The Eagle and the Bear in Angola

Abstract

The United States and the Soviet Union have supported opposing sides in Angola for more than a quarter of a century. Both superpowers have been stymied by their lack of control over their respective Angolan allies and frustrated by their lack of impact on determining events. Each of the superpowers has also been an unreliable patron for their Angolan clients. One important result is that, not surprisingly, most Angolans—no matter what side they are on—are highly skeptical and cynical about both the United States and the Soviet Union. While superpower intervention is usually justified in ideological terms, few Angolans are fighting for, let alone familiar with, any ideology. The war in Angola is hopelessly stalemated; neither side can possibly defeat the other and there seems to be no prospect for a military solution. Thus it becomes increasingly clear that only a political solution can end the war, but neither superpower is posturing for peace or seriously pursuing political solutions.

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References

1. Amilcar Cabral , Revolution in Guinea: An African People's Struggle (London: Stage 1, 1969), p. 70.

See also Gerald J. Bender , Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 221-222.

3. This section draws from Gerald J. Bender , “Angola: The Continuing Crisis and Misunderstanding,” International Affairs Bulletin, 7:5-6 (1983).

4. John Gunther , Inside Africa (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 585-599.

5. Apparently Holden Roberto, the FNLA leader, continued to receive $10,000 to $20,000 a year during the Nixon administration for intelligence he provided. This is not the same, however, as aiding the FNLA itself.

Witney Schneidman, “American Foreign Policy and the Fall of the Portuguese Empire” (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1987).

7. Chipenda visited Luanda in early 1986 and apparently plans to return home after living a number of years in Portugal.

idem , “Angola: A Story of Stupidity,” New York Review of Books, 21 Dec. 1978, pp. 26-30.

9. John Stockwell , former Central Intelligence Agency head of the Angolan operation, discusses this in greater depth in his book, In Search of Enemies (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), pp. 138-190.

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10. The latest account to suggest that the idea for the large-scale Cuban operation in Angola originated in Havana, not Moscow, can be found in Arkady N. Shevchenko , Breaking with Moscow (New York: Ballantine Books, 1985), pp. 362-365. Shevchenko was startled when he discovered this fact. He manifests a very hawkish, anti-Soviet attitude toward Moscow's Africa policy, which makes his revelation about the Havana role all the more credible. He clearly would have preferred to blame the Soviet Union exclusively for what happened in Angola in 1975.

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11. An extended discussion of this coup attempt can be found in Gerald J. Bender , “Angola, the Cubans and American Anxieties,” Foreign Policy, no. 31, pp. 23-26 (Summer 1978).

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12. At a seminar I presented to Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change on 25 March 1986, Zbigniew Brzezinski denied that the National Security Council had drawn up any plans to intervene in Angola on the side of UNITA while he was national security adviser. He was either unaware that his deputy, David Aaron, had helped to draw up such a plan or he did not see any of the newspaper articles on this issue, or he may simply have forgotten.

13.

13. While I have always believed that Neto died of natural causes, I am aware of a report—never released—drafted by some top MPLA officials that accuses the Soviet Union of murdering Neto.

14.

idem , “South Africa: Strategy for Change,” Foreign Affairs, 59(2):324-351 (Winter 1980/81).

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15. It should be noted that while the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) does hold out some prospect for the success of this program, their fundamental premises are so flawed that their conclusion does not merit serious consideration. See David Ottaway and Patrick Tyler , “DIA Alone in Optimism for Savimbi,” Washington Post, 7 Feb. 1986.

16.

16. Bracketed phrases are the author's paraphrasing of portions on the recording that were not clear enough for a literal translation.

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17. Patrick Buchanan , “Selling Savimbi down the River,” Washington Times, 29 Feb. 1984.