The United States will have to define its concept of engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Will it try to shape this process or will it wait until Arab leaders make enough concessions to interest Israel? The Reagan administration does not view the Arab-Israeli conflict as a serious threat to American interests. It sees no crisis to manage. Instead, it encourages Jordanians and Egyptians to clear the way for direct talks with Israel. In the current prenegotiation period, both sides of the conflict will have to decide to negotiate. This decision will require major changes in the political environment, as well as internal coalition building in support of concessions. Neither side is likely to negotiate unless the United States acts as a catalyst. The Reagan administration is moving toward doing something to stimulate the peace process, but it is reluctant to get out in front until it concludes that its role will be both painless and successful.
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References
1.
1. Michael H. Armacost, “U.S. Diplomacy and the Search for Peace: Address before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, 24 Apr. 1985,”Current Policy, no. 696 (May 1985).
2.
2. Harold H. Saunders, “America and the Middle East,”New Outlook28(4):28 (Apr. 1985), based on a discussion at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, 12 Feb. 1985.
3.
3. Charlotte Saikowski, “U.S. Making Effort to Keep Peace Initiative Alive in Middle East,”Christian Science Monitor, 9 Apr. 1985.
4.
4. Richard W. Murphy, “Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., January 30, 1985,”Current Policy, no. 651 (Feb. 1985).
5.
5. Resolution 242, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on 22 Nov. 1967, “affirms” the need for “a just and lasting peace in the Middle East”; “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict”; and “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” Also asserted are three other requirements: “freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;... a just settlement of the refugee problem;... [and] the territorial inviolatility and political independence of every State in the area.” The resolution also asks for (1) the appointment of “a special representative” to foster relationships with various Middle Eastern countries in order to reach “a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in [the] resolution”; and (2) a report “as soon as possible” by the U.N. secretary-general on the representative's “efforts.” See Christian Science Monitor, 27 Feb. 1985, p. 32.
6.
6. For my views of President Reagan's proposal, see Philip H. Stoddard, “The U.S. Approach Today,” in Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the Principal Actors, ed. Michael C. Hudson (Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984), pp. 175-201.
7.
7. Armacost, “U.S. Diplomacy.”
8.
8. Murphy, “Statement before the Subcommittee.”
9.
9. Ibid.
10.
10. C. Robert Zelnik, “Israel's Unity Government and Peace,”Christian Science Monitor, 6 May 1985.
11.
11. Armacost, “U.S. Diplomacy.”
12.
12. Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, A Framework for Common Action, Amman, 11 Feb. 1985 (Washington, DC: Jordan Information Bureau, 25 Feb. 1985).
13.
13. Mary Curtius, “Jordan and PLO Agree on Team to Negotiate with U.S.,”Christian Science Monitor, 7 May 1985.
14.
14. Bernard Gwertzman, “Shultz Urges a Palestinian Role in Talks,”New York Times, 10 May 1985.
15.
15. Don Oberdorfer, “Shultz Calls Progess on Mideast Talks Slow,”Washington Post, 12 May 1985.
16.
16. Ibid.; see also “Shultz's Reluctant Mission,”Christian Science Monitor, 10 May 1985; “Shultz Treads Lighly to Pull Mideast Factions Together,” ibid.
17.
17. Charlotte Saikowski, “U.S. Awaits Clearer Arab Peace Bid,”Christian Science Monitor, 27 Feb. 1985.
18.
18. Judith Miller, “Mubarak Tries to Jump Start Stalled Mideast Peace Talks,”New York Times, 3 Mar. 1985.
19.
19. Richard W. Murphy, “Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1985,”Current Policy, no. 683, p. 1 (Apr. 1985).
20.
20. David B. Ottaway, “Mubarak Call for Talks Wins Reagan's Praise,”Washington Post, 13 Mar. 1985.
21.
21. Charlotte Saikowski, “U.S. Urges Mubarak to Bring Israel, Jordan to Peace Table,”Christian Science Monitor, 13 Mar. 1985.
22.
22. Mary Curtius, “Despite Failure of Envoy's Trip, U.S. Sticks to Search for Team to Talk with Israel,”Christian Science Monitor, 1 May 1985.
23.
23. George Shultz, “The United States and Israel: Partners for Peace and Freedom,”Current Policy, no. 690, p. 3 (Apr. 1985).
24.
24. David B. Ottaway, “Arab League Conferees Vexed at U.S. Indifference,”Washington Post, 25 Apr. 1985.
25.
25. For example, Butros Ghali, the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, glumly told an interviewer in Jan. 1985 that the conflict ranked fifth on Reagan's list of priorities, even though he thought that the president would like to do something to leave his mark on history. See Christian Science Monitor, 10 Jan. 1985.
26.
26. Charlotte Saikowski, “U.S. Proceeds on Emergency Aid to Israel,”Christian Science Monitor, 3 May 1985.
27.
27. John Newhouse, “A Small Window,”New Yorker, 11 Mar. 1985, p. 117.
28.
28. Ibid., p. 134.
29.
29. Abba Eban, “No Choice but Activism,”Foreign Policy, no. 57, pp. 3-7 (Winter 1984-85).
