Legal Regulation of Gambling since 1950

Abstract

Prior to 1950, gambling activity was generally prohibited at the federal and state levels. Since that time, a movement has developed to legalize various forms of gambling, first lotteries and more recently casino operations. Federal policies against gambling, supported by Congress's power over interstate commerce, have been principally motivated by a desire to control organized crime. They have been more successful at curtailing certain forms of gambling, chiefly illegal casinos, than they have been at cutting down organized crime itself. State policies toward lotteries have shifted from prohibition to state authorization as a means of raising revenue. Controversial, they appear to be a fixed feature of modern fiscal policy. Long limited to Nevada, casino operations are now found in New Jersey, and they are widely under examination for adoption elsewhere. Organized crime influence in allied services and unions, if not the casinos themselves, remains a serious problem. Reconsideration of fundamental policies toward gambling should take into account their economic, political, social, and moral as well as legal implications.

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References

1. U.S., Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice , The Development of the Law of Gambling: 1776-1976 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976); Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling, Gambling in America (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976).

“Gambling Rage: Out of Control?”

U.S. News and World Report, 30 May 1983, p. 28.

3. G. Robert Blakey and Harold Kurland , “The Development of the Federal Law of Gambling,” Cornell Law Review, 63:923 (Aug. 1978).

4. Theodore J. Wilson , “The Kefauver Committee 1950,” in Congress Investigates: A Documented History 1792-1974, ed. A. Schlesinger, Jr. , and R. Burns (New York: Chelsea House, 1975).

5. Blakey and Kurland, “Development of the Federal Law of Gambling,” pp. 963-64; the reporting provisions, however, have succumbed to selfincrimination objections.

6. 18 U.S.C. § 1952.

7. Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling, Gambling in America, p. 12.

8. 18 U.S.C. § 1171.

9. 18 U.S.C. § 1955.

10.

10. 18 U.S.C. § 1511.

11.

11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.

12.

12. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).

13.

13. Marchetti v. United States, 359 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968).

14.

14. Act of 29 Oct. 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-499, §3,88 Stat. 1549.

15.

15. Pub. L. No. 94-55, 90 Stat. 1520.

16.

16. Commission on the Review of the National Policy toward Gambling, Gambling in America, pp. 17-18.

17.

17. Pub. L. No. 95-515, 92 Stat. 1811.

18.

18. Heide Feebauer , “The Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978: An Evaluation,” Connecticut Law Review, 12:883 (Summer 1980).

19.

19. The Kefauver Committee on Organized Crime (New York: Didier, n.d.), p. 175.

20.

20. Model Anti-Gambling Act (New York: American Bar Association, Commission on Organized Crime, 1952).

21.

21. N.Y. Penal Law §§225.00 to 255.40.

22.

22. Wis. Stat. §§945.01 to 945.12.

23.

23. The classic elements are noted in FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284, 190 (1954).

24.

24. G. Robert Blakey , “State Conducted Lotteries: History, Problems, and Promises,” Journal of Social Issues, 35:62 (1979).

25.

25. New York Times, 29 Dec. 1981.

26.

26. Blakey , “State Conducted Lotteries,” pp. 71-85.

27.

27. Pub. L. No. 1977, c. 110, approved 2 June 1977.

28.

28. In the form that the Resorts International license was approved, it did not result in litigation. For the Caesar's World and Bally licenses see, respectively, In Re Application of Boardwalk Regency Corp., 90 N.J. 361 (1982); In Re Application of Bally's Park Place Inc., (6 Dec. 1982, Sup. Ct. of N.J.) (certification denied).

29.

29. Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders Int'l Local 54 v. Danziger, 709 F. 2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1983), probable jurisdiction noted 104 S. Ct. 479 (1983).