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Abstract

China's three demands for normalization of Sino-Soviet relations are not likely to win Soviet compliance. Only a modest reduction of the 480,000 Soviet troops opposite China is possible, but not removal of the 125 SS-20 missiles and 60 Backfire bombers, which have regional and global strategic significance. No Soviet concessions on Afghanistan or Vietnam-Kampuchea are expected. Ideology is no longer an issue between Moscow and Beijing as during Mao's time, but conflicts in national interest deadlock negotiations. Meanwhile, increased Sino-Soviet trade and travel reflect improved state relations. A further improvement could serve U.S. interests in Korea, Indochina, and arms control without jeopardizing U.S. and allied security interests elsewhere. Sino-Soviet relations are, however, basically independent of American influence and should not determine Sino-American relations.

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References

see Dennis J. Doolin , Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1965), p. 44.

2. Consensus of U.S. intelligence analysis, July 1969.

3. Chinese responsibility inferred from Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of the 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” China Quarterly, no. 56 (Oct.-Dec. 1973).

4. For my role as an adviser on this matter, see Seymour M. Hersh , The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House (New York: Summit Books, 1983), pp. 357-359.

5. New York Times, 24 Mar. 1984.

6. New York Times, 30 Jan. 1984.

Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser , War and Peace: The Views From Moscow and Beijing (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1984).

8. Interview with M. S. Kapitsa, 17 June 1978.

9. For a detailed examination, with maps, of this obscure area, see John W. Garver , “The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute in the Pamir Mountains Region,” China Quarterly, no. 85, pp. 107-118 (Mar. 1981).

10.

10. The distribution of Soviet forces may be found in Shigeo Hiramatsu , “A Chinese Perspective on Sino-Soviet Relations,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 2(3):60-62 (Sept. 1983).

11.

11. Mongolian government statement transmitted by Montsame in English, 2 Mar. 1984, in Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, 5 Mar. 1984, p. F1.

12.

12. Garrett and Glaser, chap. 3.

13.

13. Allen S. Whiting , “Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 321-103 (Jan. 1959).

14.

14. For Castro's recent criticism of Soviet behavior, see Ted Szulc , “Friendship Possible, but...,” Parade, 1 Apr. 1984, p. 5.

15.

15. New York Times, 28 Feb. 1982.

16.

16. Helene von Damm , Sincerely, Ronald Reagan (Ottawa, IL: Green Hill, 1976), pp. 75-76, quotes a letter from Reagan to M. Stanton Evans: “Stan, let me suggest something about the China visit that unfortunately the President can't say.... The President, knowing of the disaffection between China and Russia, visits China, butters up the warlords, and lets them be, because they have nothing to fear from us. Russia, therefore, has to keep its 140 [sic] divisions on the Chinese border; hostility between the two is increased; and we buy a little time and elbowroom in a plain, simple strategic move.”

17.

17. Beijing Review, 6 Sept. 1982, p. 5.

18.

18. Ibid., 13 Sept. 1982, p. 33.

19.

19. Garrett and Glaser, pp. 7-12.

20.

20. H. R. Haldeman with Joseph Dimona , The Ends of Power (New York: Times Books, 1978), pp. 93-94.

21.

see also China Policy for the Next Decade: Report on the Atlantic Council's Committee on China Policy (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 1983).

22.

22. For greater detail, see Allen S. Whiting , “Sino-American Relations: The Decade Ahead,” Orbis, 26(3):697-720 (Fall 1982); and idem , “PRC-Taiwan Relations, 1883-93,” SAIS Review, 3(1):131-146 (Winter-Spring, 1983).

Sino-Soviet Relations: What Next?

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