This article looks at the successes and failures of immigration policy in France and Germany. Particular attention is given to comparing immigration and foreign-worker policies—outputs—and the results of these policies—outcomes—in each state since the suspension of immigration in the mid-1970s. The analysis of the French and German experiences suggests that the gap between outputs and outcomes results from the inability of the state fully to control the migratory process. Inevitably, many foreign workers will choose to settle in the country in which they work. Stopping the movement of workers into and out of the country and suspending immigration tends to speed up the process of settlement and increase family and seasonal immigration. The principal lesson for other industrial democracies is that suspending immigration and exporting workers is not an effective way to solve employment problems.
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References
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1. See Charles Kindleberger, Europe's Postwar Growth: The Role of Labor Supply (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 7ff.
2.
2. The distinction between outputs and outcomes is explained in David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley, 1965), pp. 351-352.
3.
3. This point is similar to the argument about distributional conflict made in Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 41-47.
4.
F. G. Castles , “How Does Politics Matter? Structure or Agency in the Determination of Public Policy Outcomes,”European Journal of Political Research, 9:119-132 (1981).
5.
5. On politics and racial conflict in Western Europe, see Gary Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
6.
6. Georges Tapinos, L'immigration étrangère en France (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1973), pp. 14-17.
7.
Wolfgang Franz , “Employment Policy and Labor Supply of Foreign Workers in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,”Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 137:590-611 (1981).
8.
8. Tapinos, L'immigration étrangère en France, pp. 1-10.
9.
9. See Alfred Sauvy, “Besoins et possibilités de l'immigration en France,”Population, 2-3: 209-234 (1950).
10.
10. Industrialization in the nineteenth century did draw immigrants from peripheral areas of central and eastern Europe. See G. Stopler, German Economy, 1870-1940, Issues and Trends (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1940), p. 40.
11.
See also Nikolaus Notter, “Le statut des travailleurs étrangers en Allemagne Fédérale,”Droit social, 4:223-230 (Apr. 1973).
12.
Marie-Claude Henneresse , Le patronat et la politique française d'immigration: 1945-1975, Thèse de 3ème cycle (Paris: Institut d'études politiques, 1978), p. 417.
13.
see also, Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 120-132.
14.
14. Since 1973 and 1974, length-of-residence requirements for obtaining permanent resident status have changed frequently. For a general review of this and other problems associated with foreign-worker programs in Western Europe, see Mark J. Miller and Philip L. Martin, Administering Foreign-Worker Programs (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1982).
15.
15. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Ueberlegungen zu einer vorausschauenden Arbeitsmarktpolitik (Nuremberg: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1978), pp. 75 ff.
16.
16. On the evolution of family immigration and other migrant flows in France and Germany after the suspension, see Georges Tapinos, “Enquête sur les perspectives des migrations à long terme en R.F.A. et en France,”Studi emigrazione, 50:213-245 (June 1978).
17.
17. See Elmar Hönekopp and Hans Ullman, The Effect of Immigration on Social Structures (Nuremberg: Institute for Labor Market Research, 1980). An attempt was also made to limit the development of immigrant enclaves by imposing numerical limits on foreigners living in administratively defined districts (Kreise). However, these limits were in place only for a short period because of the difficulties of enforcement.
18.
18. Admissions to the labor market have been at 40,000 or above annually since 1976, according to statistics from the Ministry of Labor.
19.
Exemptions account for only 14 percent of total worker immigration controlled by the National Immigration Office in 1974 and 1975. See Henneresse, Le patronat et la politique d'immigration, pp. 433-444.
20.
20. See Bruno Courault, Contribution à la théorie de l'offre de travail: Le cas de l'immigration en France, 1946-1978, Thèse d'état (Paris: Université de Paris I, 1980), pp. 300-301.
21.
21. On the Franco-Algerian case, see Miller and Martin, Administering Foreign-Worker Programs, pp. 44-48. The Franco-Algerian accords of 1980 brought renewed cooperation between Algerian and French authorities, primarily on the question of reintegration and retraining of returnees.
22.
22. See André Lebon, “Sur une politique d'aide au retour,”Economie et statistique, 193: 37-46 (July-Aug. 1979).
23.
23. For details of the new policy of the Mitterrand government, see Jean-Pierre Garson and Yann Moulier, Les clandestins et la régularisation de 1981-1982 en France, Working paper (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1982), pp. 18 ff.
24.
24. See Mark Miller, Foreign Workers in Western Europe, An Emerging Political Force (New York: Praeger, 1981), pp. 147-179.
25.
25. Anicet Le Pors, Immigration et développement économique et social (Paris: Documentation française, 1976), pp. 89-136.
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26. Reference here is to the etatist tradition. See Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 71-87.
27.
27. On this point, see, for example, Claus Offe, “The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case,” in Organizing Interests in Western Europe, ed. Suzanne Berger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 123-158.
28.
28. Henneresse, Le patronat et la politique d'immigration, pp. 414-484.
29.
Olivier Villey , “Le redéploiement actuel de la main-d'oeuvre étrangère passé le premier choc de la crise,”Travail et emploi, 8:47-55 (Apr.-May 1981).
30.
30. Unger, Ausländerpolitik in der Bundesrepublik, p. 182.
31.
31. Data from the Ministry of Labor's surveys of foreign workers in France show that foreign employment in the manufacturing sector declined while rising in the service sector; the increase from 1973 to 1976 was 11 percent. In Germany, foreign employment in manufacturing increased by 7 percent from 1978 to 1980. See Winfried Schlaffke and Rüdiger von Voss, eds., Vom Gastarbeiter zum Mitarbeitzer (Cologne: Informedia Verglag-Gmbh, 1982), p. 352.
32.
see also André Vieuguet, Français et immigrés, le combat du P.C.F. (Paris: Editions sociales, 1975).
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33. Miller, Foreign Workers in Western Europe, pp. 149-159.
34.
34. See Unger, Ausländerpolitik in der Bundesrepublik, pp. 180-185.
35.
35. Le rapport Calvez, “La politique de l'immigration,”Avis et rapports du Conseil économique et social, 23 May 1975, 349-375.
36.
36. Data on the foreign population in France are taken from two sources. In the curve in Figure 1, data before 1967 are extrapolated from census data, which tend to underestimate the foreign population. Hence, data before 1967 are discontinuous with data after 1967. The German data are more reliable.
37.
37. Measuring stocks of foreign workers in France is difficult. For a discussion of some of the problems, see Courault, Contribution à la théorie de l'offre de travail, pp. 323 ff. Data for France prior to 1975 in Figure 2 are based on estimates using the Ministry of Labor's foreign-worker surveys. The data after 1975 come from household surveys of the Institute national de la statistique et des études économiques, cited in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SOPEMI.
38.
38. See various reports of the Système d'observation permanente des migrations internationales (SOPEMI). Pierre Bideberry, Le chômage des travailleurs étrangers (Paris: Inspection générale des affaires sociales, 1974).
39.
39. According to the National Immigration Office's statistics, seasonal workers entered at an average annual rate of 122,500 from 1974 to 1980, compared to a rate of 137,000 for the period 1968-73. The average annual rate of immigration of family members went from 70,500 for the period 1968-73 to 50,000 for the period 1974-80.
40.
40. Garson and Moulier, Les clandestins et la régularisation, p. 6.
41.
see also E. Reyneri, La catena migratoria (Bologna: Societa editrice il mulino, 1979).
42.
42. This is due to the lower average age of immigrants. See Tapinos, “Enquête sur les perspectives des migrations à long terme en R.F.A. et en France,” passim.
43.
43. Compared to other nationalities, migrants from the European Economic Community have had little impact on employment or population in either country since the 1960s, but the impact of European migrations on France may be much greater when Spain and Portugal are admitted to the European Economic Community.
44.
44. Estimates of the number of undocumented workers in the United States range from 2 million to 12 million. In Germany in 1975, there were estimated to be 200,000 undocumented workers, and in France the number of foreigners who have taken advantage of the amnesty program is on the order of 100,000.
45.
45. Garson and Moulier, Les clandestins et la régularisation, pp. 36-37.
46.
46. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SOPEMI p. 12.
