Especially in a decade of heightened budgetary restraints, the United States will continue to confront the practical problem of how to reduce strategic commitments and force levels in keeping with future military roles and missions. It will be necessary to break the cycle of the past in which the United States formulated strategies and requirements that could not be met and then procured forces based on available funds simply by cutting the share of the pie for each service.
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References
1.
1. The triad is the strategic force of the United States. It comprises three elements: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, and aircraft.
2.
2. All trend data on real defense spending used in this article were provided to the author by the Comptroller's Office of the Department of Defense in Nov. 1990.
3.
3. Ibid.
4.
4. Ibid.
5.
5. Based on a series of surveys provided to the U.S. Congress called “Americans Talk Security.”
6.
Stephen Daggett , “Comparison of Original Reagan Administration Military Force Goals with Current Levels” (Working paper, Congressional Research Service, 14 Dec. 1990).
7.
Daggett , “Comparison of Original Reagan Administration Military Force Goals.”
8.
8. Based upon FY 1992 budget data provided by the Department of Defense on 4 Feb. 1991.
9.
ibid., 1987-88 ed. (1987).
10.
10. “Total Quantities and Costs of Major Weapons Systems Procured, FY 1974-FY 1988” (Data sheets, Congressional Budget Office, 6 Feb. 1987).
11.
11. Working data provided by the Defense Budget Project.
12.
12. Michael Gordon, “Pentagon Drafts Post Cold-War Strategy,”New York Times, 2 Aug. 1990; Department of Defense briefing materials on the FY1992 defense budget, 4 Feb. 1991.
13.
13. A MEF consists of one Marine division and one Marine tactical air wing.
14.
14. Gordon, “Pentagon Drafts Post Cold-War Strategy.”
15.
15. A wing has a nominal strength of 72 aircraft.
16.
16. This is not to say that U.S. Navy air planners showed any more realism or competence, but they were dealing with a much smaller force. For an analysis of the Air Force's problems, see Congressional Budget Office, “Tactical Combat Forces of the United States Air Force: Issues and Alternatives” (Staff working paper, Congressional Budget Office, May 1984), esp. pp. 19-21.
17.
17. Adams, “Weinberger Defense Legacy,” p. 4.
18.
18. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
19.
19. These problems were scarcely unique to aircraft; 19 of 38 major defensewide procurements were being produced at noneconomic rates in the FY1988-FY1992 plan. The problem also began to be critical much earlier. Only 12 of 38 key systems throughout the Department of Defense were planned to be produced at economic rates in the FY1983-FY1987 plan. Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Weapons Procurement Stretch-Outs on Costs and Schedules (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, Nov. 1987).
20.
20. David R. Griffiths, “Weinberger Alerts Reagan on Future Funding Needs,”Aviation Week, 22 June 1981, p. 25.
21.
21. Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report FY1983 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 31 Jan. 1982), p. III-20.
22.
John D. Morocco , “New Pentagon Strategy Shifts Focus from Europe to Regional Conflicts,”Aviation Week, 13 Aug. 1990, pp. 25-27.
