The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Relationship

Abstract

The U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship is being transformed by the revolutionary events in Europe—culminating in the end of the Cold War—and by dynamics internal to the Soviet Union. The relationship is, at present, asymmetrical: with the United States at the apex of its global influence and the USSR at its nadir, the superpowers remain equal only in their enduring capability to destroy each other. The future, however, holds more peril than promise. First, the USSR seeks to fundamentally redefine what its armed forces will look like and how they will be prepared to fight. This potential for a long-term surge in Soviet combat effectiveness must be factored into the U.S. national security calculus; now is not too soon to identify and pursue the emerging technologies upon which the U.S. trans-century agenda should be anchored. Second, the breakdown of central authority in the Soviet Union threatens to sweep away the stability and predictability that have, hitherto, defined the superpower relationship. Insofar as empires do not fade away peacefully, the disintegration of a nuclear-armed Soviet Union might emerge as the most dangerous threat to U.S. security.

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References

For a more recent operational assessment, see William P. Baxter , Soviet Airland Battle Tactics (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), pp. 6-11.

2. The correlation of forces indeed is the second law of war. In standard Soviet formulations it is preceded by the Clausewitzian-Leninist statement that “war depends on its political goals” and is followed by the Marxist-Leninist assertion that “victory goes to the side that possesses and uses the capabilities of a new and more progressive social order.” As laws, these tenets are outside the subjective realm of personal views and cannot be changed at will. Therefore, they serve as a long-range guide for action in the national security arena. The laws of war have no Western equivalent.

For an earlier argument along similar lines, see, for example, N. V. Ogarkov, “The Defense of Socialism: The Experience of History and the Contemporary Period,” ibid., 9 May 1984.

4. Abel Aganbegyan , The Challenge of Perestroika (London: Century Hutchison, 1988), pp. 226-227. Aganbegyan is one of Gorbachev's key economic advisers.

5. Mikhail S. Gorbachev , Perestroika i novoe myshlenie (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), p. 211. This book, available in English, is obligatory reading for U.S. national security professionals. It should be noted, however, that the English-language version is not identical to the Russian.

6. The entire statement is worth quoting, as it crystallizes the true thrust of Gorbachev's strategy: “The very course of Lenin's thought, the entire activity of the Bolsheviks, marked by swift change of form and method, flexibility, unusual tactical solutions, and by political audacity—all this was a vivid example of an anti-dogmatic, truly dialectic, and therefore, new way of thinking. That and only that is how real Marxist-Leninists think and act—especially at times of change, at critical turning points, when the future of the revolution and peace, socialism and progress is at stake.” M. S. Gorbachev , October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1987), p. 10.

7. M. S. Gorbachev, speech to the Supreme Soviet, Radio Moscow, 26 Nov. 1990, printed in FBIS-SOV-90-228, 27 Nov. 1990.

8. For an excellent Western analysis, see William E. Odom , “Soviet Military Doctrine,” Foreign Affairs, 67(2):114-134 (Winter 1988-89).

For an even earlier presentation of the restructuring agenda, see idem , “Na strazhe mirnogo truda,” in Materialy Vsesoyuznogo seminara-soveshchaniya ideologicheskikh rabotnikov, ed. Ye. M. Tiazhel'nikov (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), pp. 339-365. The piece was subsequently reprinted under the same title in Kommunist, July 1981, no. 10, pp. 80-91.

10.

10. Ogarkov , Always in Readiness, p. 31.

11.

11. Ibid., p. 35. See also N. V. Orgarkov, “Reliable Defense for Peace,”Izvestiya, 23 Sept. 1983; ibid., Krasnaya zvezda, 23 Sept. 1983. Except for Politburo-level statements, such simultaneous printing in two central newspapers is extremely rare.

12.

12. For a comprehensive analysis, see Ilana Kass and Fred Clark Boli , “The Soviet Military's Trans-century Agenda,” Comparative Strategy, 9(3):319-333 (Fall 1990).

13.

For a more recent reaffirmation, see V. V. Myasnikov , Zashchita ot oruzhiya massovogo porazheniya (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1989), pp. 135-139, esp. the discussion of “beam, radiofrequency, infrasonic, radiological and geophysical weapons.”

14.

14. V.M. Shabanov , “Adequate Armaments Are Vital,” Soviet Military Review, Mar. 1987, pp. 1-5.

15.

Yu. Molostov and A. Novikov , “High-Precision Weapons against Tanks,” Soviet Military Review, Jan. 1988, pp. 12-13.

16.

Shabanov , Krasnaya zvezda.

17.

17. D. T. Yazov, interview in Krasnaya zvezda, 13 Apr. 1989; M. A. Moiseyev, interview in Krasnaya zvezda, 10 Feb. 1989; ibid., 23 Feb. 1989; ibid., Izvestiya, 22 Nov. 1990.

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18. For a detailed analysis, see Ilana Kass , “Military Reform in the USSR: The Challenge from Within,” International Defense Review, Jan. 1991.

19.

19. U.S., House, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Policy Panel , “The Fading Threat: Soviet Conventional Military Power in Decline,” 101st Cong., 2d sess., 9 July 1990.

20.

20. Ibid.