The President,Congress,and Tax Reform: Patterns over Three Decades

Abstract

Both Congress and the president have taken the lead on tax reform at different times in the more than three decades between full-scale revisions of the tax code in 1954 and 1986. This article traces four forces that shaped executive-legislative relations on tax policy during that period: partisan politics, economics, public opinion, and policy experts and entrepreneurs. It concludes that Congress's ability to lead is greatest when economic forces—inflation, recession, and budget deficits—help push tax reform onto the agenda. Presidents retain a natural advantage in agenda setting, however; they are able to put tax reform on the agenda when pressures for reform are weak, and sometimes they can keep it off when pressures are stronger. Tax-policy experts can have a major impact when political and economic forces provide an opening and when skilled entrepreneurs forge links between their prescriptions and political needs and concerns.

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References

1. For a listing of the major bills during this period, see Joseph A. Pechman , Federal Tax Policy, 5th ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), pp. 40-41.

idem, ibid., vol. 6, 1981-84 (1985), pp. 63-82. Unless otherwise noted, historical references in this article are based on these sources.

3. New York Times, 2 Dec. 1952.

4. The data on the political makeup of Congress in this section are taken from Norman J. Ornstein , Thomas E. Mann , and Michael Malbin , Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987-1988 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1987), pp. 38-39.

5. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Alan S. Murray , Showdown at Gucci Gulch (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 285.

6. U.S., Office of Management and Budget , Historical Tables Fiscal Year 1988, 1987, p.2.3(1).

7. “In Taxes, the Impossible Became the Inevitable,” Washington Post, 29 June 1986.

Roper Organization and H&R Block, Inc. , The American Public and the Federal Income Tax System (Kansas City, MO: H&R Block, 1986), pp. 7, 13.

9. See, for example, Timothy Clark , “At Grass Roots, Not Much Groundswell of Support for Reagan's Tax Reform Plan,” National Journal, 27 Aug. 1985, pp. 1737-1742.

10.

10. For an elaboration of these concepts, see John W. Kingdon , Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), chap. 8.

11.

11. E. W. Kenworthy , “Colin Stam: A Study in Anonymous Power,” in Adventures in Public Service, ed. Delia Kuhn and Ferdinand Kuhn (New York: Vanguard Press, 1963), p. 134.

12.

12. Stanley S. Surrey , “Tribute to Dr. Laurence N. Woodworth: Two Decades of Federal Tax History Viewed from This Perspective,” National Tax Journal, Sept. 1979, pp. 227-239.

13.

13. The committee's name was officially shortened from the longer version—Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation—in 1976, its fiftieth anniversary.

14.

14. Birnbaum and Murray , Showdown at Gucci Gulch, pp. 27-31.

15.

15. Ibid., pp. 39-41.

16.

idem , Income Tax Revision (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960).

17.

17. “Mills, Conable Talk about Tax Reform,” Washington Post, 4 Aug. 1985; author's telephone conversation with Wilbur Mills, 30 July 1987.

18.

18. James M. Verdier , “The Prospects for Tax Stability,” Tax Notes, 13 Apr. 1987, p. 173.

19.

19. Eugene Steuerle and Michael Hartzmark , “Individual Income Taxation 1947-79,” OTA Paper 48, U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1981, p. 36.