“Invitation to Struggle”: An Overview of Legislative-Executive Relations

Abstract

The U.S. Constitution's central structural dilemma is the relationship between Congress and the president. The document itself provides little guidance for the day-to-day conduct of these relations. Although we commonly call the system “separation of powers,” it is really an arrangement of separate institutions sharing functions. A basic spirit of accommodation no doubt smooths policymaking, but the system's built-in counterweights are useful in encouraging this accommodation and forcing all the players to seek consensus. Divided government, in which the White House and one or both houses of Congress are controlled by opposing parties, has become more common in recent years. Although demanding skilled leadership in both branches, this situation need not preclude decisive and coherent policymaking. The most serious imbalance, not fully anticipated by the Founders, consists of the so-called war powers: a huge military establishment, unknown prior to World War II, gives the president a sizable advantage in making decisions about taking the nation to war. In such circumstances, how can we preserve the Founders' premise that such decisions are best left in the hands of representative assemblies?