In the past, Finland was often regarded as Finlandized, or as a country towing the policy line of its large and powerful neighbor. Today it is offered as a model for the newly emerging European democracies. Neither of these role models fits Finland well; the country's historical, political, and economic development would be hard to emulate. In the process of rapid change in Europe, Finland's situation produces an image of remarkable continuity: the domestic situation is stable, the rate of economic growth continues to be high, and the country's international situation is secure. The European situation as a whole continues to be volatile, however. It is in this overall context of rapid change that Finland will have to chart its course. The main policy issues for the 1990s will be European economic integration, the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and national defense.
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References
1.
1. Timothy Garton Ash, “Eastern Europe: The Year of Truth,”New York Review of Books, 15 Feb. 1990.
2.
See also Richard A. Bitzinger, Neutrality for Eastern Europe? An Examination of Possible Western Role Models, P-7622 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1990).
3.
3. Among studies of political development during the Winter War and in its aftermath, Max Jakobson's Diplomacy of the Winter War: An Account of the Russo-Finnish War 1939-1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), has become a classic.
4.
4. According to tentative estimates published in Helsingin sanomat, 13 Apr. 1990, p. D-1.
5.
5. See, for example, Pertti Alanen and Tuomas Forsberg, “The Evolution of Opinions about Foreign Policy in Finland from the 1960's till the 1980's,”Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1988-89 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1989), pp. 29-33.
6.
6. Rene Nyberg, “On Finnish Security” (Paper delivered at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 14 Mar. 1990), p. 1.
7.
7. For the most detailed discussion of Soviet bases on the Kola, see Tomas Ries and Johnny Skorve, Investigating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photography (London: Brassey's Defence, 1987).
8.
8. See, for example, Norman Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy (London: Jane's Publishing, 1988).
9.
9. For a lucid discussion of these points, see Tomas Ries, Cold Will: The Defence of Finland (London: Brassey's Defence, 1988), esp. chap. 8, “The Two Currents in Finland's Defence Posture,” pp. 222-256.
10.
10. See Jan Klenberg, “The Military Doctrine of Finland,”Seminar on Military Doctrine, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna, 17 Jan. 1990.
11.
11. See Roy Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union 1944-84 (New York: Macmillan, 1985).
12.
See also Svensk säkerhetspolitiken i en föränderlig värld, Swedish Official Report Series, Report no. 5, 1990.
13.
13. A recent analysis of Finland's security in a changing Europe states the following: “The objective of Finnish security policy is to prevent our country from being drawn into a possible conflict, and to prevent conflicts from spreading to our territory. From the military point of view, the crucial factor is that our neighbours and other countries can rely on Finland's capability to control and defend its territory.” See Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy, An Assessment of the European Security-Political Situation, Its Development Prospects and Its Impact on Finnish Defence Policy (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence, 1990), p. 22.
14.
14. A fuller treatment of these issues is provided by the present author in his “Technology and Military Doctrine in the Future of Finnish Defense” (Paper, Feb. 1990).
15.
See also Pauli Järvenpää, “Puolustusmenot ja niiden vaihtelu eri maissa,”Suomalaiset ja turvallisuuspolitiikka, 1986, p. 73.
16.
16. Järvenpää, “Puolustusmenot ja niiden vaihtelu eri maissa,” pp. 70-72.
17.
17. Gustav Hägglund, “Finskt försvar inför 1990-talets utmaningar” (Paper delivered at the Swedish Academy of Military Studies, Stockholm, 10 Oct. 1989), p. 5.
18.
18. These priorities are also expressed in the Act on the Defense Forces of 1974. According to the act, the three main tasks of the Defense Forces are the following: the responsibility for the surveillance of the country's land and sea territory as well as airspace in cooperation with other national authorities; the protection of the country's territorial integrity, by force if necessary; and the defense of the country and its legal system as well as the subsistence and the basic rights of the people. See, for example, Finnish National Defense (Helsinki: General Headquarters Information Section, 1988), p. 16.
19.
19. Jane's Defense Weekly, 3 Sept. 1989, p. 402.
20.
20. For details, see Jane's Defense Weekly, 23 Apr. 1988, p. 767.
21.
21. For a more detailed discussion, see Ries, Cold Will, pp. 245-246, 318-342.
22.
22. The author's estimate, based on such public sources as The Military Balance 1989-90 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1989).
23.
23. According to Article 17 of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947, “Finland may not possess, construct or carry out trials with any atomic weapon, any self-propelled or guided missiles or apparatus connected with their discharge (other than torpedos...), sea mines or torpedos of non-contact types... submarines or other submersible craft, motor torpedo boats, or specialized types of assault craft.” The restrictions concerning missiles and influence mines have been removed. In 1963 “defensive” missiles were permitted, and in 1983 influence mines were allowed. See, for example, Ries, Cold Will, pp. 177-178, 257.
24.
24. For point air defense, the Crotale NG missile system, built by the French Thomson-CSF company in cooperation with American LTV Missiles and Electronics, is being purchased. See Gerard Turbe, “Crotale NG Multi-Sensor Guided Missile System,”International Defense Review, June 1989, pp. 783-785.
25.
25. See Report of the Third Parliamentary Defence Committee, Committee Report no. 1, Helsinki, 1981.
26.
26. See Mauri Mikkola, “Maavoimavoittoinen järjestelmä,”Ruotuväki, 4 June 1989, pp. 24-25.
27.
27. Ibid., p. 24.
28.
28. For a more complete discussion, see Pauli O. Järvenpää, “Finland,” in The Missing Link: West European Neutrals and Regional Security, ed. Richard E. Bissell and Curt Gasteyger (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), pp. 42-58.
29.
29. A speech by President Urho Kekkonen at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 8 May 1978, reprinted in English in Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1978 (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1978), pp. 64-66.
30.
See also Desmond Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea,”International Security, 10(3) (Winter 1985-86).
31.
31. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), esp. “The Threat of Inadvertent War,” pp. 188-190.
32.
32. See Ball, “Nuclear War at Sea.”
33.
33. See Johan Jørgen Holst, “The Challenge from Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapon-free Zones,”Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 1981, no. 3.
34.
34. See Parliamentary Advisory Board for Defence Policy, Assessment of the European Security-Political Situation, p. 12.
35.
See also C. Paul Robinson and Les Paldy, “Substantial Progress in Nuclear Testing Talks: Verification Protocols Nearing Completion,”NATO Review, Feb. 1990, no. 1, pp. 17-19.
36.
36. In an opinion poll conducted in 1989, more than 8 of 10 agreed with the statement that it is “a good fortune and privilege to be born a Finn.”Finnish Gallup Reports, Mar. 1989.
37.
37. Helsingin sanomat, 21 Apr. 1990, p. 75.
38.
38. See Esko Antola, “The Finnish Integration Strategy: Adaptation with Restrictions,”Facing the Change in Europe: EFTA Countries' Integration Strategies, ed. Kari Möttölä and Heikki Patomäki (Helsinki: Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1989), pp. 55-63.
39.
reprinted in Facing the Change in Europe, ed. Möttölä and Patomäki, pp. 63-66. The quote appears on p. 64.
40.
40. Helsingin sanomat, 13 Mar. 1990, p. D-1.
41.
41. Möttölä and Patomäki, Facing the Change in Europe, p. 65.
42.
Helsingin sanomat, 13 Mar. 1990, p. D-4.
43.
43. See the discussion in Allison, Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union 1944-84, pp. 112-126.
44.
44. Max Jakobson, “Relazioni est-ovest un punto di vista Finland” (Paper delivered at the Centro di Studi per la Conciliazione Internazionale, Rome, 5 Nov. 1987), p. 21.
45.
45. See, for example, R. James Woolsey, “U.S. Strategic Force Decisions for the 1990's,”Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989, pp. 69-83.
46.
46. For details of the emerging CFE agreement, see CFE-negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Washington, DC: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of Public Affairs, Mar. 1990).
47.
47. The “sausage theory” refers to an idea that when one squeezes a sausage in the middle, the meat gets packed toward the ends. In other words, when armaments are thinned out in Central Europe, the relative weight of the flanks will increase.
