Second Chance in China: Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1990s

Abstract

The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in 1989 represents an important element in the evolving post-cold-war system of East Asian regional and global politics. Unlike the Sino-Soviet security alliance cum ideological partnership of the 1950s, the new relationship is both pragmatic and limited. The improved security atmosphere is evidenced by mutual force-reduction agreements and the resumption of military exchanges. Border and regional trade are an increasingly important element in the economic relationship, but centralized trade still predominates. Chinese leaders are very disturbed by the weakening of Communist Party control and the erosion of socialist values in the USSR. Political uncertainties in both countries, particularly in the USSR, require us to consider alternative scenarios for the future of Sino-Soviet relations. In any event, the relationship is less central to each country than in the past because of the altered international environment in the Asian-Pacific region.

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References

1. See, inter alia, Thomas G. Hart , Sino-Soviet Relations: The Prospects for Normalization (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Gower, 1987).

2. China Daily, 17 May 1989, p. 1.

3. At the time of writing, even the nomenclature of Soviet politics was in question; the names “USSR” and “Soviet Union” seemed likely to disappear.

4. For a more detailed exposition see Steven I. Levine , “Reprise or Transformation? Some Thoughts on Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1990s,” in The Soviet Union and the Asian-Pacific Region, ed. Pushpa Thambipillai and Daniel C. Matuszewski , (New York: Praeger, 1989), 50-59.

5. Steven M. Goldstein , “Diplomacy amid Protest: The Sino-Soviet Summit,” Problems of Communism, 35(5):49-71 (Sept.-Oct. 1989).

6. Pravda, 1 Mar. 1990, p. 5.

in Foreign Broadcast Information Service , FBIS Daily Report—Soviet Union (hereafter cited as FBIS—SU), 14 May 1990, p. 27.

in FBIS—SU, 19 July 1989, p. 18.

in FBIS—Chi, 20 Jan. 1990, p. 4.

10.

10. Moscow International Service in Mandarin , 23 Dec. 1989, in FBIS—SU, 26 Dec. 1989, p. 5.

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11. See Liu Binyan , China's Crisis, China's Hope (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).

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12. See Vestnik (Moscow), June 1990, pp. 25-26.

13.

in FBIS—Chi, 26 Sept. 1989, p. 4. Two military establishments that regarded each other as primary adversaries for a generation are not likely to jettison their ingrained attitudes all at once.

14.

14. Moscow International Service in Mandarin , 2 June 1990, in FBIS—SU, 4 June 1990, p. 35.

15.

15. See “The Military Implications of Sino-Soviet Relations,” in U.S., Congress, Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Congressional Research Service, Sino-Soviet Relations after the Summit (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 76-110.

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16. See Free China Journal (Taipei), 22 Nov. 1990, p. 5.

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16 Mar. 1990, pp. 6-8.

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18. See Sharon E. Ruwart , “Expanding Sino-Soviet Trade,” China Business Review, 18(2):42-50 (Mar.-Apr. 1991).

19.

19. As of late 1990, approximately 20,000 Chinese workers were engaged in construction, the timber industry, agriculture, and so on in the Soviet Union, and the total demand for such workers was estimated at 200,000. In 1990, the through rail link between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan—first agreed to in 1956 but suspended because of the Sino-Soviet conflict —was completed with the help of a Soviet loan.

20.

20. See Gaye Christoffersen , “Xinjiang's Open Door Policy in Sino-Soviet Relations,” Pacific Affairs (in press).

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Leo A. Orleans , Chinese Students in America (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988).

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22. Pravda, FBIS—SU, 22 May 1990, p. 13.