The Lebanese conflict has gone through a number of phases, each with its own rationale, incorporating different issues and at times different players. Throughout there were attempts on both the domestic and the external level to find a solution to what was plaguing the country and eroding its political and social institutions. This article examines three major attempts at resolving the Lebanese conflict when the representatives of the domestic factions sat together and came up with formulae that appeared to address everyone's concerns. The process of multilateral negotiations, the asymmetrical structures of those negotiations, the ripe moment for negotiating, the role of external mediators, and the whole issue of the valid spokesman are analyzed within a theoretical framework based on I. William Zartman's model of government-insurgency negotiations.
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References
1.
I. William Zartman , Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 220-251.
2.
2. See Marius Deeb, The Lebanese Civil War (New York: Praeger, 1989), chaps 2, 3, and 4, pp. 21-121, and, for the list of the various organizations, see pp. xiii-xiv.
3.
3. Ibid., p. 3; Al-Nahar, 25 Sept. 1975, p. 1.
4.
4. The most prominent Christian leaders in the National Dialogue Committee were three. First was Camille Chamoun, who was at the time a member of Parliament and a cabinet minister and who was also the president of the republic (1952-58). On the ground Chamoun had, through his party, the National Liberal Party, controlled the second largest Christian militia. Second was Pierre Gemayel, a member of Parliament and a former cabinet minister. Through his Phalangist Party, he had controlled the most powerful Christian militia. Third was Raymond Eddé, who was then a member of Parliament and a former cabinet minister. He is the leader of the Christian National Bloc, succeeding his father, Emile Eddé, who was a president of the republic prior to 1943. Although Raymond Eddé refused to form a militia, he had tremendous political clout due to his independent character and charismatic personality. The two remaining members of Parliament, who were also former cabinet ministers, were René Muawwad, who was an ally of President Sulayman Franjiya and who hailed from the same Zgharta region, and Khatchik Babikian, a prominent politician representing the Armenian Tashnaq Party. Ghassan Tuwaini, a publisher and a journalist, and Philip Taqla, who had frequently served as minister for foreign affairs, were members of the cabinet but had no power on the ground. Ibid.
5.
5. Only Raymond Rabbat, who was a prominent jurist, a former university professor, and an expert on constitutional law, did not belong to the political establishment. Ilyas Saba and Abbas Khalaf, who were former cabinet ministers, were, respectively, protégés of President Franjiya and the Druze chief and head of the National Movement, Kamal Junblat.
6.
6. Three of the four Sunnis were prominent politicians. The prime minister at the time, Rashid Karami, was also a member of Parliament. The second of these politicians, Saib Salam was a member of Parliament and a former prime minister. The third, Abdallah al-Yafi, was a former prime minister and a former member of Parliament. Only Najib Quaranuh, a physician by profession, was not a member of the political establishment, but he was a protégé of Saib Salam. The leading Shi`ite muqatiji (“feudal”) politician, Kamil al-Asad, who was the Speaker of Parliament, was a member of the National Dialogue Committee. But the remaining Shi`ite members, Rida Wahid, Hasan Awadah, and Asim Qansu, were not members of the political establishment. The first two were prominent civil servants but with no political clout. Qansu, on the other hand, was a leader of the pro-Syrian Baath Party in Lebanon who was heading a militia and working for Syrian Intelligence Services; that is, he was Syria's protégé.
7.
Augustus Richard Norton , Amal and the Shi'a Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).
8.
8. For the views of the Lebanese Front, see Deeb, Lebanese Civil War, pp. 37, 41.
9.
9. Ibid. pp. 75-77.
10.
10. Al-Asad refused to attend the National Dialogue Committee meetings because, as the Speaker of the House, he believed that he, rather than Prime Minister Karami, should preside over the National Dialogue Committee. Ibid., p. 79.
11.
11. See the preface in this volume.
12.
12. Ibid., pp. 85-87.
13.
13. President Amin Gemayel, Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, and Sulayman Franjiya, respectively.
14.
14. Saib Salam, Rashid Karami, Adil Usayran, Walid Junblat, and Nabih Berri, respectively.
15.
15. George Bashir, Philip Abi Aql, and Fawzi Mubarak, Umara` al-Tawa`if min Geneva ila Lausanne (Beirut: Wikala al Anba al-Markaziya, n.d.), pp. 41-116.
16.
16. Marius Deeb, “Lebanon's Continuing Conflict,”Current History, Jan. 1985, p. 34.
17.
17. Bashir, Abi Aql, and Mubarak, Umara` al-Tawa`if, pp. 114-116.
18.
18. Ibid., pp. 139-41.
19.
19. FBIS Near East and South Asia, 25 Sept. 1989, p. 38.
20.
20. Ibid., 23 Oct. 1989, p. 4.
21.
21. See Zartman, “Regional Conflict Reduction,” p. 7.
