One of the most controversial tools of federal antidiscrimination policy in the employment area is the affirmative action program conducted by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP). The OFCCP requires firms holding federal government contracts to set numerical hiring goals for minorities and women. Firms that fail to meet their targets face the threat of contract cancellation. The setting of hiring goals requires estimation of available pools of qualified minorities and women, which in practice cannot be done with any precision. Studies show no clear positive link between gains in minority earnings and the affirmative action efforts of the OFCCP. Current earnings differentials between blacks and whites appear to be more closely tied to differences in work-related skills than to labor market discrimination. The growing premium on skill in our economy underscores the need for improvement in the schooling of blacks and other minorities suffering educational deficiencies.
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References
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1. Thirteen states had enforceable anti-discrimination laws by 1959. See June O'Neillet al., The Economic Progress of Black Men in America, Clearing House Publication 91 (Washington, DC: Commission on Civil Rights, Oct. 1986), p. 108 and studies cited therein.
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2. Calculated from data in U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, series P-60, published annually.
3.
3. John J. Donohue III and James Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,”Journal of Economic Literature, 29:1603-1643 (Dec. 1991).
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4. O'Neillet al., Economic Progress of Black Men, p. 100.
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5. Many state and local governments have affirmative action programs similar to that of the OFCCP. The federal government also has a program for its own employees.
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6. The first executive order prohibiting discrimination by federal contractors was signed by President Roosevelt in 1941. Presidents Truman and Kennedy also signed related executive orders. See Hugh Davis Graham, “The Origins of Affirmative Action: Civil Rights and the Regulatory State,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
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7. A similar development occurred in the EEOC's approach to the enforcement of Section VII. A Supreme Court ruling—Griggs v. Duke Power (1972)—held that a statistical disparity can be illegal even without discriminatory intent, if it results from any aspect of the firm's hiring procedures.
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8. Laurence Silberman, “The Road to Racial Quotas,”Wall Street Journal, 11 Aug. 1977. Used by permission.
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9. Even if available, information such as test scores or even schooling may be impermissible for determining qualifications. Both high school graduation and attainment of a particular score on two general intelligence tests were disqualified by the U.S. Supreme Court as requirements for admission into training programs for skilled crafts in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.
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10. The goal for women in construction is a national constant, 6.9 percent. See Finis Welch, “Affirmative Action and Discrimination,” in The Question of Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, ed. Steven Shulman and William Darity, Jr. (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), p. 144, n. 4.
11.
11. Jonathan Leonard, “The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment,”Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4:49 (Fall 1990).
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12. Between 1978 and 1981, 27,000 compliance reviews at 11,000 different establishments resulted in only 26 debarments. Jonathan Leonard, “The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment,”Journal of Labor Economics, 2(4):447 (1984).
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13. Leonard, “Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation,” p. 49.
14.
14. Ibid., p. 50.
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15. In 1970, the OFCC had a staff of only 34 persons. In 1979, after consolidation of 11 agency offices with the OFCCP, positions numbered 1021. Donohue and Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change,” p. 1636, tab. 8.
16.
16. Leonard, “Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation,” p. 58.
17.
idem , “Employment and Occupational Advances under Affirmative Action,”Review of Economics and Statistics, 66:377-385 (1984).
18.
18. Donohue and Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change,” pp. 1630-1635.
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Donohue and Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change,” pp. 1603-1643.
20.
20. James Heckman and Brooks Paynor, “Determining the Impact of Federal Anti-Discrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,”American Economic Review, 79(1): 173 (Mar. 1989).
21.
21. Donohue and Heckman, “Continuous versus Episodic Change,” pp. 1637-1640.
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22. Chinhui Juhn, Kevin M. Murphy, and Brooks Pierce, “Accounting for the Slowdown in Black-White Convergence,” in Workers and Their Wages: Changing Patterns in the United States, ed. Marvin Kosters (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991), pp. 107-145.
23.
23. June O'Neill and S. Polachek, “Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s,”Journal of Labor Economics (in press).
24.
Abigail Thernstrom , “The Drive for Racially Inclusive Schools,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
25.
25. O'Neill, “Role of Human Capital,” p. 43 and tab.
26.
26. Ibid., tab. 5, p. 41.
27.
27. Jonathan S. Leonard, “Affirmative Action as Earnings Redistribution: The Targeting of Compliance Reviews,”Journal of Labor Economics, 3:363-384 (July 1985). Leonard labels the OFCCP targeting strategy as “leaning on open doors.”
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28. If firms subject to compliance reviews are not in fact discriminating, then relative gains by blacks can be made only at the expense of more qualified white workers. Such a situation would be difficult to force upon employers for any period of time or on a large scale.
29.
29. See Glenn C. Loury, “Incentive Effects of Affirmative Action,” this issue of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
