The five Nordic countries have quite different security problems and geostrategic settings and have made very different choices about their security policy. They will thus react differently to the new balance of forces in Europe that results from the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet empire, and the unification of Germany. Should these sweeping changes also be accompanied by a U.S. withdrawal from Europe, the Nordic countries would again react in unique ways. An optimistic view of the 1990s would see great benefits to the Nordic region from the end of the Cold War and the confrontation between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact, and the establishment of a more cooperative pan-European security arrangement. Defense planners in the Nordic countries should also plan, however, for the possibility of greater instability on the Continent, which might generate the need for new security arrangements, different alliance relationships, and a rethinking of the meaning of neutrality in a multipolar world.
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References
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1. As implied, for example, by the title of Johan Jørgen Holst, ed., Five Roads to Nordic Security (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1972).
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2. I have examined in great detail the military implications for the Nordic NATO countries of a U.S. withdrawal in Steven E. Miller, “U.S. Withdrawal and NATO's Northern Flank: Impact and Implications,” in Europe after American Withdrawal, ed. Jane M. O. Sharp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 303-348.
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3. An informative discussion of the Soviet problem in Finnish diplomacy is found in Kari Möttölä, “The Politics of Neutrality and Defence: Finnish Security Policy since the Early 1970s,”Cooperation and Conflict, 17(4):287-313 (Dec. 1982).
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4. See, for example, the very interesting discussion in Ola Tunander, Cold Water Politics: The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics of the Northern Front (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989), esp. pp. 13-15.
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For the argument that the disappearance of these factors will lead to less stable Europe, see John Mearsheimer, “The Future of Europe,”International Security (Summer 1990).
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6. This point has been made even about reductions of U.S. forces in Europe. See, for example, Joseph Fitchett, “Norway, Bucking Trend, Shores Up Defenses and NATO Ties,”International Herald Tribune, 26 Sept. 1989. Fitchett writes, “The importance of controlling... Norwegian bases is likely to grow... if arms control accords thin the allied force in central Europe. That would increase Western Europe's dependence on U.S. reinforcements crossing the Atlantic.”
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7. Sadly, this seems more likely than not. See in particular the thoughtful essay, Barrington Moore, Liberal Prospects under Soviet Socialism: A Comparative Historical Perspective (New York: Columbia University, Harriman Institute, Nov. 1989), which argues that the USSR fully meets none of the conditions conducive to liberal democracy. See esp. pp. 20-24.
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It is true also of Sweden, despite its neutral position and lack of a common border with the USSR. On the phenomenon of frequent Soviet submarine incursions in Swedish waters, see Gordon McCormick, Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, Jan. 1990).
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See also Richard Bitzinger, “Finnish Defense Today,”International Defense Review, Nov. 1989, p. 1477, which identifies the main problem for Finnish security policy as the need to maintain its territorial integrity in a general European war.
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10. The success of Finland in surviving its wars with the USSR during World War II might seem to undermine this point, but it should not be forgotten that Finland paid a high price, suffering one of the highest casualty rates of any state in Europe, that it lost several significant pieces of its territory, and that it ended up allied with Nazi Germany.
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11. Samuel Huntington, “Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe,” in Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy, Occasional Paper no. 16, ed. Peter Volten (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990), p. 44.
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12. William Safire, “A Question of Trusting in Germany,”International Herald Tribune, 23-24 June 1990.
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13. See Huntington's very interesting discussion, in which he notes the existence of a “condominium pattern,” involving Berlin-Moscow collaboration, with a “sandwiching pattern,” involving the efforts of others to contain Germany. Huntington, “Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe,” p. 45. See also Thomas Christensen and Jack Synder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,”International Organization, 44(2) (Spring 1990).
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14. Quoted in Brigitte Sauerwein, “The Russians Won't Come by Train,”International Defense Review, Nov. 1989, p. 1160.
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15. See, for example, the call for discussion by Sweden's General Bengt Gustafsson, reported in Roger Magnerård, “Neutraliteten måste djiskuteras,”Svenska dagbladet, 5 Feb. 1990.
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16. “Neutrality's Identity Crisis,”Economist, 3 Feb. 1990, p. 20.
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17. Erling Bjöl, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper no. 181 (London: IISS, 1983), emphasizes this point with respect to Sweden, for example, and raises the question of whether it will be able in the future to afford a credible armed neutrality posture. See pp. 16-21.
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18. For one illustrative discussion among many, see Eva Nowotny, “The Role of the CSCE and the Council of Europe in Facilitating a Stable Transition toward New Political Structures in Europe,” in Uncertain Futures, ed. Volten, pp. 51-61.
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19. Discussions between the European Free Trade Association and the EC are already under way. See, for example, John Palmer, “Sinking EFTA Raises Stakes for EC Deal,”Guardian, 15 June 1990.
20.
Illustrative of the mood is Catherine Ryan, “Majority of Norwegians Now Favor EC Membership,”Norway Times, 15 Mar. 1990.
21.
21. See, in particular, the discussion in Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
