While the concept of Finlandization was often used in the past by NATO spokesmen to refer to a problem, the possible intimidation of Western democracies by Soviet military power, it may also suggest a number of positive possibilities for the Baltic republics. An examination of recent history offers a number of analytical insights for comparing the fate of Finland with countries like Poland, subjected to Communist rule, and with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, actually incorporated into the Soviet Union. Models are offered of military and other resistance to foreign pressure, of concessions and withdrawals, and of delicate balances, involving all the Scandinavian countries.
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References
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1. For some valuable discussion of the concept of Finlandization, see Max Jakkobson, “Substance and Appearance: Finland,”Foreign Affairs, 58(5):1034-1047 (Summer 1980).
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2. An earlier version of the present author's views can be found in George H. Quester, “America's Interest in Eastern Europe: Toward a Finlandization of the Warsaw Pact,”Conflict, 5(3):211-232 (Fall 1984).
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3. On determining the baseline for measuring relative intimidation and power, see William Pfaff, “Finlandization,”New Yorker, 1 Sept. 1980, pp. 30-34.
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4. A useful discussion of Stalin's options and choices in 1945 can be found in Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974).
5.
5. On Stalin's choices with regard to Finland, see George Maude, The Finnish Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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6. Some analysts, who have not looked at the continuing size of Swedish defense budgets, might guess that Sweden would have instead deferred to Soviet wishes in some form of Swedenization, but this would be a very misleading inference.
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7. Theories of the Nordic balance are discussed in Arne Olav Brundtland, “The Nordic Balance and Its Possible Relevance for Europe,” in Sicherheit durch Gleichgewicht, ed. Daniel Frei (Zurich: Schultheiss, 1982).
8.
8. On Estonian national character, see Toivo Raun, Estonia and the Estonians (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1987).
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9. Estonian watching of Finnish television is described in Philip Taubman, “Estonians' Pensive Refrain: We Are Not Russians,”New York Times, 18 Mar. 1986.
10.
See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Post-Communist Nationalism,”Foreign Affairs, 68(1):1-25 (Winter 1989-90).
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11. The momentous changes in the overall East-West military confrontation in Europe are outlined in Rochelle Stanfield, “After the Wall: Where Do We Put the Blocs?”National Journal, 25 Nov. 1989, pp. 2872, 2877-2879.
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12. For an overview of the military preparations of the major neutral states in Europe, see Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986).
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13. A useful outline of the thinking behind defensive defense can be found in Dieter Senghaas, “Conventional Weapons in Europe: Dismantle Offense, Strengthen Defenses,”Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 43(10):9-11 (Dec. 1987).
14.
14. On these proposals, see Milton Leitenberg, “The Stranded USSR Submarine in Sweden and the Question of a Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone,”Cooperation and Conflict, 17(1):17-28 (Mar. 1982).
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15. The traditional dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on nuclear versus conventional armament issues is outlined in Karl Kaiseret al., “Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response to No First Use,”Foreign Affairs, 60(5):1157-1170 (Summer 1982).
