antonio Losing in Installation Race; Southern Command May Pick Tampa,”Houston Chronicle, 15 Dec. 1991.
23.
John Philadelphia , “Drug Wars: The Threat to Guyana,”Guyana Review, pp. 15-16 (Mar. 1993).
24.
24. Due to the reduction of the DOD budget, military-related industry in the Caribbean is already being affected negatively. See Mariano A. Mier Romeu, “Cuesta abajo los contratos militares,”El Nuevo Día, 12 Apr. 1993.
25.
25. See “Overseas Sites” (News Release no. 102-93, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Public Affairs], 1993), p. 1.
26.
26. The corruption of the security forces is such that “planned integration of army members into a newly constituted force would be a recipe for disaster.”Howard French, “Drug Money Snags Peace Talks,”New York Times, 25 Apr. 1993.
27.
27. The Commission's report said, “We are addressing Heads of Government separately on questions of security which are in any event under the consideration of an inter-governmental committee—chaired by Prime Minister Sandiford.”West Indian Commission, Time for Action: Report of the West Indian Commission (Black Rock, Barbados: West Indian Commission, 1992), p. 471.
28.
28. See “News in Brief: Caricom Says RSS May Be Expanded,”San Juan Star, 24 Mar. 1993.
29.
U.S., Agency for International Development , Economic Assistance Strategy for the Caribbean 1999-2000 (Washington, DC: Agency for International Development, Aug. 1992), pp. 18-19.
