Social movements frequently fail to achieve the policy changes they seek, despite impressive demonstrations of widespread support. Yet movement participation has become increasingly popular as a form of political action. The authors seek to resolve this dilemma by distinguishing between three arenas of movement success: changing policy, gaining participation in the policy process, and changing social values. It is suggested that gaining access to the policy process is the most effective path for movement organizations to have an impact on policy outcomes, because authorities are often more willing to offer inclusion in the process than they are to accept movement demands for policy change. The authors' hypotheses are examined in light of the experience of the nuclear freeze movement, which sought and failed to achieve policy change, and the movement to control hazardous wastes, in which environmentalists are having an impact on policy by gaining participation in regulatory and implementation decisions.
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References
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1. Harry Boyte, The Backyard Revolution: Understanding the New Citizen Movement (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), p. 2.
2.
2. William Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, 2d ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990), chap. 3.
3.
3. These dimensions of movement success are similar to the three aspects of transformation described by Raimo Vayrynen: issue transformation, rule transformation, and structural transformation. Raimo Vayrynen, New Directions in Conflict Theory (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991).
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4. Loch Johnson, “Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy,”International Studies Quarterly, 33:81-109 (March 1989).
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on the Environmental Protection Agency, see Risk Analysis and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, a special symposium issue of Environmental Law, 21(4) (1991).
6.
6. Gamson, Strategy of Social Protest, pp. 31-37.
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7. Because Gamson ceased to monitor his challenging groups after they gained acceptance, the phenomenon of acceptance followed by policy advantages is beyond the reach of his study. Ibid., p. 31.
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8. Roland Vaubel, “A Public Choice Approach to International Organization,”Public Choice, 51(1):39-57 (1986).
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9. Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,”American Journal of Political Science, 28(1):165-179 (Feb. 1984).
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10. Ibid., p. 166.
11.
11. For their part, movement leaders may also seek participation in the political process as a way of extending their roles beyond the mobilization phase of movement protest. See Robert Salisbury, “An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups,”Midwest Journal of Political Science, 13(1):1-32 (Feb. 1969).
12.
David Meyer , A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York: Praeger, 1990).
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13. Douglas Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987), p. 52.
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14. Both citations are from L. Marvin Overby and Sarah Ritchie, “Mobilized Masses and Strategic Opponents: A Resource Mobilization Analysis of the Clean Air and Nuclear Freeze Movements” (Paper delivered at the meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, 1990).
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15. Michael Milburn, Paul Watanabe, and Bernard Kramer, “The Nature and Sources of Attitudes toward a Nuclear Freeze,”Political Psychology, 7(4):661-674 (1986).
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16. The Constitution says in part that “[the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls...and all other Officers of the United States.” U.S., Constitution, art. 2, sec. 2, para. 2.
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17. Louis Fisher, American Constitutional Law (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), p. 308.
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18. Dick Russell, “The Rise of the Grass-Roots Toxics Movement,”Amicus Journal, 12:17-21 (Winter 1990).
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19. This legislation includes toxics and hazardous waste legislation such as the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, as well as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, popularly known as Superfund.
20.
Norman J. Vig and Michael K. Kraft, eds., Environmental Policy in the 1990s (Washington, DC: C. Q. Press, 1990).
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21. Douglas J. Amy, “Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Promise and the Pitfalls,” in Environmental Policy, ed. Vig and Kraft, p. 212.
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22. Gail Bingham, Resolving Environmental Disputes: A Decade of Experience (Washington, DC: Conservation Foundation, 1986).
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23. Christopher J. Bosso, “Transforming Adversaries into Collaborators: Interest Groups and the Regulation of Chemical Pesticides,”Policy Sciences, 21(1):3-22 (1988).
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24. Barry Rabe, “Beyond the NIMBY Syndrome in Hazardous Waste Facility Siting,”Governance, 4(2):184-206 (Apr. 1991).
25.
25. Daniel Mazmanian and Michael Stanley-Jones, “Reconceiving LULUs: Changing the Nature and Scope of Locally Unwanted Land Uses,” in Confronting Regional Challenges: Approaches to LULUs, Growth, and Other Vexing Governance Problems, ed. Joseph DiMento and LeRoy Graymer (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land, 1991), pp. 55-75.
26.
26. Daniel Mazmanian, “Toward a New Energy Paradigm for California,” in California Policy Choices, vol. 8, ed. John Kirlin and Donald Winkler (Sacramento: University of Southern California, School of Public Administration, Sacramento Center, 1992).
27.
27. Other than indirectly, by pressuring the Reagan administration to create at least the appearance of arms control progress.
