Congressional oversight of the executive, including the presidency itself, has evidently increased over the past two decades. It relies upon a wide variety of techniques and occurs in a number of settings, not just select committee investigations or specialized subcommittee hearings labeled oversight. Other means range from hearings on authorizations and regular bills to informal meetings between legislators and executive officials; and from House impeachment proceedings to the use of offices outside Congress, such as inspectors general and independent counsels. Oversight does not exist in a political vacuum; the impetus behind it is often a conflict between the two branches over public policy or over competing institutional interests and powers. In addition, the apparent growth in the amount of oversight and the wide use of different means are the results of changes in Congress, including improved resources and incentives for members; changes in the presidency, especially the expanded operational role of its personnel; and changes in the polity, such as the rise of investigative journalism and electoral developments that have helped to divide party control of government.
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References
1.
Frederick M. Kaiser , “Congressional Control of Executive Actions in the Aftermath of Chadha,”Administrative Law Review, 36(3):239-275 (Summer 1984).
2.
2. U.S. Const., art. I.
3.
3. Ibid. For examples of reporting and consultation requirements, see Kaiser, “Congressional Control,” pp. 263-265.
4.
4. McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135, 176-89 (1927); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
5.
5. Federalist no. 51, in The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961), pp. 320, 322.
6.
6. Ibid., p. 322.
7.
7. Ibid. See also Madison, Federalist nos. 47-50, in ibid, pp. 300-319; Alexander Hamilton, Federalist nos. 67-77, in ibid., pp. 407-463.
8.
8. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1885), pp. 297, 270, respectively.
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9. U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, and U.S., Congress, House, Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran (hereafter called Iran-Contra Committees), Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, S. Rept. 100-216 and H. Rept. 100-433, pp. 9-22.
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10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Final Report, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1974, S. Rept. 98-981, pp. 3-22, 130-149.
11.
11. Allen Schick, “Politics through Law: Congressional Limitations on Executive Discretion,” in Both Ends of the Avenue, ed. Anthony King (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), p. 166.
12.
Kaiser , “Congressional Control,” pp. 239-241, 247, 271.
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13. John F. Bibby, “Congress' Neglected Function,” in Republican Papers, ed. Melvin R. Laird (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1968), p. 477.
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Roger H. Davidson , “Representation and Congressional Committees,”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 411:55 (Jan. 1974).
15.
See also idem, “The Congressional Committee Intelligence System: Information, Oversight, and Change,”Congress and the Presidency, 14:51-76 (Spring 1987).
16.
16. Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,”American Journal of Political Science, 28:176 (Feb. 1984).
17.
17. Walter J. Oleszek, “Integration and Fragmentation: Key Themes of Congressional Change,”The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 466:200-201 (Mar. 1983).
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18. Joseph P. Harris, Congressional Control of Administration (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1964), p. 9.
19.
19. Morris S. Ogul, Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), p. 11.
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Bert A. Rockman, “Legislative-Executive Relations and Legislative Oversight,” ibid., 9:416-418 (Aug. 1984).
21.
21. Rockman, “Executive-Legislative Relations,” p. 387.
22.
22. See studies cited in notes 15-17 and 19-20 of this article.
23.
Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 46-60, 115-134.
24.
24. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, p. 277.
25.
25. Iran-Contra Committees, Report, pp. 11-22.
26.
See also Charles Tiefer, “The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power,”Boston University Law Review, 63:59-103 (Jan. 1983). The legal authority for the independent counsel, which has been recently reauthorized, is at 28 U.S.C. 591 et seq. In the meantime, moreover, the Supreme Court, in a 7 to 1 ruling, held the special counsel law to be constitutional. Morrison, Independent Counselv. Olson et al., Civil Action No. 87-1279 (U.S. Supreme Court, 29 June 1988).
27.
U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government , Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1984, pt. 3, “Executive Office of the President,” pp. 9-11, 342-345, 351-353, 391-401, 427-440, 463-469.
28.
28. Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, Appropriations for 1985, p. 9.
29.
David R. Mayhew , Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press), pp. 110-140.
30.
30. See, inter alia, Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President (Itahaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985).
31.
31. Wilson, Congressional Government, p. 46.
32.
James L. Sundquist , The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981).
33.
For additional statistics on legislative activity and on indirect indicators of expanded oversight, see Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, and Michael J. Malbin, Vital Statistics on Congress, 1987-1988 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1987), pp. 123-177.
