Defense Reorganization and National Security

Abstract

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 dramatically punctuated almost a century of efforts to make the leadership, management, and use of American armed forces more cohesive and efficient. The primary approach was an increasing centralization of civilian authority, including the creation and further strengthening of the Office of the Secretary of Defense by the National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent amendments. Nonetheless, the armed services remained in a divisive and contentious framework under the intentionally emaciated authority of a weakly centralized collectivity on the uniformed side of the defense establishment. The Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to fix the problem by centralizing the uniformed side of the Pentagon in parallel with the civilian side, running the risk that this could lead to civil-military conflict instead of a smooth partnership between the defense secretary and the sharply enhanced Joint Chiefs of Staff's chairman immediately under him. This article analyzes the main consequences of the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the first four years since it was signed into law.

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References

James A. Blackwell, Jr. , and Barry M. Blechman , eds., Making Defense Reform Work (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990).

2. The acronym “CINC” is pronounced “sink.”

3. For example, see the issue of Economist dated 1 Sept. 1990, p. 26: “Less than a year into his job, [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell] has deployed American troops six times—twice in Panama, once each in the Philippines, Liberia, El Salvador and now Saudi Arabia.”