Conflict and Cooperation: Between the Cold War and the Gulf

Abstract

Several myths about Soviet-American relations vis-à-vis third actors—unlimited military competition during the Cold War; perfect future political harmony; international political status quo and lack of significant change—may get in the way of possible cooperation in conflict avoidance, management, and resolution. This article examines the historical and structural setting that has created a proper climate for parallel U.S. and Soviet initiative and joint diplomatic efforts regarding Third World disputes. Conflicts that may lend themselves most to joint U.S.-Soviet involvement on behalf of conflict regulation or resolution are (1) conflicts outside local spheres of influence, (2) conflicts where the leverage available to Washington and Moscow with respect to one or both disputants is greatest, (3) disputes that can be paired and are subject to workable quid pro quos, and (4) conflict situations that can be submitted to international organizations within which the superpowers hold significant membership. Pragmatism and flexibility will serve the superpowers well in their quest to generate a more stable and secure Third World political environment.

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