Commentators on state constitutional law have been generally critical of those state courts that follow lockstep analysis. Often these criticisms have relied heavily on the concept of federalism. This reliance is misplaced; lockstep analysis is entirely consistent with basic notions of state autonomy. Instead, it is courts using other approaches that have at times ignored the basic theory of federalism.
4. Ibid., pp. 4-5. The majority did cite one Montana case for the purpose of distinguishing it from Jackson.
5.
5. 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
6.
6. 460 U.S. 1030 (1983).
7.
7. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
8.
8. State v. Jackson, 672 P.2d 255 (Mont. 1983). In part, this decision was a vindication of the Long approach to the relationship between the federal courts and state supreme courts. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., whose vote was essential to the original decision, averred explicitly that he had originally voted to suppress only because he had misunderstood the applicable federal law, later authoritatively construed in Neville. Thus review by the Supreme Court had served its proper function—correction of state court mistakes in the application of a federal standard.
9.
9. 672 P.2d at 260, quoting State v. Armstrong, 552 P.2d 616, 619 (1976).
10.
10. Ibid., p. 262.
11.
11. Robert F. Williams, “In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result,”South Carolina Law Review, 35:353, 404 (1984).
12.
12. Ronald K.L. Collins, “Reliance on State Constitutions—The Montana Disaster,”Texas Law Review, 63:1095, 1137 (Mar.-Apr. 1985).
13.
13. William J. Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,”Harvard Law Review, 90:489, 503 (Jan. 1977).
14.
14. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., “The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?” in Developments in State Constitutional Law—The Williamsburg Conference, ed. B. D. McGraw (St. Paul, MN: West, 1985), pp. 166, 183.
15.
15. 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).
16.
16. Hill v. Garner, 434 U.S. 989 (1977) dismissing mem. 561 P.2d 1016; Silver v. Silver, 180 U.S. 117 (1929).
17.
17. 693 P.2d at 669-74.
18.
18. Earl M. Maltz, “The Dark Side of State Court Activism,”Texas Law Review, 63:995, 1007-1011 (Mar.-Apr. 1985).
19.
19. Paul M. Bator, “The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation,”William & Mary Law Review, 22:605, 605-606n. 1 (1981).
20.
20. 725 P.2d 894 (1986).
21.
21. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
22.
22. 725 P.2d at 901-4.
23.
23. National Law Journal, 20 Oct. 1986, p. 10, col. 1.
24.
24. 725 P.2d at 906.
25.
25. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
26.
26. See Elkins v. U.S., 364 U.S. 206, 224-25 (1960).
27.
27. See, for example, Wilson v. The People, 398 P.2d 35 (1965); State v. Wood, 457 So. 2d 206 (La. App. 1984).
28.
28. 519 A.2d 820 (1987).
29.
29. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
30.
30. For example, Eleuteri v. Richman, 141 A.2d 46, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 843 (1958); State v. Alexander, 83 A.2d 441 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 908 (1952).
31.
31. 519 A.2d at 851.
32.
32. Ibid., p. 851, n. 30.
33.
33. 174 A.2d 737 (1961).
34.
34. 519 A.2d at 851.
35.
35. Ibid., pp. 851-53.
36.
36. For this point, the New Jersey Supreme Court might have relied on State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952 (1982).
37.
37. 174 A.2d at 737.
38.
38. Ibid., p. 738.
39.
39. Ibid.
40.
Maltz , “Dark Side.”
41.
Williams , “In the Supreme Court's Shadow,” pp. 389-402.
