West German Perspectives on Nuclear Armament and Arms Control

Abstract

The NATO decision of 1979 to modernize its nuclear arsenal has prompted an intense and divisive political debate over security policy in the Federal Republic of Germany. The divergence of public opinion reflects uncertainty over the U.S. commitment to European security; uneasiness over the possibility of limited war in Europe and the continuing Soviet deployment of the SS-20; and dissatisfaction with the progress of arms control. These concerns have heightened public attention to all aspects of NATO doctrine, conventional strategy, and arms control. However, despite a shift by the Social Democratic Party in the 1983 electoral campaign on the question of intermediate-range nuclear force modernization and some success by the Green candidates on an antinuclear platform, the prospects for reforging the consensus are encouraging. Chancellor Kohl recognizes the need to reestablish broader public support and will attempt to avoid further deterioration of the consensus, even if U.S.-German relations suffer in the short term. The discussion will probably increase support for a NATO strategy that is less dependent on the nuclear threat but does not forfeit the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

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References

1. The Godesberger Programm was adopted by the Social Democratic Party in 1959; it renounced the earlier Marxist basis of the SPD and former foreign policy objective of military neutrality if necessary to achieve reunification. Kurt Sontheimer and Hans H. Roehring , eds., Handbuch des politischen Systems der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: R. Piper and Co. Verlag, 1978), p. 541.

2. Steven R. Weisman , “Kohl Assures Reagan on U.S. Missiles,” New York Times, 16 Apr. 1983, p. 3.

This study by the Kohl government in fact also showed that 55 percent of the country doubted that the United States and Russia were negotiating seriously. William Drozdiak , “Bonn Parties Wavering on Arms Talks,” International Herald Tribune, 11 Jan. 1983, p. 1.

4. While many in the broader antinuclear movement would accept a NATO with less dependence on nuclear weapons, the Green party would prefer an Austrian-style neutrality to an alliance with the United States (80 percent). Stephen F. Szabo , “Generations and Changing Security Perspectives in West Germany” (Paper, Washington, DC, 1983); see Table 3 based on EMNID survey reported in Spiegel, 1981.

5. “NATO—The Next Thirty Years,” photocopy (Remarks at Palais d'Egmont, Brussels, 1 Sept. 1979).

6. NATO , “Communique of the Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers,” photocopy (Brussels, 12 Dec. 1979).

Manfred Woerner and Peter Wuerzbach , “NATO's New Conventional Option,” Wall Street Journal, 19 Nov. 1982.

8. McGeorge Bundy et al. , “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, 60(4):753-768 (Spring 1982).

9. Karl Kaiser et al. , “Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation: A German Response to No First Use,” Foreign Affairs, 60(5):1157-1170 (Summer 1982).

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10. Nunn , NATO: Can the Alliance Be Saved? p. 25. This is also a later phase in the report by Senator Nunn, which would presuppose a substantial increase in NATO conventional capabilities.

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11. Hedley Bull , “European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO,” Foreign Affairs, 61(4):874-892 (Spring 1983).

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12. Olaf Palme , chairman, Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, rpt. U.N. General Assembly Disarmament Commission, Doc. A/CN.10/38 (8 Apr. 1983).

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13. FRG Ministry of Defense, Weissbuch 1979. Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Entwicklung der Bundeswehr. (Bonn: Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, 1979).

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14. Ibid., p. 13.

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15. The Federal Republic has also been interested in the convening of a Conference on Disarmament in Europe as a means of including the non-Allied European nations such as France. Again their initial proposals have focused on confidence-building measures.

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16. “Speech before the Annual Meeting of the IISS,” Survival, 20(1)2-10 (Jan.-Feb. 1978).

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17. It is interesting and revealing, for instance, that not one of the major U.S. broadcasters mentioned the arms control track in its initial reporting of the 12 December 1979 decision by NATO, and concentrated instead on the modernization track.

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18. If the reports are correct, it was on the advice of Chancellor Kohl that President Reagan modified his original interim proposal, limiting both sides to 100 launchers, no more than 300 warheads, to a proposal in which the Soviets could choose any number between 0 and 572. Walter Pincus, “Arms Talks Positions Hardening,” Washington Post, 1 May 1983, pp. A-1, 4.

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19. German Information Center , “FDP Convention Produces Surprise Results,” The Week in Germany, 4 Feb. 1983, p. 1.