Soviet policy toward the Middle East since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war has been essentially reactive in nature, as Moscow has reacted to events in the region that it neither caused nor had much ability to control. Moscow has benefited from some events, such as the fall of the shah, the formation of an Arab anti-Camp David alignment, and U.S. policy errors in Lebanon. Just as frequently, however, Moscow's position in the Middle East has suffered from regional events, such as the movement of Egypt into the American camp, the outbreak and continuation of the Iran-Iraq war, and the numerous internecine splits in the Arab world. The arms that Moscow has poured into the Middle East have not given Moscow much influence in the region. Thus Moscow could not prevent Egypt's exit from the Soviet camp, the signing of the Camp David agreements, or the reestablishment of relations between Egypt and Jordan. Despite continued efforts, the USSR has been unable to bring about an end to the Iran-Iraq war or the rift between Assad and Arafat, nor has it gained solid support for the various versions of its Arab-Israeli peace plan.
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References
1.
For an Arab viewpoint, see Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); for a Soviet view, see E.M. Primakov, Anatomy of the Middle East Conflict (Moscow: Mysl, 1978).
2.
and Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
3.
3. See Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984).
4.
4. For a view of the role of Israel in Soviet Middle East strategy, see Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, chap. 8.
5.
John K. Cooley , “The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism,”Problems of Communism, 24(2):22-42 (1975); and Arnold Huttinger, “Arab Communism at a Low Ebb,”Problems of Communism, 30(3):17-32 (July-Aug. 1981).
6.
6. For a discussion of the events leading up to the 1 October 1977 joint statement, and for an evaluation of it, see Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, pp. 307-311.
7.
7. In an editorial in 1977 in the Soviet foreign policy weekly New Times it was asserted that “it is no secret that by `real peace' the Tel Aviv expansionists mean the notorious `open borders' between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the `free movement of peoples and goods', and even `cooperation in respect of security'—all of which would make Tel Aviv the center of a huge neo-colonialist `empire' in the Middle East.”New Times, no. 36, p. 1 (1977).
8.
8. These incidents are discussed in Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, pp. 370-371, 399.
9.
and Thomas T. Hammond, Red Flag over Afghanistan (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984).
10.
10. The Steadfastness Front, which initially included Iraq, had come into existence in response to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977.
11.
11. The origins of the war are discussed in Stephen R. Grumman, The Iran-Iraq War, Washington Paper no. 92 (New York: Praeger, 1982).
12.
12. For the text of Brezhnev's statement, see Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970, p. 398.
13.
13. Soviet policy toward Kuwait and Jordan in 1981 is discussed in ibid., pp 403-405.
14.
14. For a detailed discussion of the Soviet reaction to the Israeli invasion, see Robert O. Freedman, “The Soviet Union and the Middle East,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey 1981-82, ed. Colin Legum, Haim Shaked, and Daniel Dishon (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1984), pp. 40-49.
15.
15. The Reagan plan is discussed in Barry Rubin, “The United States and the Middle East,” in Middle East Contemporary Survey, ed. Legum, Shaked, and Dishon, pp. 30-33.
16.
16. Izvestiya, 10 Sept. 1982.
17.
17. For the text of the Fez plan, see Middle East Journal, 37(1):71 (Winter 1983).
18.
18. Pravda, 16 Sept. 1982.
19.
19. Cited in the report by Loren Jenkins, Washington Post, 13 Nov. 1982.
20.
20. Pravda, 13 Jan. 1983.
21.
21. Cited in the report by Thomas L. Friedman, New York Times, 23 Feb. 1983.
22.
22. Pravda, 25 Feb. 1983.
23.
23. Cf. report by Herbert H. Denton, Washington Post, 11 Apr. 1983.
24.
24. Cf. Pravda, 13 Apr. 1983.
25.
25. Moscow's quandry in dealing with the Assad-Arafat conflict is discussed in Robert O. Freedman, “The Soviet Union, Syria and the Crisis in Lebanon: A Preliminary Analysis,” in The Middle East Annual—1983, ed. David H. Partington (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1984), pp. 103-157.
26.
26. These incidents are discussed in detail in ibid.
27.
27. Ibid.
28.
28. Cf. reports by E. J. Dionne, New York Times, 12 Feb. 1984; David Hoffman, Washington Post, 12 Feb. 1984; and idem, Washington Post, 15 Feb. 1984.
29.
29. TASS, 20 Jan. 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union, 23 Jan. 1984, p. H-5.
30.
30. Moscow Television Service, 8 Feb. 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union, 9 Feb. 1984, p. H-6.
31.
31. Baghdad INA (in Arabic), 14 Mar. 1984, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Middle East, 15 Mar. 1984, p. A-2.
32.
32. See the report by David Ottaway, Washington Post, 1 Dec. 1984.
33.
33. The text of King Hussein's interview is in New York Times, 15 Mar. 1984.
34.
34. Cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Middle East, 2 Apr. 1984, p. ii.
35.
35. Numerous Jordanian delegations visited Moscow, and many Soviet delegations visited Jordan, and the Soviet press was full of praise for Jordan's “independent” position.
36.
36. For the text of the peace plan, see Pravda, 30 July 1984; an English translation of the plan may be found in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 36(30):9-10 (1984).
37.
37. Jerusalem Post, 20 Nov. 1984.
38.
38. Cf. report by Konstantin Geyvandov, Izvestiya, 28 Mar. 1985.
