France's relations with its former colonies remain close after 26 years of independence, and France has tried hard in the last decade to expand its sphere of influence beyond the ex-colonial core. This article examines French economic and security interests in Africa, as well as the role of Africa in France's foreign policy. It also considers some of the contradictions in French policy, the problems encountered by the Socialist government between May 1981 and March 1986, and the longer-term trend toward greater discretion and discrimination in dealing with African states. Finally, it discusses the analytic problems raised by the peculiar postcolonial relationship between France and French-speaking Africa.
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References
1.
Brigitte Nouaille-Degorce , La politique française de coopération avec les états africains et malgache au sud du Sahara (Bordeaux: Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire, 1982), pp. 463-465.
2.
2. French West Africa consisted of Mauritania, Senegal, Mali (then Soudan), Guinea, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Benin (then Dahomey), and Burkina Fasso, with Togo attached for administrative purposes; French Equatorial Africa consisted of Chad, the Central African Republic (then Ubangi-Shari), Gabon, and the Congo, with Cameroon attached. Both federations were dissolved in 1960 and the individual territories became independent on their own, despite various attempts to reestablish regional entities.
3.
3. Félix Houphouët-Boigny, president of the Ivory Coast, represented the territory in the French National Assembly from 1946 until 1959 and was a minister in four French governments between 1956 and 1959. Leopold Sedar Senghor, president of Senegal until 1981, also served in the French National Assembly for 14 years, and was a junior minister from 1955 to 1956. Other Francophone leaders who held senior political offices in France in the fifties included Modibo Keita, first president of Mali, and Sékou Touré, president of Guinea from 1958 until 1984.
Philippe Hugon , “L`Afrique noire franocophone: L'enjeu économique pour la France,”Politique africaine, 5:76, 77, 79 (Feb. 1982).
6.
6. Hugon, “L'Afrique noire francophone,” p. 81.
7.
Jean-François Bayart , La politique africaine de François Mitterrand (Paris: Karthala, 1984), p. 89.
8.
Bayart , La politique africaine, p. 44.
9.
For more recent figures, see Martin, “France's African Policy,” p. 199.
10.
10. Antonio-Gabriel M. Cunha, “The Other Side of the Coin,”Africa Report, 29:59 (Sept.-Oct. 1984).
11.
Pascal Chaigneau , La politique militaire de la France en Afrique (Paris: Centre de hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes, 1984).
12.
12. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, pp. 15-16.
13.
13. Ibid., p. 22.
14.
In a later article, de Guiringaud remarked that “neither the size of [Africa's] population nor the scale of its economic problems are out of proportion to what France can devote to a long-term commitment abroad.”Louis de Guiringaud, “La politique africaine de la France,”Politique étrangère, 47:443 (June 1982).
15.
15. See Jean-Luc Dagut, “Les sommets franco-africains: Un instrument de la présence française en Afrique,” in Annee africaine 1980 (Bordeaux: Centre d'étude d'Afrique noire, 1981), pp. 304-325.
16.
The French have recently shown some concern about Cameroon's drifting into the American orbit; see Celestin Monga, “Cameroun: La percée américaine inquiète la France,”Jeune Afrique (Paris), 4 Dec. 1985, p. 63.
17.
17. For an excellent discussion of the connection between images of African society and positions regarding French policy, see Bayart, La politique africaine, pp. 119-125.
18.
18. As the Economist noted, “In bringing back this secretive Gaullist figure as his official adviser, Mr. Chirac could not have demonstrated more plainly that he sees Africa as his domain as much as Mr. Mitterrand's.”“Foccart is Back,”Economist, 5 Apr. 1986, p. 50.
19.
On Foccart's role, see Samy Cohen, Les conseilleurs du président (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1980), pp. 146-169.
20.
20. Quoted in Kaye Whiteman, “President Mitterrand and Africa,”African Affairs, 82:336 (1983).
21.
21. Pierre Hunt, “Témoignages et interventions,” in Bach, “La France en Afrique,” p. 319.
22.
22. In October 1979 the French satirical weekly, Le canard enchainé, revealed that Giscard had received presents of diamonds from Bokassa, both when Giscard was minister of finance and when he visited the Central African Republic as president. Giscard did not deny receiving such gifts, questioning only their alleged value. Le canard enchainé later revealed that two cousins of the president had also accepted such gifts.
23.
23. Bayart, La politique africaine, p. 23. The case of Guinea is particularly interesting. Having broken away from the proposed French community in 1958, it followed a completely different course from that taken by the other Francophone states until the mid-seventies. Ironically—considering Sékou Touré's socialism—the rapprochement was effected by the conservative Giscard, who, indeed, considered it one of the main achievements of his presidency. The Left was alienated from Touré because of his bad human rights record; this was a dislike Touré reciprocated, describing Mitterrand, when leader of the Socialist Party, as a “Nazi.”
24.
Bayart's book, La politique africaine de François Mitterrand, explores in detail the rapid reversion to business as usual under the French Socialists.
25.
25. Few French politicians and scholars advocate a complete disengagement from Africa, but the limits and costs of French influence are apparent to observers such as Daniel Bach, who writes: “France's initiatives will produce only limited results. France is...committed to a costly policy of military and financial support which tends to obstruct the economic reorientations currently required. France remains the prisoner of a sphere of influence inherited from history.”“La France en Afrique,” pp. 307-310.
26.
26. See Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, pp. 14, 29.
27.
27. Faligot and Krop allege that the French secret service hoped to install Bokassa's successor, Dacko, without it becoming known that French troops had accompanied him. La Piscine, p. 345.
28.
28. Grosser, Affaires extérieures, p. 177.
29.
29. Tamar Golan, “A Certain Mystery: How Can France Do Everything That It Does in Africa—and Get Away with It?”African Affairs, 80:3-11 (Jan. 1981).
30.
30. The cultural bonds tying Africa to France are frequently invoked to explain African acquiescence in relations that would offend most nationalists. Even Lellouche and Moisi, otherwise exclusively concerned with French security policy, remark, “Only the unique community of culture that exists between the French and French-speaking African elites could allow Africa to accept the French mantle without feelings of inferiority.”“French Policy in Africa,” p. 119.
31.
Péan , Affaires africaines, p. 247.
32.
32. Bayart, La politique africaine, pp. 110-121.
33.
33. As Balans remarks, “This series of events demonstrates once again the Central African Republic's dependence on France. Every [domestic] political event inevitably followed the rhythm of French-Centrafrican relations.”J.-L. Balans, “La vie politique dans les états francophones en 1981,”Année africaine 1981, pp. 76-77.
34.
In a similar vein, John Chipman comments, “French influence in the region has...come to be related not only to the nature of power as deployed by French leaders, but also to the definition given that power by the Africans. Indeed, the Africans have to some degree been the determinants of French power in Africa.”French Military Policy and African Security, p. 2.
