After thirty years of war, the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean nationalists was further than ever from a solution. Liberation movements had been organized in other areas of the country, most notably in Tigre, where the Tigrean People's Liberation Front had won major victories. What had started as a bilateral conflict between the government and the Eritrean nationalists thus entered a phase of transition to a multilateral conflict. This made the prospect of a negotiated solution more remote. By definition, many of the conditions necessary for successful negotiations are absent in transitional conflicts, most notably a mutually hurting stalemate and the existence of valid spokesmen.
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References
1.
1. For example, some Eritreans argue that Tigrinya should be written in the Latin alphabet, rather than in the alphabet it shares with Amharic. Also, the final communiqué of the Atlanta talks, issued on 19 Sept. 1989, did not mention Tigrinya as one of the negotiating languages but listed just Amharic, the language of the Ethiopian side; Arabic, the language of the Eritrean side; and English, the neutral language.
2.
2. See John Markakis, National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 5.
3.
3. In early 1978, only Asmara, Barentu, and the port cities of Massawa and Asab remained firmly in government hands. See ibid., p. 245.
4.
4. Between 1977 and 1987, the Soviet Union delivered over $8 billion worth of military equipment to Ethiopia. See Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1988 (1991), pp. 84, 111.
5.
5. Cuban troops never fought in Eritrea, theoretically refusing to take sides in an internal conflict and above all to go against the Eritrean nationalists they had supported in the days of Haile Selassie. Of course, the Cuban troops on the Ogaden front freed Ethiopian troops for Eritrea. Cuban troops withdrew completely from Ethiopia in 1989.
6.
Dawit does not explain what recognizing the liberation movements meant, or what kind of political solution the government had in mind.
7.
Bereket Habte Selassie , “Empire and Constitutional Engineering: The PDRE in Historical Perspective,” in Political Economy of Ethiopia, ed. Ottaway.
8.
8. On the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, see Christopher Clapham, Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chap. 4.
9.
9. Haggai Ehrlich, Ethiopia and the Challenge of Independence (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 19.
10.
10. On the TPLF's link with the student movement, see broadcast of the Voice of Tigray Revolution, 21 Oct. 1989, in Federal Broadcast Information Service, Sub-Saharan Africa, 24 Oct. 1989.
11.
11. See Markakis, National and Class Conflict, pp. 254ff.
12.
12. See African Confidential, 29 Apr. 1988.
13.
13. On the coup, see ibid., 26 May 1989.
14.
Clapham , Transformation and Continuity, pp. 204ff.
15.
15. A TPLF statement of 13 June 1989, issued in London, summarizes a TPLF peace proposal. The major point is “the establishment of a provisional government constituted from all political organizations, for a transitional period, until a constitution has been adopted by the people and a democratic government has been elected.” Contrary to the EPLF, the TPLF seeks a role in the central government.
16.
16. On EPDM and EPRDF, see Africa Confidential, 3 Nov. 1989.
17.
17. This cultural trait is analyzed at length in Donald Levine, Wax and Gold (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965).
18.
18. On the relationship between the Derg and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, see David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Ethiopia: Empire in Revolution (New York: Africana, 1978), pp. 122-123, 187-189.
19.
19. See Negussay Ayele, “The Ethiopian Revolution: Political Aspects of the Transition from PMAC to PDRE,” in The Political Economy of Ethiopia, ed. Ottaway.
20.
20. See Federal Broadcast Information Service, Sub-Saharan Africa, 28 Nov. 1989, p. 2.
21.
See also Ottaway and Ottaway, Ethiopia, p. 158.
22.
22. I. William Zartman, “Negotiations in South Africa,”Washington Quarterly, 11(4): 141-158.
23.
23. Weapon deliveries to Ethiopia increased substantially in January 1990. This may have simply been a long-scheduled delivery, but it did not help convey a sense of urgency.
24.
Markakis , National and Class Conflict, pp. 246ff.
