Religious broadcasting has been an integral part of American culture since the very beginning of radio. Over the decades, religious broadcasters have periodically generated considerable controversy as they have used the airwaves to transmit unorthodox spiritual and political messages. The decade of the 1980s has been the most tumultuous and political thus far in the history of religious broadcasting. Televangelists forged a coalition that provided critical electoral support for Ronald Reagan and George Bush while also playing a significant role in defining the social agenda of the decade. Toward the end of the decade, however, religious broadcasting appeared to self-destruct in the wake of financial and sexual scandals that rocked several major ministries. Still, religious broadcasting not only persists, but some ministries thrive and some televangelists continue to influence the American political scene. This article examines the rise and fall of televangelism and explores the prospects for the continuing influence of broadcasters in American religion and politics.
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References
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1. The concept “evangelical” is here used to include the wide spectrum of conservative Christian traditions that are known by and call themselves “fundamentalist,”“Pentecostal,”“charismatic,” and, simply, “evangelical.”
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2. The concepts of liberal and mainline Protestantism are employed broadly to include those denominations or traditions that opted in the late nineteenth century for a modern worldview characterized by social concern and a commitment to shaping this world, in contrast to the evangelical worldview that stressed individual salvation and other-worldliness.
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3. Dennis N. Voskuil, “The Power of the Air: Evangelicals and the Rise of Religious Broadcasting,” in American Evangelicals and the Mass Media, ed. Quentin J. Schultze (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1990), p. 71.
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4. Ben Armstong, The Electric Church (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1979), p. 24.
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5. Kimberly A. Neuendorf, “The Public Trust versus the Almighty Dollar,” in Religious Television: Controversies and Conclusions, ed. Robert Abelman and Steward M. Hoover (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1990), p. 73.
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6. This estimate is reported in a variety of sources, but I have been unable to locate a primary source. Like the audience estimates of many contemporary televangelists, this figure is almost certainly an exaggeration. Other indicators, however, suggest that Coughlin did, indeed, have a very substantial following.
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7. Cynical viewers typically challenge the motives of religious broadcasters, seeing the religious broadcast itself as an instrument for the self-aggrandizement of the televangelist and his cronies. This, of course, is the subject for another article. For some relevant reflections, see Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson Shupe, “Elmer Gantry: Exemplar of American Televangelism,” in Religious Television, ed. Abelman and Hoover, pp. 13-22.
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8. Public service broadcasting has always been a responsibility that comes with the granting of a license to broadcast. FCC guidelines as to what constitutes public service broadcasting are general rather than explicit. Prior to 1960, it was always understood that sustaining, or free, time for religious broadcasting constituted public service broadcasting. As long as there are people standing in line to buy air time for religious programming, and as long as that paid programming is considered public service broadcasting, there is no incentive to give away air time.
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9. In 1958, the National Council of Churches of Christ formed a blue-ribbon Study Commission on the Role of Radio, Television, and Films in Religion. While a final report was never published, a book by commission member John W. Bachman (The Church in the World of Radio-Television [New York: Association Press, 1960]) was viewed by the commission secretary as representing the views of commission members.
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10. Ibid., p. 174.
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11. This process of shipping film from one station to another was called “bicycling.”
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12. These numbers represent a sum of the average number of viewers for all syndicated programs based on quarter-hour estimates. The data were assembled by the author from Arbitron ratings. The total cumulative audience would be substantially larger. For a discussion of audience, including the debate about audience size, see Jeffrey K. Hadden and Anson Shupe, Televangelism: Power and Politics on God's Frontier (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), pp. 142-159.
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13. All of the audience data presented in this article, unless otherwise indicated, were assembled by the author for the month of February from Arbitron publications. My thanks to Shelley Cagner of Arbitron for assistance. Arbitron and Nielsen operationally define “syndication” as broadcasting in five or more markets.
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14. From marketing research, including assessment of their own mail response, they learned that the station, time slot, and program immediately preceding can have important impacts on audience size.
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15. A parachurch is a religious organization that is freestanding, that is, independent of governance by denomination or major church bodies.
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16. For a discussion of the status of EFICOM, see “NRB Moves Slowly to Enforce Ethics Code,”Christianity Today, 9 Mar. 1992, p. 59.
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17. For an illuminating and sober assessment of the Christian Right from the Great Depression through the Cold War, see Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).
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18. Robertson, along with other radio and television broadcasters, used his programming to enlist participants. The rally demonstrated the potential for evangelicals to utilize the infrastructure of Christian radio, television, and religious presses to mobilize political participation.
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19. Most of the politically minded televangelists operate within legally permissible boundaries, at least most of the time. But the very fact that they have come to view their faith as inseparable from politics has positioned them beyond the range of permissible activity as far as many potential constituencies are concerned. They may have adequate resources to operate quite comfortably, at least for a while. But when hard times beset them, they will have extreme difficulty in establishing rapport with potential constituents whom they have already alienated. An equal, if not even more important, implication is the fact that they contribute to negative public perceptions that have tarnished their cathode-ray colleagues who resolutely avoid politics.
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20. The PTL scandal did not break until late March of 1987.
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21. John H. Simpson, “Moral Issues and Status Politics,” in The New Christian Right, ed. Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (New York: Aldine, 1983).
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22. This is probably an important reason why politicians become increasingly vague as they move closer to elections.
