The recent movement among state supreme courts to affirm rights not protected by the United States Supreme Court has occasioned much favorable commentary. In one area of this new judicial federalism—economic rights protection—the response has been less enthusiastic. State courts used various clauses of their respective constitutions to protect these rights even before the Civil War and have continued to do so despite the U.S. Supreme court's abdication of any serious role in the realm of economic rights. This persistence by state courts is justified by a historically valid substantive content of the due process clause, the numerous clauses in state constitutions concerned with the protection of property, and the role of the state courts in the American constitutional system. The arguments frequently invoked by critics of judicial activism on the part of the federal judiciary do not apply with the same force to the state judiciary. State courts can contribute to American constitutional liberties by actively protecting an area of rights that would otherwise find no forum for vindication.
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References
1.
the articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 17, New Developments in State Constitutional Law (Winter 1987).
2.
James C. Kirby, Jr. , “Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulations under State Constitutions,” in Developments in State Constitutional Law, ed. McGraw, pp. 118-119.
3.
Benjamin Twiss , Lawyers and the Constitution: How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme Court (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1942).
4.
4. 13 N. Y. 378 (1856).
5.
5. Corwin, Liberty against Government (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), pp. 114-115.
6.
6. See, for example, Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843); In re Dorsey, 7 Porter 293 (Ala. 1838).
7.
7. 98 N.Y. 98 (1885).
8.
8. Ibid., pp. 106-7.
9.
9. Bernard Siegan, Economic Rights and the Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 58-59.
10.
10. Ibid., pp. 27-40, provides a history of this commitment.
11.
cf. the treatment in Siegan, Economic Rights, pp. 110-155.
12.
Linde , “Due Process of Lawmaking,” passim.
13.
13. See, for example, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, — U.S. — (1987); property owners must be compensated when use of their land is restricted even temporarily.
14.
James C. Kirby, Jr. , “Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation under State Constitutions,” in Developments in State Constitutional Law, ed. McGraw, pp. 94-145.
15.
15. Generally these articles exclude cases involving public utilities rates, the validity of state taxation, and zoning. I have followed this exclusionary policy to keep the added cases consistent with those in the studies. One major caveat: most of the research on state courts and economic regulation has focused on the 1937-87 period, with little done on the period 1890-1910. The results presented in Table 1 probably underrepresent the activity that occurred between 1910 and 1937. The disproportionate number of cases after 1937, however, also represents state court reactions to increasing activity by state legislatures, and the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court generally refused to review or strike down social and economic legislation passed by the states after 1937.
16.
16. Bailey v. People, 60 N.E. 98 (Ill. 1901), is typical of many cases. In Bailey, the Illinois court struck down a statute that limited the number of people a lodging housekeeper could sleep in one room while exempting keepers of inns, hotels, and boarding houses from that limit. The court reasoned on equal protection terms, and the case clearly involved invidious or irrational classification questions, but the court voided the statute on substantive due process grounds. 60 N.E. at 99.
17.
Alexander Bickel , The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), pp. 103 ff.
18.
18. See the discussion of the history of due process in the following subsection of this article, “Argument 1: The Distorted History Argument.”
19.
Note, “Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Access to Courts,”Nebraska Law Review, 63:150 (1984).
20.
20. Alvarado v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 716 P.2d 18 (Ariz. 1986).
21.
21. Henderson Clay Products Inc. v. Edgar Wood & Associates Inc., 451 A.2d 174 (N.H. 1982).
22.
22. Mominee v. Sherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986).
23.
23. For example, Batton-Jackson Oil Co. Inc. v. Reeves, 340 S.E.2d 16 (Ga. 1986); Finocchiaro v. Nebraska Liquor Control, 351 N.W.2d 710 (Neb. 1984); San Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. 1985); Vaughan v. State Bd. of Embalmers etc., 82 S.E.2d 618 (Va. 1954).
24.
Kirby reports that 35 states have specifically refused to follow the lead of the Supreme Court. Kirby, “Judicial Review of Economic Regulation,” pp. 109, 122.
25.
25. Leonard Levy, ed., American Constitutional Law: Historical Essays (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 129.
26.
26. Frank R. Strong, Substantive Due Process of Law: A Dichotomy of Sense and Nonsense (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 1986), p. 7.
27.
27. Ibid., p. 14.
28.
28. Ibid., p. 72.
29.
29. Ibid., p. 91.
30.
30. Levy, ed., American Constitutional Law, p. 157.
31.
31. Colo. Const. art. II, § 3. See also Ala. Const. art I, § 35; Alaska Const. art. I, § 1; Ark. Const. art. II, § 22; Idaho Const. art. I, § 1; Ill. Const. art. I, § 1; Iowa Const. art. I, § 1; La. Const. art. I, § 4; Mass. Const. art. I, § 1; Mo. Const. art. I, § 2; Mont. Const. art. I, § 3; Neb. Const. art. I, § 1; Nev. Const. art. I, § 1; N.D. Const. art. I, § 1; N.H. Const. pt. I, art. 2; N.J. Const. art. I, para. 1; N.M. Const. art. II, § 4; N.C. Const. art. I, § 1; Ohio Const. art. I, § 1; Okla. Const. art. II, § 2; Pa. Const. art. I, § 1; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 1; Utah Const. art. I, § 1; Vt. Const. chap. I, art. 1; Va. Const. art. I, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 1; Calif. Const. art. I, § 1.
32.
32. For example, Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17; Miss. Const. art. III, § 17. Six states add to their just compensation clauses for property “taken” the phrase “or damaged.” Neb. Const. art. I, § 21; Hawaii Const. art. I, § 20; Mo. Const. art. I, § 26; Tex. Const. art. I, § 27; Va. Const. art. I, § 11. Finally, a majority of states have right-to-remedy or open-court clauses that generally read like the Idaho constitutional provision: “Courts of justice shall be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character.” Idaho Const. art. I, § 18.
A variation on this argument is found in Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
35.
35. Levy, ed., American Constitutional Law, p. 157.
36.
36. Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Pastor, 272 A.2d 487, 300 (Pa. 1971).
37.
37. Kirby, “Judicial Review of Economic Regulation,” p. 120.
38.
John A. Hoskins and David A. Katz, “Substantive Due Process in the States Revisited,”Ohio State Law Review, 18:384, 400-401 (1952).
39.
Even critics of judicial review of economic regulations like Paulsen recognize these defects. Paulsen, “The Persistence of Substantive Due Process,” p. 118.
40.
40. Note, “Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,”Harvard Law Review, 95:1324, 1354, n. 106 (1982).
41.
41. David Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 36.
42.
Hoskins and Katz, “Substantive Due Process Revisited,” p. 401.
43.
43. Hoskins and Katz, “Substantive Due Process Revisited,” p. 401.
44.
44. Lawrence Friedman, “Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study,”California Law Review, 53:487, 525 (1965).
45.
45. Melvin Urofsky, “State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation,”Journal of American History, 72:63, 64 (1985).
46.
46. Ibid., p. 91.
47.
Note, “State Economic Substantive Due Process,” p. 1510.
48.
Kirby , “Judicial Review of Economic Regulation,” pp. 118-122.
