Direct rule by Islamic clerics in Iran is an important new phenomenon in Middle Eastern politics. The legitimacy of clerical rule is based on an ideology developed from Shiite thought by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his neofundamentalist followers. This ideology is embodied in the Iranian Constitution, which institutionalizes rule by Islamic clerics. Their sense of legitimacy has been reinforced by Khomeini's commitment to maintaining clerical rule, by his claim to leadership on the basis of a divine calling, and by a monopolization of the interpretation of the sacred law. The principal themes of clerical rule include grandiosity, an insistence on unity, ascription of hostile motives to the actions of other states, a preference for military solutions to political problems, and a belief in ultimate victory. Replication of the Iranian pattern of clerical rule elsewhere in the Middle East will be problematic without the emergence of a figure like Khomeini or the assistance of Iran.
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References
1.
1. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 19.
2.
2. Because Iran was eventually to become the center of Shiism while the Sunni sect came to predominate in the Arab world, an ideological basis was created for Iranian-Arab hostility. Many subsequent historical events, most recently the Iran-Iraq war, have fortified that division and the mutual contempt between Arabs and Iranians. The Islamic Republic of Iran has found that its efforts to lead the Islamic world have been impeded by that mutual hostility. Consequently, it has devoted considerable effort to downplaying the significance of differences with the Arab world. For example, Iran's Majlis Speaker, Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani recently addressed a Tehran conference attended by theologians from Arab countries. He assured his largely Sunni audience that “we consider the Arabic language as one of the noblest in the world and believe that Arab literature is a divine blessing bestowed upon humanity by the almighty. It is the language of the Quran, the Prophet, the Imams, as well as our religion and our history. Our glosses in the libraries are all in Arabic. Our Ulema are now writing in Arabic....So you can see that we are not prejudiced towards the Arabs. On the contrary, we feel sentimental towards them.”Kayhan International, 5 May 1985, p. 1.
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Still others, notably Eliash, argue that the story of Sadiq's delegation of authority does not adequately explain how the mujtahids came to be powerful. He argues that their leadership was not the result of any action taken by Imam Jafar but rather that it was the result of a historical process during which the mujtahids gradually assumed more responsibilities in the community. See Eliash, “The Ithna'ashari Shi'i Juristic Theory of Political and Legal Authority,”Studia Islamica, vol. 29 (1960).
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4. Subsequently there developed the tradition of each of the leading sources of imitation publishing a treatise of his interpretations of proper conduct for his imitators in each area of life, including nearly all aspects of personal conduct. This genre of religious works became highly stylized and there are few differences among the works of the current Shiite sources of imitation. Ayatollah Khomeini's version of this genre has recently been published in English translation; see Ruhollah Khomeini, The Explanation of Problems (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).
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5. It should be noted that keeping open the gate of ijtihad provides the Shiites with the possibility of a progressive, liberal interpretation of Islam reflecting contemporary social conditions.
6.
6. Hamid Algar, “The Role of the Ulema in Twentieth Century Iran,” in Scholars, Saints, and Sufis, ed. Nikki Keddie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 232.
7.
7. See Marvin Zonis, “Iran: A Theory of Revolution from Accounts of the Revolution,”World Politics, 35: 586-660 (1983).
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8. The term “neofundamentalist,” as opposed to “fundamentalist,” is used here because the concept of a fundamentalist refers, in its accepted usage, to an individual who insists upon a literalist interpretation of the Quran. Since in the Shiite religion, however, the full revelation of the word of God is not accessible through the Quran, and will become evident only upon the return of the twelfth imam, Shiism can be seen as intrinsically antithetical to fundamentalism. However, Khomeini's brand of Shiite fundamentalism does share certain major characteristics with Sunni fundamentalism, the most important of which is the urge to reestablish a united, Islamic community founded on authentic rather than foreign values. This emotional impulse toward Islamic unity and authenticity engaged the imagination of both Sunnis and Shiites.
9.
9. Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 117-158.
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10. Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought, p. 46. It is important to note that this generalization concerning Shiite modernism overemphasizes its unanimity. There were, in fact, differences within the modernist school as well. For example, the modernists included such moderates as Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, thinkers with more radical inclinations such as Ayatollah Mutahhari, as well as neo-Marxists, the most important of whom was Dr. Ali Shariati.
11.
11. For a more detailed discussion of the neofundamentalist school in Iran and its victory in that country, see Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, “Interpreting Islam: Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Islam and the Baha'i Faith, ed. Heshmat Moayyad (forthcoming).
12.
12. “Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran,”Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Middle East, FBIS-MEA 29-236, 5(236), supp. 034 (6 Dec. 1979); all excerpts of the Iranian Constitution in this article are from this publication.
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13. The significance of the teacher-student relationship in the triumph of the clerics cannot be overemphasized. It made for ties of deep trust and unshakable loyalty. Ayatollah Mutahhari, for example, was one such Khomeini student and played a crucial role in the revolution while Khomeini was in exile. Mutahhari was assassinated in Tehran on 2 May 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini wept openly at his funeral—he did not do so at the public ceremony commemorating the death of his son—and referred to Mutahhari as “the fruition of my life.”“Mutahhari—Martyr for Islam,”Echo of Islam, p. 1 (June 1979). That Mutahhari was a modernist was not sufficient to overcome the deep ties between him and his former mentor. His death undoubtedly facilitated the victory of the neofundamentalists.
14.
14. The neofundamentalist constitution was won only after considerable political struggle. For a description of the infighting over the formulation and adoption of that document, see Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
15.
15. “Constitution,” p. 4.
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16. While the constitution is not completely clear on this matter, it seems that the members of the Leadership Council, like the leading mujtahid, are to be selected by popular acclamation as well. Moreover, it appears in Principle 20 that the Guidance Council is responsible for arranging for their selection; yet half of the members of the Guidance Council are selected by the Leadership Council! Hence the ulama appoint each other. See Principle 108.
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17. For example, one of the five Shiite sources of imitation—the most revered of the ulama—is reported to have spoken with Ayatollah Khomeini on this point. Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Golpaigani is alleged to have sought an audience to protest the propaganda campaign on behalf of Montazeri and also Montazeri's selection of Friday prayer leaders, who are the senior clerics in Iran's provincial cities and towns. The basis of Golpaigani's argument was that the designation of clerical status should not be controlled from the political system but emanate from the Shiite faithful. See Keyhan(London), 6 Sept. 1984, p. 1.
18.
trans. in Joint Publication Research Service, JPRS-NEA-85-055, 18 Apr. 1985, p. 75.
19.
19. Muhammad al-Ghazali, “Interview,”Alahram al-iqtisadi (Cairo), 11 Feb. 1985, pp. 50-53.
20.
20. Hojatolislam Seyyid Ali Mussawi Khamenei, “The Big Powers Have Established a Global Tyrrany,”Kayhan International, 10 Mar. 1985, p. 6. The implications of his referring to the United States as a female are yet to be analyzed.
21.
21. Ibid.
22.
in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-NEA-84-161, 29 Oct. 1984, p. 93.
23.
in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Middle East, FBIS-MEA-85-040, 28 Feb. 1985, p. D5.
24.
trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS-NEA-85-024, 15 Feb. 1985, p. 62.
