This article examines the economic characteristics, the political environment, and the social effects that have prevailed around the legal casino gaming industry in Nevada in recent years. Important factors that have led to changes in the financing, ownership, and acceptability of the casino industry over the past two decades are examined, as are many of the arguments for and against the legalization of casino gambling in new jurisdictions in the United States. Some comparisons are made between the casino industry found in Nevada and the more regulated Atlantic City industry, and observations are made concerning the possible economic and regulatory framework that may prevail if and when casino gambling is legalized elsewhere in the United States.
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References
1.
1. See, for example, Jerome H. Skolnick, House of Cards: Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1978), chaps. 8-10.
2.
2. For a discussion of the attempts at casino legalization in New Jersey and Florida in the 1970s, see John Dombrink, “Outlaw Businessmen: Organized Crime and the Legalization of Gambling” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1981).
3.
3. See, for example, Estes Kefauver, Crime in America (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1951); Ed Reid and Ovid Demaris, The Green Felt Jungle (New York: Trident Press, 1963); Wallace Turner, Gambler's Money (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Skolnick, House of Cards.
4.
4. William R. Eadington, “The Evolution of Corporate Gambling in Nevada,”Nevada Review of Business and Economics (Spring 1982).
5.
5. Steven Brill, The Teamsters (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978).
6.
6. Between 1979 and 1982, Nevada's real gross gaming revenues actually declined at an average annualized rate of 2.3 percent as compared to a real gross national product that was virtually the same in 1982 as it was in 1979. This slowing was attributable to the recessions of 1980 and 1981-82, as well as to the inroads Atlantic City had made into Las Vegas's eastern U.S. customer base.
7.
7. For performance data on groups of Nevada casinos, see the Nevada Gaming Abstract (Carson City, NV: Gaming Control Board, published annually).
8.
8. William R. Eadington, “Economic Trends in Nevada's Casino Gaming Industry,” in National Tax Association Proceedings (Columbus, OH: National Tax Association-Tax Institute of America, 1978).
9.
9. Donald Bartlett and James Steele, Empire: The Life, Legend, and Madness of Howard Hughes (New York: Norton, 1979), pp. 276-339.
10.
10. Gambling in America (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976).
11.
11. Casino Control Act, Pub. L. No. 1977, c. 110, art. 6.
12.
12. Nevada Gaming Abstract (1982). A “large” casino in Nevada has gross gaming winnings in excess of $10 million per year whereas “small” Nevada casinos gross between $1 million and $10 million per year. The smallest Atlantic City casino grossed $88.9 million in 1982, more than all but a handful of Nevada casinos that year.
13.
13. Ibid.; “Report on Casino Revenues” (Trenton: New Jersey Casino Control Commission, released monthly).
15. See, for example, Bill Weinberger, Jr., “Marketing for the Premium Gaming Customer— Caesars Palace Experience,” in Travel and Tourism Research Association Proceedings (Salt Lake City: Bureau of Business Research, University of Utah, 1981); Harrie F. Ness and Jerry V. Diller, “Motivation for Gambling as Revealed by the Legitimate Gambling Industry,”Psychological Reports (Aug. 1969); Howard J. Klein, “Wynn: Why I Hired Sinatra,”Gaming Business Magazine, Oct. 1983.
16.
16. Uncollectible gaming debts amounted to approximately $116 million in Nevada in fiscal 1982, about 4.5 percent of the gross gaming revenues, and $25.4 million in Atlantic City, 1.7 percent of the total gaming revenues. In Nevada all bad debts are deductible against gross gaming revenues, whereas in Atlantic City bad debts are deductible only up to 4 percent of the total casino win.
17.
17. See, for example, Gerard T. Fulcher, “The Gambling Industry's Responsibilities toward Its Casualties: Compulsive Gamblers,”Gaming Business Magazine, Apr. 1981.
18.
18. Hank Messick, Lansky (New York: Putnam, 1971); Reid and Demaris, Green Felt Jungle; Skolnick, House of Cards.
19.
19. Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling, Gambling in America, p. 78.
20.
20. Jim Drinkhull, “State Gaming Officials Say Millions Vanished from Agent's Slots,”Wall Street Journal, 10 Sept. 1979; Michael J. Goodman, “The Mob Moves West,”Los Angeles Times, 20-28 Feb. 1983.
21.
William R. Eadington and James S. Hattori, “A Legislative History of Gambling in Nevada,”Nevada Review of Business and Economics (Spring 1978).
22.
22. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, State and Metropolitan Area Data Book, 1982 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), apps. 1 and 2.
23.
23. U.S., Department of Justice, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports, 1981 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), app. 6.
24.
24. See, for example, The Gambling Papers: Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Gambling and Risk Taking (Reno: University of Nevada, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 1982).
25.
25. William R. Eadington, “Regulatory Objectives and the Expansion of Casino Gambling,”Nevada Review of Business and Economics (Fall 1982).
26.
26. State of New Jersey, Casino Control Act, Pub. L. No. 1977 c. 110, art. 1.
27.
27. Charles Stansfield, “Atlantic City and the Resort Cycle: Background to the Legalization of Gambling,”Annals of Tourism Research (Apr.-June 1978).
28.
28. For a detailed discussion of the effects of casino development on Atlantic City employment, housing, and other matters, see George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes, The Atlantic City Gamble (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983).
29.
29. Royal Commission on Gambling, Final Report (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1978), pp. 286-314.
