Current Arctic regimes are narrow and shallow, but the potential for increased cooperation seems high. In the areas of science, petroleum development, fisheries management, and marine protection, the predominance of strategic considerations is increasingly being challenged in key Arctic states. Groups such as scientists, industrial firms, and environmental organizations portray these problems in terms of cost efficiency rather than competition, and the assessment of national interests is less straightforward than before. In this situation, processes of regime formation will be less structured, and senior policymakers in the Arctic will be more influenced by situational factors. Today these are very favorable for cooperation, due to the sense of urgency present in certain areas, the entrepreneurial activity of some actors, and the presence in each issue area of cooperative salient solutions.
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4. Ibid., p. 78.
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16. That is, U.S. technology in this area, which is fairly standardized.
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21. The Soviet Union has set up a number of barter trades with Denmark and West Germany, trading fish for engineering services and fishing equipment.
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27. Alexei Roginko, “Arctic Environmental Cooperation: Prospects and Possibilities” (Paper prepared for the Joint International Studies Association/British International Studies Association Convention, London, Mar. 1989).
