Since the early nineteenth century, when Uthman b. Fudi established an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, there has been a close symbiosis between religion and political power. Since independence in 1960, the issue of regional or ethnic power sharing in Nigeria has shifted to a contest between Muslims and Christians, with the part-Muslim, part-Christian Yoruba of the southwest helping to hold the balance. Since the 1960s, Saudi Arabia has promoted its own austere interpretation of Islam, to the discomfort of the Sufi groups. More recently, Iran has been a model for younger militant Muslims. Calls by Nigerian Muslims for an Islamic state, and wider application of shari`a law, as well as the question of Nigeria's membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference have aroused the antagonism of Christians. Religious issues were behind several outbreaks of violence in the 1980s, some of which threatened the integrity of the Nigerian state.
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References
1.
1. See Barbara Crossette, “U.S. Aide Calls Muslim Militants' Concern to World,”New York Times, 1 Jan. 1992.
2.
2. See John N. Paden, Religion and Political Culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), tab. 3, p. 44. Apart from a small number of converts to the Ahmadiyya sect, all Nigerian Muslims are Sunnites of the Maliki school.
3.
3. Paden, Religion and Political Culture. The figures announced for the 1991 census show a total population of 88.5 million.
4.
4. See further Jibrin Ibrahim, “The Politics of Religion in Nigeria: The Parameters of the 1987 Crisis in Kaduna State,”Review of African Political Economy, 45-46:78 (1989), where attention is also drawn to the dramatic gains of Christianity vis-à-vis animism in the period 1931-63.
5.
5. See Richard Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
6.
6. Taylor Cole, “Bureaucracy in Transition,” in The Nigerian Political Scene, ed. Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 109. A regional quota system for recruitment of army officers was also established in which 50 percent of the places were reserved for candidates of northern origin.
7.
Ibrahim , “Politics of Religion.”
8.
8. On this issue, see David D. Laitin, “The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic,”Journal of Modern African Studies, 20(3):411-430 (1982).
9.
See also Don Ohadike, “Muslim-Christian Conflict and Political Instability in Nigeria,” in Religion and National Integration in Africa: Islam, Christianity and Politics in the Sudan and Nigeria, ed. John O. Hunwick (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1992), pp. 101-124.
10.
10. Ibrahim, “Politics of Religion in Nigeria,” p. 77, quoting remarks of Ibrahim Suleiman published in the Nigerian Sunday Triumph, 24 Apr. 1986.
11.
11. See Ousmane Kane, “La confrérie `Tijâniyya Ibrahîmiyya' de Kano et ses liens avec la zâwiya mère de Kaolack,”Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara, 3:27-40 (1989).
12.
12. See Muhammad Sani Umar, “Changing Islamic Identity in Nigeria, 1960s-1980s: From Sufism to Anti-Sufism,” in Muslim Identities in Sub-Saharan Africa: Contemporary Transformations in Muslim Societies, ed. L. Brenner (London: Christopher Hurst, forthcoming).
13.
13. See Peter Clarke, “Islamic Reform in Contemporary Nigeria: Methods and Aims,”Third World Quarterly, 10(2):530 (Apr. 1988).
14.
14. See the press release of the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, n.d., in Peter Clarke and Ian Linden, Islam in Modern Nigeria (Mainz-Munchen: Kaiser-Grunewald, 1984), pp. 167-168.
15.
15. On these developments, see the excellent summary in Ousmane Kane, “Mouvements religieux et champ politique au Nigeria septentrional: Le cas de réformisme musulman au Kano,”Islam et sociétés au sud du Sahara, 4:7-24 (1990). The term “Shia” seems to be used loosely in Nigeria, without doctrinal connotations, to stigmatize radical, militant Muslim groups.
16.
16. See Umar, “Changing Islamic Identity.”
17.
17. It may be noted that, had shari`a been applicable, the man would have suffered the death penalty for his apostasy from Islam.
18.
18. According to an official inquiry, 19 people and eight animals were killed, and 169 hotels or beer parlors, 152 churches, five mosques, and 95 vehicles were destroyed or damaged. See Ibrahim, “Politics of Religion,” p. 67.
19.
19. Ibid., p. 68.
20.
20. A Muslim preacher from South Africa had earlier been denied a permit to hold meetings in Kano.
21.
21. As reported in Punch (Lagos), 24 Apr. 1990, p. 8.
22.
22. Kane, “Mouvements religieux,” p. 21.
23.
23. The Maitatsine phenomenon has provoked a literature of explanations. A convenient bibliography of this literature is to be found in Niels Kastfelt, “Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture in Northern Nigeria,”African Affairs, 88:83-90 (1989), an article that analyzes the power of rumor in political myth-making in the Nigerian context.
