It is suggested that one reason for the resistance of protracted, intranational conflicts to efforts at resolution arises from their asymmetric structure. The concept of asymmetry is examined and illustrated. The argument is made that asymmetry is a more complex conception than a simple matter of power imbalance. Various dimensions of asymmetry are outlined and some examination made of the implications of legal and structural asymmetries for conflict resolution. Finally, some suggestions are offered concerning the possible impact of asymmetric structure on feasible procedures for conflict resolution and the content of lasting solutions to protracted, intranational conflicts.
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References
1.
1. C. R. Mitchell, “Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties,”International Studies Quarterly, 14(2):164-194 (June 1970).
2.
2. Ted Robert Gurr and James R. Scarritt, “Minorities Rights at Risk: A Global Survey,” mimeographed (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1989).
3.
3. Kumar Rupasinghe, “Theories of Conflict Resolution and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflict,”Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 18(4):527-539 (1978).
4.
4. Much U.S. analysis seems, to an outsider, to be dominated by an almost unconscious acceptance of the success of the meltingpot model or, at least, by a failure to distinguish between an ethnic group and ethnic nationalism. See Aftab A. Kazi, “Ethnic Nationalism and Superpowers in South Asia: Sindhis and Baluchis,”Journal of Asian and African Affairs, 1(1):1-18 (July 1989).
5.
5. Dean G. Pruitt and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, Social Conflict (New York: Random House, 1986).
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6. It should be emphasized that other important dimensions in Pruitt and Rubin's theory about the selection of strategies in interpersonal and intergroup conflicts involve such variables as the anticipated effectiveness of the chosen strategy, which may also be asymmetric! The present concentration upon the dual-concern aspect of their work runs a danger of distorting the subtlety of their overall argument.
7.
7. Another important, and related, question involves whether these salient forms of asymmetry can help us to discriminate between separate cases of protracted ethnonational conflict and different stages or cycles of the same case.
8.
8. Apart from this assumption of asymmetry, which distinguishes conflict participants from conflict analysts, the former share a strong assumption of uniqueness and become indignant when it is suggested that their conflict can be fruitfully compared with others and lessons can be learned about causes, dynamics, and outcomes.
9.
9. See Andrew J. R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,”World Politics, 27(2):175-200 (Jan. 1975).
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10. In some protracted conflicts, the issue of survivability is obviously associated with perceptions about the finality or reversibility of any settlement of a cycle in the dispute. In Israeli eyes, Arab success in forcing a solution on Israel might result not merely in the final destruction of Israel as the Jewish state but in that of the Jewish ethnonational community in Israel through genocide. There could be no reversal of either outcome; moreover, both would involve a double level of destruction—of state and community. In the case of the unionist community in Northern Ireland, there exists a strong perception that, should a nationalist majority for a politically united Ireland somehow come into being, there would be no possibility of their reversing either the decision about political unity or the—admittedly gradual—process of destruction of their own community and identity, a destruction that they perceive as having occurred with the Protestant community in the south.
11.
11. See Mitchell, “Civil Strife.”
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12. Enough conflicts—or conflict cycles—do end in negotiated solutions—for example the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1916-21 or the First Sudanese Civil War of 1956-72—to indicate that such endings, while difficult to achieve, are not impossible.
13.
13. John Darby, Intimidation and the Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1987).
14.
14. Louis Kriesberg, “Interlocking Conflicts in the Middle East,” in Research on Conflict, Social Movements and Change, ed. Louis Kriesberg (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980), 3:99-119.
15.
15. Kalevi J. Holsti, “Resolving Conflicts Internationally: A Taxonomy and Some Figures,”Journal of Conflict Resolution, 10(3): 272-296 (Sept. 1966).
16.
16. It could be argued that the preservation of the existing political system for incumbents is, in fact, a means of defending the latter's own identity.
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17. This may turn out, upon further analysis, to be a major difference between protracted internal regime wars and protracted ethnonationalist conflicts.
