Enhancing Total Combat Power with Fewer Forces

Abstract

The United States is about to reduce its military forces to levels not seen since before World War II. Even with the demise of the Warsaw Pact and improvements in relationships with the Soviet Union, however, the world remains an uncertain and often hostile place. The United States needs the means to minimize the risks to its security that could arise as forces are reduced. This can best be done by exploiting its technological advantages. Sensor-fuzed munition technology stands apart from other alternatives because it provides enormous gains in total combat capabilities without attendant liabilities. The marriage of sensor-fuzed munition technology with modern target acquisition and delivery systems will revolutionize conventional warfare just as the nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile revolutionized strategic warfare. Such a revolutionary change has major policy implications.

Get full access to this article

View all access options for this article.

References

1. For example, the base force concept, which represents a floor in capabilities “below which forces may no longer be adequate to underwrite vital strategic objectives.” Outlined by Lieutenant General George L. Butler in a speech to the Center for Defense Journalism, National Press Club, 27 Sept. 1990.

2. General John W. Foss in an interview published in Armed Forces Journal International, Mar. 1990, p. 64.

3. Foss , interview, Armed Forces Journal International, p. 63.

4. David C. Hardison, keynote address, First Biennial Modeling and Simulation of Smart Weapons Symposium, GACIAC PR 89-06, Tactical Weapon Guidance and Control Information Analysis Center, IIT Research Institute, Chicago, IL, 26-27 June 1989, p. 60.

5. Chris Bellamy , Red God of War (London: Brassey's Defence, 1986).

6. U.S., Department of Defense , Department of the Army , United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center , Soviet Army Operations, IAG-13-U-78, Apr. 1978.

7. David Hardison expressed the same point this way: “To illustrate, an Army Division, with its Corps slice of artillery, might have the equivalent of, say, 100 howitzers. On a busy day these on average might fire some 200 rounds each for a total of 20,000 rounds which would have a shipping weight of perhaps 3000 tons which in turn would require 200 10-ton trucks to lift. These, if in a convoy at the usual pacing of 50 meter intervals, would stretch 10 km and would account for 70-80% of the Division's total daily resupply requirements....” Hardison, keynote address, First Biennial Modeling and Simulation of Smart Weapons Symposium, p. 60.

8. There are typically more dumb warheads in a 1000-pound class munition than there are smart warheads in the SFW. After accounting for the difference in numbers of warheads, the likelihood of any particular target being hit favors SFW by about 20:1.

9. General Crosbie E. Saint and Colonel (P) Walter H. Yates, Jr. , “Attack Helicopter Operations in the AirLand Battle: Rear Operations,” Military Review, Oct. 1988, pp. 2-10.